Merge pull request #8272 from daverodgman/iar-warnings
Fix IAR warnings
This commit is contained in:
commit
16e9256fe8
7 changed files with 24 additions and 40 deletions
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@ -131,15 +131,17 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign(mbedtls_mpi *X,
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(X, Y->n));
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mbedtls_ct_condition_t do_assign = mbedtls_ct_bool(assign);
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{
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mbedtls_ct_condition_t do_assign = mbedtls_ct_bool(assign);
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X->s = (int) mbedtls_ct_uint_if(do_assign, Y->s, X->s);
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X->s = (int) mbedtls_ct_uint_if(do_assign, Y->s, X->s);
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mbedtls_mpi_core_cond_assign(X->p, Y->p, Y->n, do_assign);
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mbedtls_mpi_core_cond_assign(X->p, Y->p, Y->n, do_assign);
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mbedtls_ct_condition_t do_not_assign = mbedtls_ct_bool_not(do_assign);
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for (size_t i = Y->n; i < X->n; i++) {
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X->p[i] = mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_if_else_0(do_not_assign, X->p[i]);
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mbedtls_ct_condition_t do_not_assign = mbedtls_ct_bool_not(do_assign);
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for (size_t i = Y->n; i < X->n; i++) {
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X->p[i] = mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_if_else_0(do_not_assign, X->p[i]);
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}
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}
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cleanup:
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@ -386,7 +388,7 @@ static inline mbedtls_mpi_uint mpi_sint_abs(mbedtls_mpi_sint z)
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/* Convert x to a sign, i.e. to 1, if x is positive, or -1, if x is negative.
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* This looks awkward but generates smaller code than (x < 0 ? -1 : 1) */
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#define TO_SIGN(x) ((((mbedtls_mpi_uint) x) >> (biL - 1)) * -2 + 1)
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#define TO_SIGN(x) ((mbedtls_mpi_sint) (((mbedtls_mpi_uint) x) >> (biL - 1)) * -2 + 1)
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/*
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* Set value from integer
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@ -514,9 +514,11 @@ int mbedtls_pk_verify_ext(mbedtls_pk_type_t type, const void *options,
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int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
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const mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options *pss_opts;
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#if SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX
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if (md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && UINT_MAX < hash_len) {
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return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
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}
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#endif
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if (options == NULL) {
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return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
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@ -262,9 +262,11 @@ static int rsa_verify_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
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mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) pk->pk_ctx;
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size_t rsa_len = mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa);
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#if SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX
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if (md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && UINT_MAX < hash_len) {
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return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
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}
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#endif
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if (sig_len < rsa_len) {
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return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED;
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@ -382,9 +384,11 @@ static int rsa_sign_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
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{
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mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) pk->pk_ctx;
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#if SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX
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if (md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && UINT_MAX < hash_len) {
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return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
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}
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#endif
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*sig_len = mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa);
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if (sig_size < *sig_len) {
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@ -1565,9 +1569,11 @@ static int rsa_alt_sign_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
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{
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mbedtls_rsa_alt_context *rsa_alt = pk->pk_ctx;
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#if SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX
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if (UINT_MAX < hash_len) {
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return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
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}
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#endif
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*sig_len = rsa_alt->key_len_func(rsa_alt->key);
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if (*sig_len > MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE) {
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@ -328,9 +328,11 @@ static psa_status_t psa_rsa_decode_md_type(psa_algorithm_t alg,
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/* The Mbed TLS RSA module uses an unsigned int for hash length
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* parameters. Validate that it fits so that we don't risk an
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* overflow later. */
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#if SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX
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if (hash_length > UINT_MAX) {
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return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
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}
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#endif
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/* For signatures using a hash, the hash length must be correct. */
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if (alg != PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW) {
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@ -681,6 +681,7 @@ int mbedtls_sha256_finish(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx,
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int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
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uint32_t used;
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uint32_t high, low;
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int truncated = 0;
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/*
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* Add padding: 0x80 then 0x00 until 8 bytes remain for the length
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@ -728,7 +729,6 @@ int mbedtls_sha256_finish(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx,
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MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(ctx->state[5], output, 20);
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MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(ctx->state[6], output, 24);
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int truncated = 0;
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C)
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truncated = ctx->is224;
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#endif
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@ -828,6 +828,7 @@ int mbedtls_sha512_finish(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx,
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int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
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unsigned used;
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uint64_t high, low;
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int truncated = 0;
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/*
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* Add padding: 0x80 then 0x00 until 16 bytes remain for the length
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@ -874,7 +875,6 @@ int mbedtls_sha512_finish(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx,
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sha512_put_uint64_be(ctx->state[4], output, 32);
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sha512_put_uint64_be(ctx->state[5], output, 40);
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int truncated = 0;
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
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truncated = ctx->is384;
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#endif
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@ -527,9 +527,7 @@ static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash_start(
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size_t key_buffer_size, psa_algorithm_t alg,
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const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length )
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{
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psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
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psa_key_location_t location =
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PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION(
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psa_key_location_t location = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION(
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attributes->core.lifetime );
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switch( location )
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@ -560,18 +558,8 @@ static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash_start(
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default:
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/* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */
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( void ) status;
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return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
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}
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( void ) operation;
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( void ) key_buffer;
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( void ) key_buffer_size;
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( void ) alg;
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( void ) hash;
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( void ) hash_length;
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return( status );
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}
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static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash_complete(
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@ -627,8 +615,6 @@ static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_verify_hash_start(
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const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length,
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const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length )
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{
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psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
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psa_key_location_t location = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION(
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attributes->core.lifetime );
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@ -662,20 +648,8 @@ static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_verify_hash_start(
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default:
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/* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */
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( void ) status;
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return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
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}
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( void ) operation;
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( void ) key_buffer;
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( void ) key_buffer_size;
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( void ) alg;
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( void ) hash;
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( void ) hash_length;
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( void ) signature;
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( void ) signature_length;
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return( status );
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}
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static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_verify_hash_complete(
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@ -2726,6 +2700,7 @@ static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_pake_setup(
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case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE:
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/* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so
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* cycle through all known transparent accelerators */
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status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
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#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT)
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#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST)
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status = mbedtls_test_transparent_pake_setup(
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@ -2743,15 +2718,12 @@ static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_pake_setup(
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inputs );
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if( status == PSA_SUCCESS )
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operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID;
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return status;
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#endif
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return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
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return status;
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/* Add cases for opaque driver here */
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default:
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/* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */
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(void)operation;
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(void)inputs;
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(void)status;
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return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
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}
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}
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