Merge branch 'development' into Remove__CHECK_PARAMS_option

ChangeLog.d/cipher-delayed-output.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+API changes
+   * For multi-part AEAD operations with the cipher module, calling
+     mbedtls_cipher_finish() is now mandatory. Previously the documentation
+     was unclear on this point, and this function happened to never do
+     anything with the currently implemented AEADs, so in practice it was
+     possible to skip calling it, which is no longer supported.

ChangeLog.d/issue4055.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+API changes
+   * The function mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_extension() has an extra parameter
+     which allows to mark an extension as critical. Fixes #4055.

ChangeLog.d/issue4128.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+API changes
+   * The option MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM use pre-computed comb tables
+     instead of computing tables in runtime. Thus, this option now increase
+     code size, and it does not increase RAM usage in runtime anymore.

ChangeLog.d/issue4286.txt

@@ -1,11 +1,10 @@
 Removals
-   * Remove the TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1 and DTLS 1.0 support by removing the following
+   * Remove support for TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1 and DTLS 1.0, as well as support for
-     deprecated library constants: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1,
+     CBC record splitting, fallback SCSV, and the ability to configure
-     MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1, MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING,
+     ciphersuites per version, which are no longer relevant. This removes the
-     MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_ENABLED,
+     configuration options MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1,
-     MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_DISABLED, MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING,
+     MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1, MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING and
-     MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV, MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV_VALUE,
+     MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV as well as the functions
-     MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_FALLBACK, MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_NOT_FALLBACK, and functions:
      mbedtls_ssl_conf_cbc_record_splitting(),
-     mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_ssl_tls(), mbedtls_ssl_conf_fallback().
+     mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_ssl_tls(), mbedtls_ssl_conf_fallback(),
-     Fixes #4286.
+     and mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites_for_version(). Fixes #4286.

ChangeLog.d/issue4335.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+Changes
+   * Replace MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_PADDING_GRANULARITY and
+     MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY with a new single unified option
+     MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY. Fixes #4335.

ChangeLog.d/issue4367.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+Removals
+   * Remove all the 3DES ciphersuites:
+     MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+     MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+     MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+     MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+     MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+     MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+     MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+     MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+     MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA. Remove the
+     MBEDTLS_REMOVE_3DES_CIPHERSUITES option which is no longer relevant.
+     Fixes #4367.

ChangeLog.d/issue4386.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Removals
+   * Remove the MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3 option and let the code
+     behave as if it was always disabled. Fixes #4386.

ChangeLog.d/mpi_random.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Features
+   * The new function mbedtls_mpi_random() generates a random value in a
+     given range uniformly.

ChangeLog.d/random-range.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+Security
+* Fix a bias in the generation of finite-field Diffie-Hellman-Merkle (DHM)
+  private keys and of blinding values for DHM and elliptic curves (ECP)
+  computations. Reported by FlorianF89 in #4245.

ChangeLog.d/relaxed-psk-semantics.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+API changes
+    * Modify semantics of `mbedtls_ssl_conf_[opaque_]psk()`:
+      In Mbed TLS 2.X, the API prescribes that later calls overwrite
+      the effect of earlier calls. In Mbed TLS 3.0, calling
+      `mbedtls_ssl_conf_[opaque_]psk()` more than once will fail,
+      leaving the PSK that was configured first intact.
+      Support for more than one PSK may be added in 3.X.

ChangeLog.d/rm-ecdh-legacy-context-option.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Removals
+   * Remove MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT config option since this was purely for
+     backward compatibility which is no longer supported. Addresses #4404.

docs/3.0-migration-guide.d/Remove_3DES_ciphersuites.md

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+Remove 3DES ciphersuites
+--
+
+This change does not affect users using default settings for 3DES in `config.h`
+because the 3DES ciphersuites were disabled by that.
+
+3DES has weaknesses/limitations and there are better alternatives, and more and
+more standard bodies are recommending against its use in TLS.
+
+The migration path here is to chose from the recomended in literature alternatives.

docs/3.0-migration-guide.d/ccm-alt.md

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+CCM interface changes: impact for alternative implementations
+-------------------------------------------------------------
+
+The CCM interface has changed with the addition of support for
+multi-part operations. Five new API functions have been defined:
+mbedtls_ccm_starts(), mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths(),
+mbedtls_ccm_update_ad(), mbedtls_ccm_update() and mbedtls_ccm_finish().
+Alternative implementations of CCM (`MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT`) have now to
+implement those additional five API functions.

docs/3.0-migration-guide.d/cipher-delayed-output.md

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+Calling `mbedtls_cipher_finish()` is mandatory for all multi-part operations
+----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+This only affects people who use the cipher module to perform AEAD operations
+using the multi-part API.
+
+Previously, the documentation didn't state explicitly if it was OK to call
+`mbedtls_cipher_check_tag()` or `mbedtls_cipher_write_tag()` directly after
+the last call to `mbedtls_cipher_update()` - that is, without calling
+`mbedtls_cipher_finish()` in-between. If you code was missing that call,
+please add it and be prepared to get as much as 15 bytes of output.
+
+Currently the output is always 0 bytes, but it may be more when alternative
+implementations of the underlying primitives are in use, or with future
+versions of the library.

docs/3.0-migration-guide.d/combine_SSL_CID-TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY_options.md

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+Combine the `MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_PADDING_GRANULARITY` and `MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY` options
+--
+
+This change affects users who modified the default `config.h` padding granularity
+settings, i.e. enabled at least one of the options.
+
+The `config.h` options `MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_PADDING_GRANULARITY` and
+`MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY` were combined into one option because
+they used exactly the same padding mechanism and hence their respective padding
+granularities can be used in exactly the same way. This change simplifies the
+code maintenance.
+
+The new single option `MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY` can be used
+for both DTLS-CID and TLS 1.3.

docs/3.0-migration-guide.d/csr-add-critical-extension.md

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+Change the API to allow adding critical extensions to CSRs
+------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+This affects applications that call the `mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_extension`
+function.
+
+The API is changed to include the parameter `critical` which allow to mark an
+extension included in a CSR as critical. To get the previous behaviour pass
+`0`.

docs/3.0-migration-guide.d/modify_MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM_behaviour.md

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+Change MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM behaviour
+------------------------------------------------------
+
+The option `MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM` now increase code size and it does
+not increase peak RAM usage anymore.
+
+If you are limited by code size, you can define `MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM`
+to `0` in your config file. The impact depends on the number and size of
+enabled curves. For example, for P-256 the difference is 1KB; see the documentation
+of this option for details.
+

docs/3.0-migration-guide.d/relaxed-psk-semantics.md

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+Relaxed semantics for PSK configuration
+-----------------------------------------------------------------
+
+This affects users which call the PSK configuration APIs
+`mbedtlsl_ssl_conf_psk()` and `mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque()`
+multiple times on the same SSL configuration.
+
+In Mbed TLS 2.x, users would observe later calls overwriting
+the effect of earlier calls, with the prevailing PSK being
+the one that has been configured last. In Mbed TLS 3.0,
+calling `mbedtls_ssl_conf_[opaque_]psk()` multiple times
+will return an error, leaving the first PSK intact.
+
+To achieve equivalent functionality when migrating to Mbed TLS 3.0,
+users calling `mbedtls_ssl_conf_[opaque_]psk()` multiple times should
+remove all but the last call, so that only one call to _either_
+`mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk()` _or_ `mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque()`
+remains.

docs/3.0-migration-guide.d/remove_supp_for_extensions_in_pre-v3_X_509_certs.md

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+Remove the `MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3` option
+--
+
+This change does not affect users who were using the default configuration, as
+this option was already disabled by default. Also, it does not affect users who
+are working with current V3 X.509 certificates.
+
+Extensions were added in V3 of the X.509 specification, so pre-V3 certificates
+containing extensions were never compliant. Mbed TLS now rejects them with a
+parsing error in all configurations, as it did previously in the default
+configuration.
+
+If you are working with the pre-V3 certificates you need to switch to the
+current ones.

docs/3.0-migration-guide.d/remove_support_for_tls_1.0_1.1_and_dtls_1.0.md

@@ -3,9 +3,25 @@ Remove suport for TLS 1.0, 1.1 and DTLS 1.0
 
 This change affects users of the TLS 1.0, 1.1 and DTLS 1.0 protocols.
 
-The versions of (D)TLS that are being removed are not as secure as the latest
+These versions have been deprecated by RFC 8996.
-versions. Keeping them in the library creates opportunities for misconfiguration
+Keeping them in the library creates opportunities for misconfiguration
 and possibly downgrade attacks. More generally, more code means a larger attack
 surface, even if the code is supposedly not used.
 
 The migration path is to adopt the latest versions of the protocol.
+
+As a consequence of removing TLS 1.0, support for CBC record splitting was
+also removed, as it was a work-around for a weakness in this particular
+version. There is no migration path since the feature is no longer relevant.
+
+As a consequence of currently supporting only one version of (D)TLS (and in the
+future 1.3 which will have a different version negociation mechanism), support
+for fallback SCSV (RFC 7507) was also removed. There is no migration path as
+it's no longer useful with TLS 1.2 and later.
+
+As a consequence of currently supporting only one version of (D)TLS (and in the
+future 1.3 which will have a different concept of ciphersuites), support for
+configuring ciphersuites separately for each version via
+`mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites_for_version()` was removed. Use
+`mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites()` to configure ciphersuites to use with (D)TLS
+1.2; in the future a different API will be added for (D)TLS 1.3.

include/mbedtls/bignum.h

@@ -871,6 +871,44 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t size,
                      int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
                      void *p_rng );
 
+/** Generate a random number uniformly in a range.
+ *
+ * This function generates a random number between \p min inclusive and
+ * \p N exclusive.
+ *
+ * The procedure complies with RFC 6979 §3.3 (deterministic ECDSA)
+ * when the RNG is a suitably parametrized instance of HMAC_DRBG
+ * and \p min is \c 1.
+ *
+ * \note           There are `N - min` possible outputs. The lower bound
+ *                 \p min can be reached, but the upper bound \p N cannot.
+ *
+ * \param X        The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI.
+ * \param min      The minimum value to return.
+ *                 It must be nonnegative.
+ * \param N        The upper bound of the range, exclusive.
+ *                 In other words, this is one plus the maximum value to return.
+ *                 \p N must be strictly larger than \p min.
+ * \param f_rng    The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL.
+ * \param p_rng    The RNG parameter to be passed to \p f_rng.
+ *
+ * \return         \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return         #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed.
+ * \return         #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p min or \p N is invalid
+ *                 or if they are incompatible.
+ * \return         #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE if the implementation was
+ *                 unable to find a suitable value within a limited number
+ *                 of attempts. This has a negligible probability if \p N
+ *                 is significantly larger than \p min, which is the case
+ *                 for all usual cryptographic applications.
+ * \return         Another negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_random( mbedtls_mpi *X,
+                        mbedtls_mpi_sint min,
+                        const mbedtls_mpi *N,
+                        int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+                        void *p_rng );
+
 /**
  * \brief          Compute the greatest common divisor: G = gcd(A, B)
  *

include/mbedtls/ccm.h

@@ -55,6 +55,11 @@
 
 #include "mbedtls/cipher.h"
 
+#define MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT       0
+#define MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT       1
+#define MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT  2
+#define MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT  3
+
 #define MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT       -0x000D /**< Bad input parameters to the function. */
 #define MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED     -0x000F /**< Authenticated decryption failed. */
 
@@ -133,10 +138,10 @@ void mbedtls_ccm_free( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx );
  * \param iv_len    The length of the nonce in Bytes: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12,
  *                  or 13. The length L of the message length field is
  *                  15 - \p iv_len.
- * \param add       The additional data field. If \p add_len is greater than
+ * \param ad        The additional data field. If \p ad_len is greater than
- *                  zero, \p add must be a readable buffer of at least that
+ *                  zero, \p ad must be a readable buffer of at least that
  *                  length.
- * \param add_len   The length of additional data in Bytes.
+ * \param ad_len    The length of additional data in Bytes.
  *                  This must be less than `2^16 - 2^8`.
  * \param input     The buffer holding the input data. If \p length is greater
  *                  than zero, \p input must be a readable buffer of at least
@@ -154,7 +159,7 @@ void mbedtls_ccm_free( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx );
  */
 int mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length,
                          const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len,
-                         const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len,
+                         const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len,
                          const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output,
                          unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len );
 
@@ -179,9 +184,9 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length,
  * \param iv_len    The length of the nonce in Bytes: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12,
  *                  or 13. The length L of the message length field is
  *                  15 - \p iv_len.
- * \param add       The additional data field. This must be a readable buffer of
+ * \param ad        The additional data field. This must be a readable buffer of
- *                  at least \p add_len Bytes.
+ *                  at least \p ad_len Bytes.
- * \param add_len   The length of additional data in Bytes.
+ * \param ad_len    The length of additional data in Bytes.
  *                  This must be less than 2^16 - 2^8.
  * \param input     The buffer holding the input data. If \p length is greater
  *                  than zero, \p input must be a readable buffer of at least
@@ -202,7 +207,7 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length,
  */
 int mbedtls_ccm_star_encrypt_and_tag( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length,
                          const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len,
-                         const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len,
+                         const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len,
                          const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output,
                          unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len );
 
@@ -218,9 +223,9 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_star_encrypt_and_tag( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length,
  * \param iv_len    The length of the nonce in Bytes: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12,
  *                  or 13. The length L of the message length field is
  *                  15 - \p iv_len.
- * \param add       The additional data field. This must be a readable buffer
+ * \param ad        The additional data field. This must be a readable buffer
- *                  of at least that \p add_len Bytes..
+ *                  of at least that \p ad_len Bytes..
- * \param add_len   The length of additional data in Bytes.
+ * \param ad_len    The length of additional data in Bytes.
  *                  This must be less than 2^16 - 2^8.
  * \param input     The buffer holding the input data. If \p length is greater
  *                  than zero, \p input must be a readable buffer of at least
@@ -239,7 +244,7 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_star_encrypt_and_tag( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length,
  */
 int mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length,
                       const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len,
-                      const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len,
+                      const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len,
                       const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output,
                       const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len );
 
@@ -260,9 +265,9 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length,
  * \param iv_len    The length of the nonce in Bytes: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12,
  *                  or 13. The length L of the message length field is
  *                  15 - \p iv_len.
- * \param add       The additional data field. This must be a readable buffer of
+ * \param ad        The additional data field. This must be a readable buffer of
- *                  at least that \p add_len Bytes.
+ *                  at least that \p ad_len Bytes.
- * \param add_len   The length of additional data in Bytes.
+ * \param ad_len    The length of additional data in Bytes.
  *                  This must be less than 2^16 - 2^8.
  * \param input     The buffer holding the input data. If \p length is greater
  *                  than zero, \p input must be a readable buffer of at least
@@ -284,10 +289,208 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length,
  */
 int mbedtls_ccm_star_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length,
                       const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len,
-                      const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len,
+                      const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len,
                       const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output,
                       const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len );
 
+/**
+ * \brief           This function starts a CCM encryption or decryption
+ *                  operation.
+ *
+ *                  This function and mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths() must be called
+ *                  before calling mbedtls_ccm_update_ad() or
+ *                  mbedtls_ccm_update(). This function can be called before
+ *                  or after mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths().
+ *
+ * \note            This function is not implemented in Mbed TLS yet.
+ *
+ * \param ctx       The CCM context. This must be initialized.
+ * \param mode      The operation to perform: #MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT or
+ *                  #MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT or #MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT or
+ *                  #MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT.
+ * \param iv        The initialization vector. This must be a readable buffer
+ *                  of at least \p iv_len Bytes.
+ * \param iv_len    The length of the nonce in Bytes: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12,
+ *                  or 13. The length L of the message length field is
+ *                  15 - \p iv_len.
+ *
+ * \return          \c 0 on success.
+ * \return          #MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT on failure:
+ *                  \p ctx is in an invalid state,
+ *                  \p mode is invalid,
+ *                  \p iv_len is invalid (lower than \c 7 or greater than
+ *                  \c 13).
+ */
+int mbedtls_ccm_starts( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx,
+                        int mode,
+                        const unsigned char *iv,
+                        size_t iv_len );
+
+/**
+ * \brief           This function declares the lengths of the message
+ *                  and additional data for a CCM encryption or decryption
+ *                  operation.
+ *
+ *                  This function and mbedtls_ccm_starts() must be called
+ *                  before calling mbedtls_ccm_update_ad() or
+ *                  mbedtls_ccm_update(). This function can be called before
+ *                  or after mbedtls_ccm_starts().
+ *
+ * \note            This function is not implemented in Mbed TLS yet.
+ *
+ * \param ctx       The CCM context. This must be initialized.
+ * \param total_ad_len   The total length of additional data in bytes.
+ *                       This must be less than `2^16 - 2^8`.
+ * \param plaintext_len  The length in bytes of the plaintext to encrypt or
+ *                       result of the decryption (thus not encompassing the
+ *                       additional data that are not encrypted).
+ *
+ * \return          \c 0 on success.
+ * \return          #MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT on failure:
+ *                  \p ctx is in an invalid state,
+ *                  \p total_ad_len is greater than \c 0xFF00.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx,
+                             size_t total_ad_len,
+                             size_t plaintext_len );
+
+/**
+ * \brief           This function feeds an input buffer as associated data
+ *                  (authenticated but not encrypted data) in a CCM
+ *                  encryption or decryption operation.
+ *
+ *                  You may call this function zero, one or more times
+ *                  to pass successive parts of the additional data. The
+ *                  lengths \p ad_len of the data parts should eventually add
+ *                  up exactly to the total length of additional data
+ *                  \c total_ad_len passed to mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths(). You
+ *                  may not call this function after calling
+ *                  mbedtls_ccm_update().
+ *
+ * \note            This function is not implemented in Mbed TLS yet.
+ *
+ * \param ctx       The CCM context. This must have been started with
+ *                  mbedtls_ccm_starts(), the lengths of the message and
+ *                  additional data must have been declared with
+ *                  mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths() and this must not have yet
+ *                  received any input with mbedtls_ccm_update().
+ * \param ad        The buffer holding the additional data, or \c NULL
+ *                  if \p ad_len is \c 0.
+ * \param ad_len    The length of the additional data. If \c 0,
+ *                  \p ad may be \c NULL.
+ *
+ * \return          \c 0 on success.
+ * \return          #MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT on failure:
+ *                  \p ctx is in an invalid state,
+ *                  total input length too long.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ccm_update_ad( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx,
+                           const unsigned char *ad,
+                           size_t ad_len );
+
+/**
+ * \brief           This function feeds an input buffer into an ongoing CCM
+ *                  encryption or decryption operation.
+ *
+ *                  You may call this function zero, one or more times
+ *                  to pass successive parts of the input: the plaintext to
+ *                  encrypt, or the ciphertext (not including the tag) to
+ *                  decrypt. After the last part of the input, call
+ *                  mbedtls_ccm_finish(). The lengths \p input_len of the
+ *                  data parts should eventually add up exactly to the
+ *                  plaintext length \c plaintext_len passed to
+ *                  mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths().
+ *
+ *                  This function may produce output in one of the following
+ *                  ways:
+ *                  - Immediate output: the output length is always equal
+ *                    to the input length.
+ *                  - Buffered output: except for the last part of input data,
+ *                    the output consists of a whole number of 16-byte blocks.
+ *                    If the total input length so far (not including
+ *                    associated data) is 16 \* *B* + *A* with *A* < 16 then
+ *                    the total output length is 16 \* *B*.
+ *                    For the last part of input data, the output length is
+ *                    equal to the input length plus the number of bytes (*A*)
+ *                    buffered in the previous call to the function (if any).
+ *                    The function uses the plaintext length
+ *                    \c plaintext_len passed to mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths()
+ *                    to detect the last part of input data.
+ *
+ *                  In particular:
+ *                  - It is always correct to call this function with
+ *                    \p output_size >= \p input_len + 15.
+ *                  - If \p input_len is a multiple of 16 for all the calls
+ *                    to this function during an operation (not necessary for
+ *                    the last one) then it is correct to use \p output_size
+ *                    =\p input_len.
+ *
+ * \note            This function is not implemented in Mbed TLS yet.
+ *
+ * \param ctx           The CCM context. This must have been started with
+ *                      mbedtls_ccm_starts() and the lengths of the message and
+ *                      additional data must have been declared with
+ *                      mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths().
+ * \param input         The buffer holding the input data. If \p input_len
+ *                      is greater than zero, this must be a readable buffer
+ *                      of at least \p input_len bytes.
+ * \param input_len     The length of the input data in bytes.
+ * \param output        The buffer for the output data. If \p output_size
+ *                      is greater than zero, this must be a writable buffer of
+ *                      at least \p output_size bytes.
+ * \param output_size   The size of the output buffer in bytes.
+ *                      See the function description regarding the output size.
+ * \param output_len    On success, \p *output_len contains the actual
+ *                      length of the output written in \p output.
+ *                      On failure, the content of \p *output_len is
+ *                      unspecified.
+ *
+ * \return         \c 0 on success.
+ * \return         #MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT on failure:
+ *                 \p ctx is in an invalid state,
+ *                 total input length too long,
+ *                 or \p output_size too small.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ccm_update( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx,
+                        const unsigned char *input, size_t input_len,
+                        unsigned char *output, size_t output_size,
+                        size_t *output_len );
+
+/**
+ * \brief           This function finishes the CCM operation and generates
+ *                  the authentication tag.
+ *
+ *                  It wraps up the CCM stream, and generates the
+ *                  tag. The tag can have a maximum length of 16 Bytes.
+ *
+ * \note            This function is not implemented in Mbed TLS yet.
+ *
+ * \param ctx       The CCM context. This must have been started with
+ *                  mbedtls_ccm_starts() and the lengths of the message and
+ *                  additional data must have been declared with
+ *                  mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths().
+ * \param tag       The buffer for holding the tag. If \p tag_len is greater
+ *                  than zero, this must be a writable buffer of at least \p
+ *                  tag_len Bytes.
+ * \param tag_len   The length of the tag to generate in Bytes:
+ *                  4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14 or 16.
+ *                  For CCM*, zero is also valid.
+ *
+ * \return          \c 0 on success.
+ * \return          #MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT on failure:
+ *                  \p ctx is in an invalid state,
+ *                  invalid value of \p tag_len,
+ *                  the total amount of additional data passed to
+ *                  mbedtls_ccm_update_ad() was lower than the total length of
+ *                  additional data \c total_ad_len passed to
+ *                  mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths(),
+ *                  the total amount of input data passed to
+ *                  mbedtls_ccm_update() was lower than the plaintext length
+ *                  \c plaintext_len passed to mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths().
+ */
+int mbedtls_ccm_finish( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx,
+                        unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len );
+
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
 /**
  * \brief          The CCM checkup routine.

include/mbedtls/check_config.h

@@ -130,16 +130,6 @@
 #error "MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE defined, but it cannot coexist with an alternative or PSA-based ECP implementation"
 #endif
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)           && \
-    ! defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT)
-#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE defined, but not MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT"
-#endif
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED)           && \
-    defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT)
-#error "MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED defined, but MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT not disabled"
-#endif
-
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) && !defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C)
 #error "MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC defined, but not all prerequisites"
 #endif
@@ -840,6 +830,14 @@
 #error "MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS was removed in Mbed TLS 3.0. See https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/issues/4313"
 #endif
 
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_PADDING_GRANULARITY) //no-check-names
+#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_PADDING_GRANULARITY was removed in Mbed TLS 3.0. See https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/issues/4335"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY) //no-check-names
+#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY was removed in Mbed TLS 3.0. See https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/issues/4335"
+#endif
+
 /*
  * Avoid warning from -pedantic. This is a convenient place for this
  * workaround since this is included by every single file before the

include/mbedtls/cipher.h

@@ -437,10 +437,23 @@ void mbedtls_cipher_free( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx );
 
 
 /**
- * \brief               This function initializes a cipher context for
+ * \brief               This function prepares a cipher context for
  *                      use with the given cipher primitive.
  *
- * \param ctx           The context to initialize. This must be initialized.
+ * \note                After calling this function, you should call
+ *                      mbedtls_cipher_setkey() and, if the mode uses padding,
+ *                      mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode(), then for each
+ *                      message to encrypt or decrypt with this key, either:
+ *                      - mbedtls_cipher_crypt() for one-shot processing with
+ *                      non-AEAD modes;
+ *                      - mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext() or
+ *                      mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext() for one-shot
+ *                      processing with AEAD modes or NIST_KW;
+ *                      - for multi-part processing, see the documentation of
+ *                      mbedtls_cipher_reset().
+ *
+ * \param ctx           The context to prepare. This must be initialized by
+ *                      a call to mbedtls_cipher_init() first.
  * \param cipher_info   The cipher to use.
  *
  * \return              \c 0 on success.
@@ -448,10 +461,6 @@ void mbedtls_cipher_free( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx );
  *                      parameter-verification failure.
  * \return              #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED if allocation of the
  *                      cipher-specific context fails.
- *
- * \internal Currently, the function also clears the structure.
- * In future versions, the caller will be required to call
- * mbedtls_cipher_init() on the structure first.
  */
 int mbedtls_cipher_setup( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
                           const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info );
@@ -687,7 +696,30 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_set_iv( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
 /**
  * \brief         This function resets the cipher state.
  *
- * \param ctx     The generic cipher context. This must be initialized.
+ * \note          With non-AEAD ciphers, the order of calls for each message
+ *                is as follows:
+ *                1. mbedtls_cipher_set_iv() if the mode uses an IV/nonce.
+ *                2. mbedtls_cipher_reset()
+ *                3. mbedtls_cipher_update() one or more times
+ *                4. mbedtls_cipher_finish()
+ *                .
+ *                This sequence can be repeated to encrypt or decrypt multiple
+ *                messages with the same key.
+ *
+ * \note          With AEAD ciphers, the order of calls for each message
+ *                is as follows:
+ *                1. mbedtls_cipher_set_iv() if the mode uses an IV/nonce.
+ *                2. mbedtls_cipher_reset()
+ *                3. mbedtls_cipher_update_ad()
+ *                4. mbedtls_cipher_update() one or more times
+ *                5. mbedtls_cipher_finish()
+ *                6. mbedtls_cipher_check_tag() (for decryption) or
+ *                mbedtls_cipher_write_tag() (for encryption).
+ *                .
+ *                This sequence can be repeated to encrypt or decrypt multiple
+ *                messages with the same key.
+ *
+ * \param ctx     The generic cipher context. This must be bound to a key.
  *
  * \return        \c 0 on success.
  * \return        #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA on

include/mbedtls/config.h

@@ -616,26 +616,6 @@
  */
 //#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY
 
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_REMOVE_3DES_CIPHERSUITES
- *
- * Remove 3DES ciphersuites by default in SSL / TLS.
- * This flag removes the ciphersuites based on 3DES from the default list as
- * returned by mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites(). However, it is still possible
- * to enable (some of) them with mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites() by including
- * them explicitly.
- *
- * A man-in-the-browser attacker can recover authentication tokens sent through
- * a TLS connection using a 3DES based cipher suite (see "On the Practical
- * (In-)Security of 64-bit Block Ciphers" by Karthikeyan Bhargavan and Gaëtan
- * Leurent, see https://sweet32.info/SWEET32_CCS16.pdf). If this attack falls
- * in your threat model or you are unsure, then you should keep this option
- * enabled to remove 3DES based cipher suites.
- *
- * Comment this macro to keep 3DES in the default ciphersuite list.
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_REMOVE_3DES_CIPHERSUITES
-
 /**
  * \def MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED
  *
@@ -713,39 +693,10 @@
  *
  * \note  This option only works with the default software implementation of
  *        elliptic curve functionality. It is incompatible with
- *        MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT, MBEDTLS_ECDH_XXX_ALT, MBEDTLS_ECDSA_XXX_ALT
+ *        MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT, MBEDTLS_ECDH_XXX_ALT, MBEDTLS_ECDSA_XXX_ALT.
- *        and MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT.
  */
 //#define MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE
 
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT
- *
- * Use a backward compatible ECDH context.
- *
- * Mbed TLS supports two formats for ECDH contexts (#mbedtls_ecdh_context
- * defined in `ecdh.h`). For most applications, the choice of format makes
- * no difference, since all library functions can work with either format,
- * except that the new format is incompatible with MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE.
-
- * The new format used when this option is disabled is smaller
- * (56 bytes on a 32-bit platform). In future versions of the library, it
- * will support alternative implementations of ECDH operations.
- * The new format is incompatible with applications that access
- * context fields directly and with restartable ECP operations.
- *
- * Define this macro if you enable MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE or if you
- * want to access ECDH context fields directly. Otherwise you should
- * comment out this macro definition.
- *
- * This option has no effect if #MBEDTLS_ECDH_C is not enabled.
- *
- * \note This configuration option is experimental. Future versions of the
- *       library may modify the way the ECDH context layout is configured
- *       and may modify the layout of the new context type.
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT
-
 /**
  * \def MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC
  *
@@ -777,7 +728,6 @@
  *      MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
  *      MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256
  *      MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
- *      MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
  */
 #define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED
 
@@ -800,7 +750,6 @@
  *      MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
  *      MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256
  *      MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
- *      MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
  *
  * \warning    Using DHE constitutes a security risk as it
  *             is not possible to validate custom DH parameters.
@@ -826,7 +775,6 @@
  *      MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
  *      MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
  *      MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
- *      MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
  */
 #define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED
 
@@ -850,7 +798,6 @@
  *      MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
  *      MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256
  *      MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
- *      MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
  */
 #define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED
 
@@ -876,7 +823,6 @@
  *      MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256
  *      MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
  *      MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA
- *      MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
  */
 #define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED
 
@@ -902,7 +848,6 @@
  *      MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256
  *      MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
  *      MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA
- *      MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
  *
  * \warning    Using DHE constitutes a security risk as it
  *             is not possible to validate custom DH parameters.
@@ -933,7 +878,6 @@
  *      MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
  *      MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256
  *      MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
- *      MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
  */
 #define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED
 
@@ -956,7 +900,6 @@
  *      MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
  *      MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256
  *      MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
- *      MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
  */
 #define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED
 
@@ -969,7 +912,6 @@
  *
  * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are
  * enabled as well):
- *      MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
  *      MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
  *      MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
  *      MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
@@ -992,7 +934,6 @@
  *
  * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are
  * enabled as well):
- *      MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
  *      MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
  *      MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
  *      MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
@@ -1872,16 +1813,6 @@
  */
 #define MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES
 
-/**
- * \def MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3
- *
- * If set, the X509 parser will not break-off when parsing an X509 certificate
- * and encountering an extension in a v1 or v2 certificate.
- *
- * Uncomment to prevent an error.
- */
-//#define MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3
-
 /**
  * \def MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION
  *
@@ -2356,19 +2287,6 @@
  * Caller:  library/pem.c
  *          library/cipher.c
  *
- * This module enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are
- * enabled as well):
- *      MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
- *      MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
- *      MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
- *      MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
- *      MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
- *      MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
- *      MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
- *      MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
- *      MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
- *      MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
- *
  * PEM_PARSE uses DES/3DES for decrypting encrypted keys.
  *
  * \warning   DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a
@@ -3384,27 +3302,10 @@
  */
 //#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX 32
 
-/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_PADDING_GRANULARITY
+/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY
  *
  * This option controls the use of record plaintext padding
- * when using the Connection ID extension in DTLS 1.2.
+ * in TLS 1.3 and when using the Connection ID extension in DTLS 1.2.
- *
- * The padding will always be chosen so that the length of the
- * padded plaintext is a multiple of the value of this option.
- *
- * Note: A value of \c 1 means that no padding will be used
- *       for outgoing records.
- *
- * Note: On systems lacking division instructions,
- *       a power of two should be preferred.
- *
- */
-//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_PADDING_GRANULARITY 16
-
-/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY
- *
- * This option controls the use of record plaintext padding
- * in TLS 1.3.
  *
  * The padding will always be chosen so that the length of the
  * padded plaintext is a multiple of the value of this option.
@@ -3415,7 +3316,7 @@
  * Note: On systems lacking division instructions,
  *       a power of two should be preferred.
  */
-//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY 1
+//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY 16
 
 /** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN
  *

include/mbedtls/config_psa.h

@@ -38,6 +38,30 @@
 extern "C" {
 #endif
 
+
+
+/****************************************************************/
+/* De facto synonyms */
+/****************************************************************/
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY) && !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA)
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY
+#elif !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA)
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA
+#endif
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW) && !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN)
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW
+#elif !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN)
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN
+#endif
+
+
+
+/****************************************************************/
+/* Require built-in implementations based on PSA requirements */
+/****************************************************************/
+
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG)
 
 #if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA)
@@ -497,6 +521,12 @@ extern "C" {
 #endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_K1_256 */
 #endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 */
 
+
+
+/****************************************************************/
+/* Infer PSA requirements from Mbed TLS capabilities */
+/****************************************************************/
+
 #else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG */
 
 /*
@@ -522,6 +552,7 @@ extern "C" {
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
 #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA 1
 #define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY 1
 
 // Only add in DETERMINISTIC support if ECDSA is also enabled
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
@@ -586,6 +617,7 @@ extern "C" {
 #define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT 1
 #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN 1
 #define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW 1
 #endif /* MBEDTLSS_PKCS1_V15 */
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
 #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP 1

include/mbedtls/ecdh.h

@@ -40,6 +40,25 @@
 
 #include "mbedtls/ecp.h"
 
+/*
+ * Mbed TLS supports two formats for ECDH contexts (#mbedtls_ecdh_context
+ * defined in `ecdh.h`). For most applications, the choice of format makes
+ * no difference, since all library functions can work with either format,
+ * except that the new format is incompatible with MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE.
+
+ * The new format used when this option is disabled is smaller
+ * (56 bytes on a 32-bit platform). In future versions of the library, it
+ * will support alternative implementations of ECDH operations.
+ * The new format is incompatible with applications that access
+ * context fields directly and with restartable ECP operations.
+ */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+#define MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT
+#else
+#undef MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT
+#endif
+
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED)
 #undef MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT
 #include "everest/everest.h"

include/mbedtls/ecp.h

@@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_ecp_group
     int (*t_post)(mbedtls_ecp_point *, void *); /*!< Unused. */
     void *t_data;               /*!< Unused. */
     mbedtls_ecp_point *T;       /*!< Pre-computed points for ecp_mul_comb(). */
-    size_t T_size;              /*!< The number of pre-computed points. */
+    size_t T_size;              /*!< The number of dynamic allocated pre-computed points. */
 }
 mbedtls_ecp_group;
 
@@ -276,15 +276,16 @@ mbedtls_ecp_group;
 
 #if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM)
 /*
- * Trade memory for speed on fixed-point multiplication.
+ * Trade code size for speed on fixed-point multiplication.
  *
  * This speeds up repeated multiplication of the generator (that is, the
  * multiplication in ECDSA signatures, and half of the multiplications in
  * ECDSA verification and ECDHE) by a factor roughly 3 to 4.
  *
- * The cost is increasing EC peak memory usage by a factor roughly 2.
+ * For each n-bit Short Weierstrass curve that is enabled, this adds 4n bytes
+ * of code size if n < 384 and 8n otherwise.
  *
- * Change this value to 0 to reduce peak memory usage.
+ * Change this value to 0 to reduce code size.
  */
 #define MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM  1   /**< Enable fixed-point speed-up. */
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM */

include/mbedtls/oid.h

@@ -145,6 +145,7 @@
 #define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_DN_QUALIFIER             MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x2E" /**< id-at-dnQualifier AttributeType:= {id-at 46} */
 #define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_PSEUDONYM                MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x41" /**< id-at-pseudonym AttributeType:= {id-at 65} */
 
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_UID                         "\x09\x92\x26\x89\x93\xF2\x2C\x64\x01\x01" /** id-domainComponent AttributeType:= {itu-t(0) data(9) pss(2342) ucl(19200300) pilot(100) pilotAttributeType(1) uid(1)} */
 #define MBEDTLS_OID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT            "\x09\x92\x26\x89\x93\xF2\x2C\x64\x01\x19" /** id-domainComponent AttributeType:= {itu-t(0) data(9) pss(2342) ucl(19200300) pilot(100) pilotAttributeType(1) domainComponent(25)} */
 
 /*

include/mbedtls/ssl.h

@@ -125,14 +125,10 @@
  */
 
 /* These are the high an low bytes of ProtocolVersion as defined by:
- * - RFC 2246: ProtocolVersion version = { 3, 1 };     // TLS v1.0
- * - RFC 4346: ProtocolVersion version = { 3, 2 };     // TLS v1.1
  * - RFC 5246: ProtocolVersion version = { 3, 3 };     // TLS v1.2
  * - RFC 8446: see section 4.2.1
  */
 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3             3
-#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1             1   /*!< TLS v1.0 deprecated */
-#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2             2   /*!< TLS v1.1 deprecated */
 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3             3   /*!< TLS v1.2 */
 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4             4   /*!< TLS v1.3 (experimental) */
 
@@ -257,12 +253,8 @@
 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX         32
 #endif
 
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_PADDING_GRANULARITY)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY)
-#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_PADDING_GRANULARITY 16
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY 16
-#endif
-
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY)
-#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY 1
 #endif
 
 /* \} name SECTION: Module settings */
@@ -980,10 +972,8 @@ struct mbedtls_ssl_config
      * Pointers
      */
 
-    /** Allowed ciphersuites per version. To access list's elements, please use
+    /** Allowed ciphersuites for (D)TLS 1.2 (0-terminated)                  */
-     *  \c mbedtls_ssl_get_protocol_version_ciphersuites
+    const int *ciphersuite_list;
-     */
-    const int *ciphersuite_list[3];
 
     /** Callback for printing debug output                                  */
     void (*f_dbg)(void *, int, const char *, int, const char *);
@@ -2512,17 +2502,6 @@ const mbedtls_ssl_session *mbedtls_ssl_get_session_pointer( const mbedtls_ssl_co
 void mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
                                    const int *ciphersuites );
 
-/**
- * \brief               Get ciphersuite for given protocol's minor version.
- *
- * \param conf          The SSL configuration.
- * \param prot_version  Protocol version. One of MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_x macros.
- * \return              Ciphersuites pointer if successful.
- * \return              \c NULL if no ciphersuites where found.
- */
-const int *mbedtls_ssl_get_protocol_version_ciphersuites(
-    const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int prot_version );
-
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID_IGNORE 0
 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID_FAIL   1
@@ -2562,27 +2541,6 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, size_t len,
                           int ignore_other_cids );
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
 
-/**
- * \brief               Set the list of allowed ciphersuites and the
- *                      preference order for a specific version of the protocol.
- *                      (Only useful on the server side)
- *
- *                      The ciphersuites array is not copied, and must remain
- *                      valid for the lifetime of the ssl_config.
- *
- * \param conf          SSL configuration
- * \param ciphersuites  0-terminated list of allowed ciphersuites
- * \param major         Major version number (only MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3
- *                      supported)
- * \param minor         Minor version number (only MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3
- *                      supported)
- *
- * \note                With DTLS, use MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 for DTLS 1.2
- */
-void mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites_for_version( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
-                                       const int *ciphersuites,
-                                       int major, int minor );
-
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
 /**
  * \brief          Set the X.509 security profile used for verification
@@ -2712,8 +2670,14 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED)
 /**
- * \brief          Configure a pre-shared key (PSK) and identity
+ * \brief          Configure pre-shared keys (PSKs) and their
- *                 to be used in PSK-based ciphersuites.
+ *                 identities to be used in PSK-based ciphersuites.
+ *
+ *                 Only one PSK can be registered, through either
+ *                 mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() or mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque().
+ *                 If you attempt to register more than one PSK, this function
+ *                 fails, though this may change in future versions, which
+ *                 may add support for multiple PSKs.
  *
  * \note           This is mainly useful for clients. Servers will usually
  *                 want to use \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb() instead.
@@ -2721,13 +2685,6 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
  * \note           A PSK set by \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk() in the PSK callback
  *                 takes precedence over a PSK configured by this function.
  *
- * \warning        Currently, clients can only register a single pre-shared key.
- *                 Calling this function or mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque() more
- *                 than once will overwrite values configured in previous calls.
- *                 Support for setting multiple PSKs on clients and selecting
- *                 one based on the identity hint is not a planned feature,
- *                 but feedback is welcomed.
- *
  * \param conf     The SSL configuration to register the PSK with.
  * \param psk      The pointer to the pre-shared key to use.
  * \param psk_len  The length of the pre-shared key in bytes.
@@ -2740,7 +2697,9 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
  *                 of the SSL configuration.
  *
  * \return         \c 0 if successful.
- * \return         An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_XXX error code on failure.
+ * \return         #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if no more PSKs
+ *                 can be configured. In this case, the old PSK(s) remain intact.
+ * \return         Another negative error code on other kinds of failure.
  */
 int mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
                 const unsigned char *psk, size_t psk_len,
@@ -2748,8 +2707,14 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
 /**
- * \brief          Configure an opaque pre-shared key (PSK) and identity
+ * \brief          Configure one or more opaque pre-shared keys (PSKs) and
- *                 to be used in PSK-based ciphersuites.
+ *                 their identities to be used in PSK-based ciphersuites.
+ *
+ *                 Only one PSK can be registered, through either
+ *                 mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() or mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque().
+ *                 If you attempt to register more than one PSK, this function
+ *                 fails, though this may change in future versions, which
+ *                 may add support for multiple PSKs.
  *
  * \note           This is mainly useful for clients. Servers will usually
  *                 want to use \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb() instead.
@@ -2758,13 +2723,6 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
  *                 the PSK callback takes precedence over an opaque PSK
  *                 configured by this function.
  *
- * \warning        Currently, clients can only register a single pre-shared key.
- *                 Calling this function or mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() more than
- *                 once will overwrite values configured in previous calls.
- *                 Support for setting multiple PSKs on clients and selecting
- *                 one based on the identity hint is not a planned feature,
- *                 but feedback is welcomed.
- *
  * \param conf     The SSL configuration to register the PSK with.
  * \param psk      The identifier of the key slot holding the PSK.
  *                 Until \p conf is destroyed or this function is successfully
@@ -2781,7 +2739,9 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
  *                 SSL configuration.
  *
  * \return         \c 0 if successful.
- * \return         An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_XXX error code on failure.
+ * \return         #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if no more PSKs
+ *                 can be configured. In this case, the old PSK(s) remain intact.
+ * \return         Another negative error code on other kinds of failure.
  */
 int mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
                                  psa_key_id_t psk,
@@ -3231,8 +3191,7 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_get_dtls_srtp_negotiation_result( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ss
  *
  * \param conf     SSL configuration
  * \param major    Major version number (only MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 supported)
- * \param minor    Minor version number (MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 and MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2,
+ * \param minor    Minor version number (only MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 supported)
- *                 MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 supported)
  */
 void mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_version( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int major, int minor );
 
@@ -3247,9 +3206,7 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_version( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int major, int mino
  *
  * \param conf     SSL configuration
  * \param major    Major version number (only MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 supported)
- * \param minor    Minor version number (MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1,
+ * \param minor    Minor version number (only MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 supported)
- *                 MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2,
- *                 MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 supported)
  */
 void mbedtls_ssl_conf_min_version( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int major, int minor );
 

include/mbedtls/ssl_ciphersuites.h

@@ -42,10 +42,6 @@ extern "C" {
 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5                    0x01   /**< Weak! */
 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA                    0x02   /**< Weak! */
 
-#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA            0x0A
-
-#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA        0x16
-
 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA                    0x2C   /**< Weak! */
 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA                0x2D   /**< Weak! */
 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA                0x2E   /**< Weak! */
@@ -68,15 +64,12 @@ extern "C" {
 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA        0x84
 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA    0x88
 
-#define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA            0x8B
 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA             0x8C
 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA             0x8D
 
-#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA        0x8F
 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA         0x90
 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA         0x91
 
-#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA        0x93
 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA         0x94
 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA         0x95
 
@@ -114,22 +107,18 @@ extern "C" {
 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 0xC4   /**< TLS 1.2 */
 
 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA             0xC001 /**< Weak! */
-#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA     0xC003
 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA      0xC004
 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA      0xC005
 
 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA            0xC006 /**< Weak! */
-#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA    0xC008
 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA     0xC009
 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA     0xC00A
 
 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA               0xC00B /**< Weak! */
-#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA       0xC00D
 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA        0xC00E
 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA        0xC00F
 
 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA              0xC010 /**< Weak! */
-#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA      0xC012
 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA       0xC013
 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA       0xC014
 
@@ -151,7 +140,6 @@ extern "C" {
 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256     0xC031 /**< TLS 1.2 */
 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384     0xC032 /**< TLS 1.2 */
 
-#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA      0xC034
 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA       0xC035
 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA       0xC036
 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256    0xC037

include/mbedtls/x509_csr.h

@@ -235,6 +235,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_ns_cert_type( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx,
  * \param ctx       CSR context to use
  * \param oid       OID of the extension
  * \param oid_len   length of the OID
+ * \param critical  Set to 1 to mark the extension as critical, 0 otherwise.
  * \param val       value of the extension OCTET STRING
  * \param val_len   length of the value data
  *
@@ -242,6 +243,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_ns_cert_type( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx,
  */
 int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_extension( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx,
                                  const char *oid, size_t oid_len,
+                                 int critical,
                                  const unsigned char *val, size_t val_len );
 
 /**

library/aes.c

@@ -1005,7 +1005,7 @@ int mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx,
 #endif
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86)
-    if( aes_padlock_ace )
+    if( aes_padlock_ace > 0)
     {
         if( mbedtls_padlock_xcryptecb( ctx, mode, input, output ) == 0 )
             return( 0 );
@@ -1047,7 +1047,7 @@ int mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx,
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH );
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86)
-    if( aes_padlock_ace )
+    if( aes_padlock_ace > 0 )
     {
         if( mbedtls_padlock_xcryptcbc( ctx, mode, length, iv, input, output ) == 0 )
             return( 0 );

library/bignum.c

@@ -181,6 +181,27 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_shrink( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nblimbs )
     return( 0 );
 }
 
+/* Resize X to have exactly n limbs and set it to 0. */
+static int mbedtls_mpi_resize_clear( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t limbs )
+{
+    if( limbs == 0 )
+    {
+        mbedtls_mpi_free( X );
+        return( 0 );
+    }
+    else if( X->n == limbs )
+    {
+        memset( X->p, 0, limbs * ciL );
+        X->s = 1;
+        return( 0 );
+    }
+    else
+    {
+        mbedtls_mpi_free( X );
+        return( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, limbs ) );
+    }
+}
+
 /*
  * Copy the contents of Y into X
  */
@@ -838,14 +859,7 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_read_binary_le( mbedtls_mpi *X,
     size_t const limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS( buflen );
 
     /* Ensure that target MPI has exactly the necessary number of limbs */
-    if( X->n != limbs )
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_resize_clear( X, limbs ) );
-    {
-        mbedtls_mpi_free( X );
-        mbedtls_mpi_init( X );
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, limbs ) );
-    }
-
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( X, 0 ) );
 
     for( i = 0; i < buflen; i++ )
         X->p[i / ciL] |= ((mbedtls_mpi_uint) buf[i]) << ((i % ciL) << 3);
@@ -874,17 +888,11 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( mbedtls_mpi *X, const unsigned char *buf, size_t bu
     MPI_VALIDATE_RET( buflen == 0 || buf != NULL );
 
     /* Ensure that target MPI has exactly the necessary number of limbs */
-    if( X->n != limbs )
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_resize_clear( X, limbs ) );
-    {
-        mbedtls_mpi_free( X );
-        mbedtls_mpi_init( X );
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, limbs ) );
-    }
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( X, 0 ) );
 
-    /* Avoid calling `memcpy` with NULL source argument,
+    /* Avoid calling `memcpy` with NULL source or destination argument,
      * even if buflen is 0. */
-    if( buf != NULL )
+    if( buflen != 0 )
     {
         Xp = (unsigned char*) X->p;
         memcpy( Xp + overhead, buf, buflen );
@@ -2395,6 +2403,33 @@ cleanup:
     return( ret );
 }
 
+/* Fill X with n_bytes random bytes.
+ * X must already have room for those bytes.
+ * The ordering of the bytes returned from the RNG is suitable for
+ * deterministic ECDSA (see RFC 6979 §3.3 and mbedtls_mpi_random()).
+ * The size and sign of X are unchanged.
+ * n_bytes must not be 0.
+ */
+static int mpi_fill_random_internal(
+    mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t n_bytes,
+    int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng )
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    const size_t limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS( n_bytes );
+    const size_t overhead = ( limbs * ciL ) - n_bytes;
+
+    if( X->n < limbs )
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+
+    memset( X->p, 0, overhead );
+    memset( (unsigned char *) X->p + limbs * ciL, 0, ( X->n - limbs ) * ciL );
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( f_rng( p_rng, (unsigned char *) X->p + overhead, n_bytes ) );
+    mpi_bigendian_to_host( X->p, limbs );
+
+cleanup:
+    return( ret );
+}
+
 /*
  * Fill X with size bytes of random.
  *
@@ -2408,25 +2443,84 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t size,
 {
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     size_t const limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS( size );
-    size_t const overhead = ( limbs * ciL ) - size;
-    unsigned char *Xp;
 
     MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X     != NULL );
     MPI_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL );
 
     /* Ensure that target MPI has exactly the necessary number of limbs */
-    if( X->n != limbs )
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_resize_clear( X, limbs ) );
+    if( size == 0 )
+        return( 0 );
+
+    ret = mpi_fill_random_internal( X, size, f_rng, p_rng );
+
+cleanup:
+    return( ret );
+}
+
+int mbedtls_mpi_random( mbedtls_mpi *X,
+                        mbedtls_mpi_sint min,
+                        const mbedtls_mpi *N,
+                        int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+                        void *p_rng )
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+    int count;
+    unsigned cmp = 0;
+    size_t n_bits = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( N );
+    size_t n_bytes = ( n_bits + 7 ) / 8;
+
+    if( min < 0 )
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+    if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( N, min ) <= 0 )
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+
+    /*
+     * When min == 0, each try has at worst a probability 1/2 of failing
+     * (the msb has a probability 1/2 of being 0, and then the result will
+     * be < N), so after 30 tries failure probability is a most 2**(-30).
+     *
+     * When N is just below a power of 2, as is the case when generating
+     * a random scalar on most elliptic curves, 1 try is enough with
+     * overwhelming probability. When N is just above a power of 2,
+     * as when generating a random scalar on secp224k1, each try has
+     * a probability of failing that is almost 1/2.
+     *
+     * The probabilities are almost the same if min is nonzero but negligible
+     * compared to N. This is always the case when N is crypto-sized, but
+     * it's convenient to support small N for testing purposes. When N
+     * is small, use a higher repeat count, otherwise the probability of
+     * failure is macroscopic.
+     */
+    count = ( n_bytes > 4 ? 30 : 250 );
+
+    /* Ensure that target MPI has exactly the same number of limbs
+     * as the upper bound, even if the upper bound has leading zeros.
+     * This is necessary for the mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct() check. */
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_resize_clear( X, N->n ) );
+
+    /*
+     * Match the procedure given in RFC 6979 §3.3 (deterministic ECDSA)
+     * when f_rng is a suitably parametrized instance of HMAC_DRBG:
+     * - use the same byte ordering;
+     * - keep the leftmost n_bits bits of the generated octet string;
+     * - try until result is in the desired range.
+     * This also avoids any bias, which is especially important for ECDSA.
+     */
+    do
     {
-        mbedtls_mpi_free( X );
+        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mpi_fill_random_internal( X, n_bytes, f_rng, p_rng ) );
-        mbedtls_mpi_init( X );
+        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( X, 8 * n_bytes - n_bits ) );
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_grow( X, limbs ) );
+
+        if( --count == 0 )
+        {
+            ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE;
+            goto cleanup;
+        }
+
+        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct( X, N, &cmp ) );
     }
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( X, 0 ) );
+    while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( X, min ) < 0 || cmp != 1 );
-
-    Xp = (unsigned char*) X->p;
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( f_rng( p_rng, Xp + overhead, size ) );
-
-    mpi_bigendian_to_host( X->p, limbs );
 
 cleanup:
     return( ret );

library/dhm.c

@@ -100,22 +100,21 @@ static int dhm_read_bignum( mbedtls_mpi *X,
  */
 static int dhm_check_range( const mbedtls_mpi *param, const mbedtls_mpi *P )
 {
-    mbedtls_mpi L, U;
+    mbedtls_mpi U;
     int ret = 0;
 
-    mbedtls_mpi_init( &L ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &U );
+    mbedtls_mpi_init( &U );
 
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &L, 2 ) );
     MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &U, P, 2 ) );
 
-    if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( param, &L ) < 0 ||
+    if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( param, 2 ) < 0 ||
         mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( param, &U ) > 0 )
     {
         ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
     }
 
 cleanup:
-    mbedtls_mpi_free( &L ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &U );
+    mbedtls_mpi_free( &U );
     return( ret );
 }
 
@@ -151,38 +150,44 @@ int mbedtls_dhm_read_params( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx,
 }
 
 /*
- * Setup and write the ServerKeyExchange parameters
+ * Pick a random R in the range [2, M-2] for blinding or key generation.
  */
-int mbedtls_dhm_make_params( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, int x_size,
+static int dhm_random_below( mbedtls_mpi *R, const mbedtls_mpi *M,
-                     unsigned char *output, size_t *olen,
+                int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng )
-                     int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
-                     void *p_rng )
 {
-    int ret, count = 0;
+    int ret;
-    size_t n1, n2, n3;
+
-    unsigned char *p;
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_random( R, 3, M, f_rng, p_rng ) );
-    DHM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( R, R, 1 ) );
-    DHM_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL );
+
-    DHM_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL );
+cleanup:
-    DHM_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL );
+    return( ret );
+}
+
+static int dhm_make_common( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, int x_size,
+                            int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+                            void *p_rng )
+{
+    int ret = 0;
 
     if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->P, 0 ) == 0 )
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+    if( x_size < 0 )
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
 
-    /*
+    if( (unsigned) x_size < mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->P ) )
-     * Generate X as large as possible ( < P )
-     */
-    do
     {
         MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &ctx->X, x_size, f_rng, p_rng ) );
-
-        while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &ctx->X, &ctx->P ) >= 0 )
-            MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &ctx->X, 1 ) );
-
-        if( count++ > 10 )
-            return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PARAMS_FAILED );
     }
-    while( dhm_check_range( &ctx->X, &ctx->P ) != 0 );
+    else
+    {
+        /* Generate X as large as possible ( <= P - 2 ) */
+        ret = dhm_random_below( &ctx->X, &ctx->P, f_rng, p_rng );
+        if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE )
+            return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PARAMS_FAILED );
+        if( ret != 0 )
+            return( ret );
+    }
 
     /*
      * Calculate GX = G^X mod P
@@ -193,8 +198,33 @@ int mbedtls_dhm_make_params( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, int x_size,
     if( ( ret = dhm_check_range( &ctx->GX, &ctx->P ) ) != 0 )
         return( ret );
 
+cleanup:
+    return( ret );
+}
+
+/*
+ * Setup and write the ServerKeyExchange parameters
+ */
+int mbedtls_dhm_make_params( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, int x_size,
+                     unsigned char *output, size_t *olen,
+                     int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+                     void *p_rng )
+{
+    int ret;
+    size_t n1, n2, n3;
+    unsigned char *p;
+    DHM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
+    DHM_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL );
+    DHM_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL );
+    DHM_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL );
+
+    ret = dhm_make_common( ctx, x_size, f_rng, p_rng );
+    if( ret != 0 )
+        goto cleanup;
+
     /*
-     * export P, G, GX
+     * Export P, G, GX. RFC 5246 §4.4 states that "leading zero octets are
+     * not required". We omit leading zeros for compactness.
      */
 #define DHM_MPI_EXPORT( X, n )                                          \
     do {                                                                \
@@ -220,11 +250,9 @@ int mbedtls_dhm_make_params( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, int x_size,
     ctx->len = n1;
 
 cleanup:
-
+    if( ret != 0 && ret > -128 )
-    if( ret != 0 )
+        ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PARAMS_FAILED, ret );
-        return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PARAMS_FAILED, ret ) );
+    return( ret );
-
-    return( 0 );
 }
 
 /*
@@ -276,7 +304,7 @@ int mbedtls_dhm_make_public( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, int x_size,
                      int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
                      void *p_rng )
 {
-    int ret, count = 0;
+    int ret;
     DHM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
     DHM_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL );
     DHM_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL );
@@ -284,62 +312,17 @@ int mbedtls_dhm_make_public( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, int x_size,
     if( olen < 1 || olen > ctx->len )
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
 
-    if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->P, 0 ) == 0 )
+    ret = dhm_make_common( ctx, x_size, f_rng, p_rng );
-        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
+    if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PARAMS_FAILED )
-
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PUBLIC_FAILED );
-    /*
+    if( ret != 0 )
-     * generate X and calculate GX = G^X mod P
+        goto cleanup;
-     */
-    do
-    {
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &ctx->X, x_size, f_rng, p_rng ) );
-
-        while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &ctx->X, &ctx->P ) >= 0 )
-            MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &ctx->X, 1 ) );
-
-        if( count++ > 10 )
-            return( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PUBLIC_FAILED );
-    }
-    while( dhm_check_range( &ctx->X, &ctx->P ) != 0 );
-
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &ctx->GX, &ctx->G, &ctx->X,
-                          &ctx->P , &ctx->RP ) );
-
-    if( ( ret = dhm_check_range( &ctx->GX, &ctx->P ) ) != 0 )
-        return( ret );
 
     MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &ctx->GX, output, olen ) );
 
 cleanup:
-
+    if( ret != 0 && ret > -128 )
-    if( ret != 0 )
+        ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PUBLIC_FAILED, ret );
-        return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PUBLIC_FAILED, ret ) );
-
-    return( 0 );
-}
-
-/*
- * Pick a random R in the range [2, M) for blinding purposes
- */
-static int dhm_random_below( mbedtls_mpi *R, const mbedtls_mpi *M,
-                int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng )
-{
-    int ret, count;
-
-    count = 0;
-    do
-    {
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( R, mbedtls_mpi_size( M ), f_rng, p_rng ) );
-
-        while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( R, M ) >= 0 )
-            MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( R, 1 ) );
-
-        if( count++ > 10 )
-            return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE );
-    }
-    while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( R, 1 ) <= 0 );
-
-cleanup:
     return( ret );
 }
 
@@ -390,7 +373,7 @@ static int dhm_update_blinding( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx,
      * We need to generate blinding values from scratch
      */
 
-    /* Vi = random( 2, P-1 ) */
+    /* Vi = random( 2, P-2 ) */
     MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( dhm_random_below( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->P, f_rng, p_rng ) );
 
     /* Vf = Vi^-X mod P
@@ -454,8 +437,9 @@ int mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret( mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx,
         MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &ctx->K, &ctx->K, &ctx->P ) );
     }
 
+    /* Output the secret without any leading zero byte. This is mandatory
+     * for TLS per RFC 5246 §8.1.2. */
     *olen = mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->K );
-
     MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &ctx->K, output, *olen ) );
 
 cleanup:

library/ecp.c

@@ -728,6 +728,18 @@ void mbedtls_ecp_point_free( mbedtls_ecp_point *pt )
     mbedtls_mpi_free( &( pt->Z ) );
 }
 
+/*
+ * Check that the comb table (grp->T) is static initialized.
+ */
+static int ecp_group_is_static_comb_table( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp ) {
+#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1
+    return grp->T != NULL && grp->T_size == 0;
+#else
+    (void) grp;
+    return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
 /*
  * Unallocate (the components of) a group
  */
@@ -747,7 +759,7 @@ void mbedtls_ecp_group_free( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp )
         mbedtls_mpi_free( &grp->N );
     }
 
-    if( grp->T != NULL )
+    if( !ecp_group_is_static_comb_table(grp) && grp->T != NULL )
     {
         for( i = 0; i < grp->T_size; i++ )
             mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &grp->T[i] );
@@ -1701,26 +1713,11 @@ static int ecp_randomize_jac( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *p
 #else
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     mbedtls_mpi l, ll;
-    int count = 0;
-    size_t p_size = ( grp->pbits + 7 ) / 8;
 
     mbedtls_mpi_init( &l ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &ll );
 
     /* Generate l such that 1 < l < p */
-    do
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_random( &l, 2, &grp->P, f_rng, p_rng ) );
-    {
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &l, p_size, f_rng, p_rng ) );
-
-        while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &l, &grp->P ) >= 0 )
-            MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &l, 1 ) );
-
-        if( count++ > 10 )
-        {
-            ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED;
-            goto cleanup;
-        }
-    }
-    while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &l, 1 ) <= 0 );
 
     /* Z = l * Z */
     MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &pt->Z,   &pt->Z,     &l  ) );
@@ -1736,6 +1733,8 @@ static int ecp_randomize_jac( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *p
 cleanup:
     mbedtls_mpi_free( &l ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &ll );
 
+    if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE )
+        ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED;
     return( ret );
 #endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT) */
 }
@@ -2245,11 +2244,16 @@ static unsigned char ecp_pick_window_size( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
         w++;
 
     /*
-     * Make sure w is within bounds.
+     * If static comb table may not be used (!p_eq_g) or static comb table does
+     * not exists, make sure w is within bounds.
      * (The last test is useful only for very small curves in the test suite.)
+     *
+     * The user reduces MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE does not changes the size of
+     * static comb table, because the size of static comb table is fixed when
+     * it is generated.
      */
 #if( MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE < 6 )
-    if( w > MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE )
+    if( (!p_eq_g || !ecp_group_is_static_comb_table(grp)) && w > MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE )
         w = MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE;
 #endif
     if( w >= grp->nbits )
@@ -2485,25 +2489,10 @@ static int ecp_randomize_mxz( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *P
 #else
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     mbedtls_mpi l;
-    int count = 0;
-    size_t p_size = ( grp->pbits + 7 ) / 8;
     mbedtls_mpi_init( &l );
 
     /* Generate l such that 1 < l < p */
-    do
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_random( &l, 2, &grp->P, f_rng, p_rng ) );
-    {
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &l, p_size, f_rng, p_rng ) );
-
-        while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &l, &grp->P ) >= 0 )
-            MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &l, 1 ) );
-
-        if( count++ > 10 )
-        {
-            ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED;
-            goto cleanup;
-        }
-    }
-    while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &l, 1 ) <= 0 );
 
     MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &P->X, &P->X, &l ) );
     MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod( grp, &P->Z, &P->Z, &l ) );
@@ -2511,6 +2500,8 @@ static int ecp_randomize_mxz( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *P
 cleanup:
     mbedtls_mpi_free( &l );
 
+    if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE )
+        ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED;
     return( ret );
 #endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT) */
 }
@@ -3040,6 +3031,56 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
     return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
 }
 
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED)
+MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE
+int mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey_mx( size_t high_bit,
+                                mbedtls_mpi *d,
+                                int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+                                void *p_rng )
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+    size_t n_random_bytes = high_bit / 8 + 1;
+
+    /* [Curve25519] page 5 */
+    /* Generate a (high_bit+1)-bit random number by generating just enough
+     * random bytes, then shifting out extra bits from the top (necessary
+     * when (high_bit+1) is not a multiple of 8). */
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( d, n_random_bytes,
+                                              f_rng, p_rng ) );
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( d, 8 * n_random_bytes - high_bit - 1 ) );
+
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( d, high_bit, 1 ) );
+
+    /* Make sure the last two bits are unset for Curve448, three bits for
+       Curve25519 */
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( d, 0, 0 ) );
+    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( d, 1, 0 ) );
+    if( high_bit == 254 )
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( d, 2, 0 ) );
+    }
+
+cleanup:
+    return( ret );
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED)
+static int mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey_sw(
+    const mbedtls_mpi *N, mbedtls_mpi *d,
+    int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng )
+{
+    int ret = mbedtls_mpi_random( d, 1, N, f_rng, p_rng );
+    switch( ret )
+    {
+        case MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE:
+            return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED );
+        default:
+            return( ret );
+    }
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */
+
 /*
  * Generate a private key
  */
@@ -3048,89 +3089,21 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
                      int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
                      void *p_rng )
 {
-    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-    size_t n_size;
-
     ECP_VALIDATE_RET( grp   != NULL );
     ECP_VALIDATE_RET( d     != NULL );
     ECP_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL );
 
-    n_size = ( grp->nbits + 7 ) / 8;
-
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED)
     if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY )
-    {
+        return( mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey_mx( grp->nbits, d, f_rng, p_rng ) );
-        /* [M225] page 5 */
-        size_t b;
-
-        do {
-            MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( d, n_size, f_rng, p_rng ) );
-        } while( mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( d ) == 0);
-
-        /* Make sure the most significant bit is nbits */
-        b = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( d ) - 1; /* mbedtls_mpi_bitlen is one-based */
-        if( b > grp->nbits )
-            MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( d, b - grp->nbits ) );
-        else
-            MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( d, grp->nbits, 1 ) );
-
-        /* Make sure the last two bits are unset for Curve448, three bits for
-           Curve25519 */
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( d, 0, 0 ) );
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( d, 1, 0 ) );
-        if( grp->nbits == 254 )
-        {
-            MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_set_bit( d, 2, 0 ) );
-        }
-    }
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED */
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED)
     if( mbedtls_ecp_get_type( grp ) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS )
-    {
+        return( mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey_sw( &grp->N, d, f_rng, p_rng ) );
-        /* SEC1 3.2.1: Generate d such that 1 <= n < N */
-        int count = 0;
-        unsigned cmp = 0;
-
-        /*
-         * Match the procedure given in RFC 6979 (deterministic ECDSA):
-         * - use the same byte ordering;
-         * - keep the leftmost nbits bits of the generated octet string;
-         * - try until result is in the desired range.
-         * This also avoids any biais, which is especially important for ECDSA.
-         */
-        do
-        {
-            MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( d, n_size, f_rng, p_rng ) );
-            MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( d, 8 * n_size - grp->nbits ) );
-
-            /*
-             * Each try has at worst a probability 1/2 of failing (the msb has
-             * a probability 1/2 of being 0, and then the result will be < N),
-             * so after 30 tries failure probability is a most 2**(-30).
-             *
-             * For most curves, 1 try is enough with overwhelming probability,
-             * since N starts with a lot of 1s in binary, but some curves
-             * such as secp224k1 are actually very close to the worst case.
-             */
-            if( ++count > 30 )
-            {
-                ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED;
-                goto cleanup;
-            }
-
-            ret = mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct( d, &grp->N, &cmp );
-            if( ret != 0 )
-            {
-                goto cleanup;
-            }
-        }
-        while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( d, 1 ) < 0 || cmp != 1 );
-    }
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */
 
-cleanup:
+    return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
-    return( ret );
 }
 
 /*

library/ecp_invasive.h

@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
 #define MBEDTLS_ECP_INVASIVE_H
 
 #include "common.h"
+#include "mbedtls/bignum.h"
 #include "mbedtls/ecp.h"
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
@@ -46,6 +47,35 @@
 void mbedtls_ecp_fix_negative( mbedtls_mpi *N, signed char c, size_t bits );
 #endif
 
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED)
+/** Generate a private key on a Montgomery curve (Curve25519 or Curve448).
+ *
+ * This function implements key generation for the set of secret keys
+ * specified in [Curve25519] p. 5 and in [Curve448]. The resulting value
+ * has the lower bits masked but is not necessarily canonical.
+ *
+ * \note            - [Curve25519] http://cr.yp.to/ecdh/curve25519-20060209.pdf
+ *                  - [RFC7748] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7748
+ *
+ * \p high_bit      The position of the high-order bit of the key to generate.
+ *                  This is the bit-size of the key minus 1:
+ *                  254 for Curve25519 or 447 for Curve448.
+ * \param d         The randomly generated key. This is a number of size
+ *                  exactly \p n_bits + 1 bits, with the least significant bits
+ *                  masked as specified in [Curve25519] and in [RFC7748] §5.
+ * \param f_rng     The RNG function.
+ * \param p_rng     The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng.
+ *
+ * \return          \c 0 on success.
+ * \return          \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_xxx or MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_xxx on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey_mx( size_t n_bits,
+                                mbedtls_mpi *d,
+                                int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+                                void *p_rng );
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED */
+
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS && MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
 
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_INVASIVE_H */

library/nist_kw.c

@@ -189,8 +189,6 @@ int mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap( mbedtls_nist_kw_context *ctx,
     uint64_t t = 0;
     unsigned char outbuff[KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH * 2];
     unsigned char inbuff[KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH * 2];
-    unsigned char *R2 = output + KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH;
-    unsigned char *A = output;
 
     *out_len = 0;
     /*
@@ -266,6 +264,9 @@ int mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap( mbedtls_nist_kw_context *ctx,
     }
     else
     {
+        unsigned char *R2 = output + KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH;
+        unsigned char *A = output;
+
         /*
          * Do the wrapping function W, as defined in RFC 3394 section 2.2.1
          */
@@ -329,7 +330,7 @@ static int unwrap( mbedtls_nist_kw_context *ctx,
     uint64_t t = 0;
     unsigned char outbuff[KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH * 2];
     unsigned char inbuff[KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH * 2];
-    unsigned char *R = output + ( semiblocks - 2 ) * KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH;
+    unsigned char *R = NULL;
     *out_len = 0;
 
     if( semiblocks < MIN_SEMIBLOCKS_COUNT )
@@ -339,6 +340,7 @@ static int unwrap( mbedtls_nist_kw_context *ctx,
 
     memcpy( A, input, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH );
     memmove( output, input + KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH, ( semiblocks - 1 ) * KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH );
+    R = output + ( semiblocks - 2 ) * KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH;
 
     /* Calculate intermediate values */
     for( t = s; t >= 1; t-- )

library/oid.c

@@ -237,6 +237,10 @@ static const oid_x520_attr_t oid_x520_attr_type[] =
         OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_PSEUDONYM,   "id-at-pseudonym",                "Pseudonym" ),
         "pseudonym",
     },
+    {
+        OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_UID,            "id-uid",                         "User Id" ),
+        "uid",
+    },
     {
         OID_DESCRIPTOR( MBEDTLS_OID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT, "id-domainComponent",           "Domain component" ),
         "DC",

library/ssl_ciphersuites.c

@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
 
 #include "mbedtls/ssl_ciphersuites.h"
 #include "mbedtls/ssl.h"
+#include "ssl_misc.h"
 
 #include <string.h>
 
@@ -254,18 +255,6 @@ static const int ciphersuite_preference[] =
     MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256,
     MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
 
-    /* 3DES suites */
-    MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
-    MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
-    MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
-    MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
-    MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
-    MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
-    MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
-    MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
-    MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
-    MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
-
     /* NULL suites */
     MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
     MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
@@ -471,18 +460,6 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] =
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C)
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C)
-    { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA",
-      MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA,
-      MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1,
-      MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
-      0 },
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */
-
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER)
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C)
     { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-NULL-SHA",
@@ -580,18 +557,6 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] =
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C)
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C)
-    { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA",
-      MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA,
-      MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1,
-      MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
-      0 },
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */
-
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER)
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C)
     { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-NULL-SHA",
@@ -726,17 +691,6 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] =
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C)
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C)
-    { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA",
-      MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA,
-      MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1,
-      MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
-      0 },
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED */
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED)
@@ -863,18 +817,6 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] =
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C)
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C)
-    { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS-RSA-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA",
-      MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA,
-      MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1,
-      MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
-      0 },
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */
-
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED */
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED)
@@ -963,18 +905,6 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] =
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C)
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C)
-    { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA",
-      MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA,
-      MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1,
-      MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
-      0 },
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */
-
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER)
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C)
     { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-NULL-SHA",
@@ -1072,18 +1002,6 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] =
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C)
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C)
-    { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA",
-      MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA,
-      MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1,
-      MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
-      0 },
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */
-
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER)
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C)
     { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-NULL-SHA",
@@ -1208,18 +1126,6 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] =
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C)
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C)
-    { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS-PSK-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA",
-      MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK,
-      MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1,
-      MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
-      0 },
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */
-
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED */
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED)
@@ -1335,18 +1241,6 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] =
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C)
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C)
-    { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA",
-      MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK,
-      MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1,
-      MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
-      0 },
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */
-
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED)
@@ -1405,18 +1299,6 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] =
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C)
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C)
-    { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA",
-      MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK,
-      MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1,
-      MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
-      0 },
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */
-
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED)
@@ -1510,18 +1392,6 @@ static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] =
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C)
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C)
-    { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA",
-      MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK,
-      MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1,
-      MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
-      0 },
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */
-
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
@@ -2047,14 +1917,6 @@ static int ciphersuite_is_removed( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *cs_info )
 {
     (void)cs_info;
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_REMOVE_3DES_CIPHERSUITES)
-    if( cs_info->cipher == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_ECB ||
-        cs_info->cipher == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC )
-    {
-        return( 1 );
-    }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_REMOVE_3DES_CIPHERSUITES */
-
     return( 0 );
 }
 

library/ssl_cli.c

@@ -1155,8 +1155,7 @@ static int ssl_write_client_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
     /*
      * Ciphersuite list
      */
-    ciphersuites = mbedtls_ssl_get_protocol_version_ciphersuites( ssl->conf,
+    ciphersuites = ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list;
-                                                                ssl->minor_ver );
 
     /* Skip writing ciphersuite length for now */
     n = 0;
@@ -2244,7 +2243,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
     i = 0;
     while( 1 )
     {
-        if( mbedtls_ssl_get_protocol_version_ciphersuites( ssl->conf, ssl->minor_ver )[i] == 0 )
+        if( ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list[i] == 0 )
         {
             MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) );
             mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
@@ -2254,7 +2253,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
             return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
         }
 
-        if( mbedtls_ssl_get_protocol_version_ciphersuites( ssl->conf, ssl->minor_ver )[i++] ==
+        if( ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list[i++] ==
             ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite )
         {
             break;

library/ssl_misc.h

@@ -65,6 +65,16 @@
 #define inline __inline
 #endif
 
+/* Legacy minor version numbers as defined by:
+ * - RFC 2246: ProtocolVersion version = { 3, 1 };     // TLS v1.0
+ * - RFC 4346: ProtocolVersion version = { 3, 2 };     // TLS v1.1
+ *
+ * We no longer support these versions, but some code still references those
+ * constants, for keep them for now until we clean up that code.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1             1
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2             2
+
 /* Determine minimum supported version */
 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MAJOR_VERSION           MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3
 
@@ -164,7 +174,7 @@
 #endif
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
-#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CID_EXPANSION      MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_PADDING_GRANULARITY
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CID_EXPANSION      MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY
 #else
 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CID_EXPANSION        0
 #endif

library/ssl_msg.c

@@ -579,7 +579,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
     {
         size_t padding =
             ssl_compute_padding_length( rec->data_len,
-                                        MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY );
+                                        MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY );
         if( ssl_build_inner_plaintext( data,
                                        &rec->data_len,
                                        post_avail,
@@ -605,7 +605,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
     {
         size_t padding =
             ssl_compute_padding_length( rec->data_len,
-                                        MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_PADDING_GRANULARITY );
+                                        MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY );
         /*
          * Wrap plaintext into DTLSInnerPlaintext structure.
          * See ssl_build_inner_plaintext() for more information.

library/ssl_srv.c

@@ -1870,7 +1870,7 @@ read_record_header:
      * and certificate from the SNI callback triggered by the SNI extension.)
      */
     got_common_suite = 0;
-    ciphersuites = mbedtls_ssl_get_protocol_version_ciphersuites( ssl->conf, ssl->minor_ver );
+    ciphersuites = ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list;
     ciphersuite_info = NULL;
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE)
     for( j = 0, p = buf + ciph_offset + 2; j < ciph_len; j += 2, p += 2 )

library/ssl_tls.c

@@ -3514,73 +3514,10 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_set_session( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const mbedtls_ssl_session
 }
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
 
-static int protocol_version_to_ciphersuites_list_index(int prot_version)
-{
-    switch(prot_version) {
-        case MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1:
-            return 0;
-        case MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2:
-            return 1;
-        case MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3:
-            return 2;
-        default:
-            return -1;
-    };
-}
-
-static void set_protocol_version_ciphersuites( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
-                                               int prot_version,
-                                               const int* ciphersuites )
-{
-    int ciphersuite_list_index =
-        protocol_version_to_ciphersuites_list_index(prot_version);
-    if ( ciphersuite_list_index >= 0 &&
-         (unsigned int)ciphersuite_list_index <
-         sizeof(conf->ciphersuite_list)/sizeof(conf->ciphersuite_list[0]) )
-    {
-        conf->ciphersuite_list[ciphersuite_list_index] = ciphersuites;
-    }
-}
-
 void mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
                                     const int *ciphersuites )
 {
-    set_protocol_version_ciphersuites(conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1,
+    conf->ciphersuite_list = ciphersuites;
-        ciphersuites);
-    set_protocol_version_ciphersuites(conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2,
-        ciphersuites);
-    set_protocol_version_ciphersuites(conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
-        ciphersuites);
-}
-
-const int *mbedtls_ssl_get_protocol_version_ciphersuites(
-    const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int prot_version )
-{
-    int ciphersuite_list_index =
-        protocol_version_to_ciphersuites_list_index(prot_version);
-    if ( ciphersuite_list_index >= 0 &&
-         (unsigned int)ciphersuite_list_index <
-         sizeof(conf->ciphersuite_list)/sizeof(conf->ciphersuite_list[0]) )
-    {
-        return conf->ciphersuite_list[ciphersuite_list_index];
-    }
-    else
-    {
-        return NULL;
-    }
-}
-
-void mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites_for_version( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
-                                       const int *ciphersuites,
-                                       int major, int minor )
-{
-    if( major != MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 )
-        return;
-
-    if( minor != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 )
-        return;
-
-    set_protocol_version_ciphersuites(conf, minor, ciphersuites);
 }
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
@@ -3721,6 +3658,19 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ecjpake_password( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED)
 
+static int ssl_conf_psk_is_configured( mbedtls_ssl_config const *conf )
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+    if( !mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( conf->psk_opaque ) )
+        return( 1 );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+
+    if( conf->psk != NULL )
+        return( 1 );
+
+    return( 0 );
+}
+
 static void ssl_conf_remove_psk( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf )
 {
     /* Remove reference to existing PSK, if any. */
@@ -3786,8 +3736,10 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
                 const unsigned char *psk_identity, size_t psk_identity_len )
 {
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-    /* Remove opaque/raw PSK + PSK Identity */
+
-    ssl_conf_remove_psk( conf );
+    /* We currently only support one PSK, raw or opaque. */
+    if( ssl_conf_psk_is_configured( conf ) )
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
 
     /* Check and set raw PSK */
     if( psk == NULL )
@@ -3855,8 +3807,10 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
                                  size_t psk_identity_len )
 {
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-    /* Clear opaque/raw PSK + PSK Identity, if present. */
+
-    ssl_conf_remove_psk( conf );
+    /* We currently only support one PSK, raw or opaque. */
+    if( ssl_conf_psk_is_configured( conf ) )
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
 
     /* Check and set opaque PSK */
     if( mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( psk ) )
@@ -6261,12 +6215,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
             conf->max_major_ver = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MAJOR_VERSION;
             conf->max_minor_ver = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MINOR_VERSION;
 
-            set_protocol_version_ciphersuites(conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1,
+            conf->ciphersuite_list = ssl_preset_suiteb_ciphersuites;
-                                              ssl_preset_suiteb_ciphersuites);
-            set_protocol_version_ciphersuites(conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2,
-                                              ssl_preset_suiteb_ciphersuites);
-            set_protocol_version_ciphersuites(conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
-                                              ssl_preset_suiteb_ciphersuites);
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
             conf->cert_profile = &mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_suiteb;
@@ -6300,13 +6249,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
             if( transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
                 conf->min_minor_ver = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3;
 #endif
-            const int* default_ciphersuites = mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites();
+            conf->ciphersuite_list = mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites();
-            set_protocol_version_ciphersuites(conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1,
-                                              default_ciphersuites);
-            set_protocol_version_ciphersuites(conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2,
-                                              default_ciphersuites);
-            set_protocol_version_ciphersuites(conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3,
-                                              default_ciphersuites);
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
             conf->cert_profile = &mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default;

library/x509_crt.c

@@ -1268,9 +1268,7 @@ static int x509_crt_parse_der_core( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
         }
     }
 
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3)
     if( crt->version == 3 )
-#endif
     {
         ret = x509_get_crt_ext( &p, end, crt, cb, p_ctx );
         if( ret != 0 )

library/x509write_csr.c

@@ -83,10 +83,11 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_subject_name( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx,
 
 int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_extension( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx,
                                  const char *oid, size_t oid_len,
+                                 int critical,
                                  const unsigned char *val, size_t val_len )
 {
     return mbedtls_x509_set_extension( &ctx->extensions, oid, oid_len,
-                               0, val, val_len );
+                               critical, val, val_len );
 }
 
 int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_key_usage( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, unsigned char key_usage )
@@ -103,7 +104,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_key_usage( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, unsigned ch
 
     ret = mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_extension( ctx, MBEDTLS_OID_KEY_USAGE,
                                        MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_KEY_USAGE ),
-                                       c, (size_t)ret );
+                                       0, c, (size_t)ret );
     if( ret != 0 )
         return( ret );
 
@@ -125,7 +126,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_ns_cert_type( mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx,
 
     ret = mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_extension( ctx, MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT_TYPE,
                                        MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT_TYPE ),
-                                       c, (size_t)ret );
+                                       0, c, (size_t)ret );
     if( ret != 0 )
         return( ret );
 

programs/ssl/ssl_server2.c

@@ -93,7 +93,6 @@ int main( void )
 #define DFL_ECJPAKE_PW          NULL
 #define DFL_PSK_LIST            NULL
 #define DFL_FORCE_CIPHER        0
-#define DFL_VERSION_SUITES      NULL
 #define DFL_RENEGOTIATION       MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED
 #define DFL_ALLOW_LEGACY        -2
 #define DFL_RENEGOTIATE         0
@@ -501,9 +500,6 @@ int main( void )
     "    force_version=%%s    default: \"\" (none)\n"       \
     "                        options: tls1_2, dtls1_2\n" \
     "\n"                                                                \
-    "    version_suites=a,b,c        per-version ciphersuites\n"        \
-    "                                in order from tls1 to tls1_2\n"    \
-    "                                default: all enabled\n"            \
     "    force_ciphersuite=<name>    default: all enabled\n"            \
     "    query_config=<name>         return 0 if the specified\n"       \
     "                                configuration macro is defined and 1\n"  \
@@ -565,7 +561,6 @@ struct options
     char *psk_list;             /* list of PSK id/key pairs for callback    */
     const char *ecjpake_pw;     /* the EC J-PAKE password                   */
     int force_ciphersuite[2];   /* protocol/ciphersuite to use, or all      */
-    const char *version_suites; /* per-version ciphersuites                 */
     int renegotiation;          /* enable / disable renegotiation           */
     int allow_legacy;           /* allow legacy renegotiation               */
     int renegotiate;            /* attempt renegotiation?                   */
@@ -1253,7 +1248,6 @@ int main( int argc, char *argv[] )
 {
     int ret = 0, len, written, frags, exchanges_left;
     int query_config_ret = 0;
-    int version_suites[3][2];
     io_ctx_t io_ctx;
     unsigned char* buf = 0;
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED)
@@ -1481,7 +1475,6 @@ int main( int argc, char *argv[] )
     opt.psk_list            = DFL_PSK_LIST;
     opt.ecjpake_pw          = DFL_ECJPAKE_PW;
     opt.force_ciphersuite[0]= DFL_FORCE_CIPHER;
-    opt.version_suites      = DFL_VERSION_SUITES;
     opt.renegotiation       = DFL_RENEGOTIATION;
     opt.allow_legacy        = DFL_ALLOW_LEGACY;
     opt.renegotiate         = DFL_RENEGOTIATE;
@@ -1669,8 +1662,6 @@ int main( int argc, char *argv[] )
         }
         else if( strcmp( p, "curves" ) == 0 )
             opt.curves = q;
-        else if( strcmp( p, "version_suites" ) == 0 )
-            opt.version_suites = q;
         else if( strcmp( p, "renegotiation" ) == 0 )
         {
             opt.renegotiation = (atoi( q )) ?
@@ -2036,10 +2027,6 @@ int main( int argc, char *argv[] )
         if( opt.min_version < ciphersuite_info->min_minor_ver )
         {
             opt.min_version = ciphersuite_info->min_minor_ver;
-            /* DTLS starts with TLS 1.1 */
-            if( opt.transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM &&
-                opt.min_version < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 )
-                opt.min_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2;
         }
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
@@ -2067,47 +2054,6 @@ int main( int argc, char *argv[] )
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
     }
 
-    if( opt.version_suites != NULL )
-    {
-        const char *name[3] = { 0 };
-
-        /* Parse 4-element coma-separated list */
-        for( i = 0, p = (char *) opt.version_suites;
-             i < 3 && *p != '\0';
-             i++ )
-        {
-            name[i] = p;
-
-            /* Terminate the current string and move on to next one */
-            while( *p != ',' && *p != '\0' )
-                p++;
-            if( *p == ',' )
-                *p++ = '\0';
-        }
-
-        if( i != 3 )
-        {
-            mbedtls_printf( "too few values for version_suites\n" );
-            ret = 1;
-            goto exit;
-        }
-
-        memset( version_suites, 0, sizeof( version_suites ) );
-
-        /* Get the suites identifiers from their name */
-        for( i = 0; i < 3; i++ )
-        {
-            version_suites[i][0] = mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_id( name[i] );
-
-            if( version_suites[i][0] == 0 )
-            {
-                mbedtls_printf( "unknown ciphersuite: '%s'\n", name[i] );
-                ret = 2;
-                goto usage;
-            }
-        }
-    }
-
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
     if( mbedtls_test_unhexify( cid, sizeof( cid ),
                                opt.cid_val, &cid_len ) != 0 )
@@ -2689,19 +2635,6 @@ int main( int argc, char *argv[] )
     if( opt.force_ciphersuite[0] != DFL_FORCE_CIPHER )
         mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites( &conf, opt.force_ciphersuite );
 
-    if( opt.version_suites != NULL )
-    {
-        mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites_for_version( &conf, version_suites[0],
-                                          MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3,
-                                          MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 );
-        mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites_for_version( &conf, version_suites[1],
-                                          MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3,
-                                          MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 );
-        mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites_for_version( &conf, version_suites[2],
-                                          MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3,
-                                          MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 );
-    }
-
     if( opt.allow_legacy != DFL_ALLOW_LEGACY )
         mbedtls_ssl_conf_legacy_renegotiation( &conf, opt.allow_legacy );
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)

programs/test/benchmark.c

@@ -251,7 +251,11 @@ static int myrand( void *rng_state, unsigned char *output, size_t len )
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
 void ecp_clear_precomputed( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp )
 {
-    if( grp->T != NULL )
+    if( grp->T != NULL
+#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1
+        && grp->T_size != 0
+#endif
+    )
     {
         size_t i;
         for( i = 0; i < grp->T_size; i++ )

scripts/config.py

@@ -189,7 +189,6 @@ EXCLUDE_FROM_FULL = frozenset([
     'MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER', # incompatible with USE_PSA_CRYPTO
     'MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM', # platform dependency (PSA SPM)
     'MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY', # build dependency (hook functions)
-    'MBEDTLS_REMOVE_3DES_CIPHERSUITES', # removes a feature
     'MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT', # influences the use of RSA in X.509 and TLS
     'MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN', # build dependency (clang+memsan)
     'MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND', # build dependency (valgrind headers)

scripts/ecp_comb_table.py

@@ -0,0 +1,249 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""
+Purpose
+
+This script dumps comb table of ec curve. When you add a new ec curve, you
+can use this script to generate codes to define `<curve>_T` in ecp_curves.c
+"""
+
+# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+#
+# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
+# not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+# You may obtain a copy of the License at
+#
+# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+#
+# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
+# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+# limitations under the License.
+
+import os
+import subprocess
+import sys
+import tempfile
+
+HOW_TO_ADD_NEW_CURVE = """
+If you are trying to add new curve, you can follow these steps:
+
+1. Define curve parameters (<curve>_p, <curve>_gx, etc...) in ecp_curves.c.
+2. Add a macro to define <curve>_T to NULL following these parameters.
+3. Build mbedcrypto
+4. Run this script with an argument of new curve
+5. Copy the output of this script into ecp_curves.c and replace the macro added
+   in Step 2
+6. Rebuild and test if everything is ok
+
+Replace the <curve> in the above with the name of the curve you want to add."""
+
+CC = os.getenv('CC', 'cc')
+MBEDTLS_LIBRARY_PATH = os.getenv('MBEDTLS_LIBRARY_PATH', "library")
+
+SRC_DUMP_COMB_TABLE = r'''
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include "mbedtls/ecp.h"
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+
+static void dump_mpi_initialize( const char *name, const mbedtls_mpi *d )
+{
+    uint8_t buf[128] = {0};
+    size_t olen;
+    uint8_t *p;
+
+    olen = mbedtls_mpi_size( d );
+    mbedtls_mpi_write_binary_le( d, buf, olen );
+    printf("static const mbedtls_mpi_uint %s[] = {\n", name);
+    for (p = buf; p < buf + olen; p += 8) {
+        printf( "    BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8( 0x%02X, 0x%02X, 0x%02X, 0x%02X, 0x%02X, 0x%02X, 0x%02X, 0x%02X ),\n",
+                p[0], p[1], p[2], p[3], p[4], p[5], p[6], p[7] );
+    }
+    printf("};\n");
+}
+
+static void dump_T( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp )
+{
+    char name[128];
+
+    printf( "#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1\n" );
+
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < grp->T_size; ++i) {
+        snprintf( name, sizeof(name), "%s_T_%zu_X", CURVE_NAME, i );
+        dump_mpi_initialize( name, &grp->T[i].X );
+
+        snprintf( name, sizeof(name), "%s_T_%zu_Y", CURVE_NAME, i );
+        dump_mpi_initialize( name, &grp->T[i].Y );
+    }
+    printf( "static const mbedtls_ecp_point %s_T[%zu] = {\n", CURVE_NAME, grp->T_size );
+    size_t olen;
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < grp->T_size; ++i) {
+        int z;
+        if ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&grp->T[i].Z, 0) == 0 ) {
+            z = 0;
+        } else if ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&grp->T[i].Z, 1) == 0 ) {
+            z = 1;
+        } else {
+            fprintf( stderr, "Unexpected value of Z (i = %d)\n", (int)i );
+            exit( 1 );
+        }
+        printf( "    ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z%d(%s_T_%zu_X, %s_T_%zu_Y),\n",
+                z,
+                CURVE_NAME, i,
+                CURVE_NAME, i
+        );
+    }
+    printf("};\n#endif\n\n");
+}
+
+int main()
+{
+    int rc;
+    mbedtls_mpi m;
+    mbedtls_ecp_point R;
+    mbedtls_ecp_group grp;
+
+    mbedtls_ecp_group_init( &grp );
+    rc = mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &grp, CURVE_ID );
+    if (rc != 0) {
+        char buf[100];
+        mbedtls_strerror( rc, buf, sizeof(buf) );
+        fprintf( stderr, "mbedtls_ecp_group_load: %s (-0x%x)\n", buf, -rc );
+        return 1;
+    }
+    grp.T = NULL;
+    mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &R );
+    mbedtls_mpi_init( &m);
+    mbedtls_mpi_lset( &m, 1 );
+    rc = mbedtls_ecp_mul( &grp, &R, &m, &grp.G, NULL, NULL );
+    if ( rc != 0 ) {
+        char buf[100];
+        mbedtls_strerror( rc, buf, sizeof(buf) );
+        fprintf( stderr, "mbedtls_ecp_mul: %s (-0x%x)\n", buf, -rc );
+        return 1;
+    }
+    if ( grp.T == NULL ) {
+        fprintf( stderr, "grp.T is not generated. Please make sure"
+                         "MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM is enabled in config.h\n" );
+        return 1;
+    }
+    dump_T( &grp );
+    return 0;
+}
+'''
+
+SRC_DUMP_KNOWN_CURVE = r'''
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include "mbedtls/ecp.h"
+
+int main() {
+    const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_list();
+    mbedtls_ecp_group grp;
+
+    mbedtls_ecp_group_init( &grp );
+    while ( info->name != NULL ) {
+        mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &grp, info->grp_id );
+        if ( mbedtls_ecp_get_type(&grp) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS ) {
+            printf( " %s", info->name );
+        }
+        info++;
+    }
+    printf( "\n" );
+    return 0;
+}
+'''
+
+
+def join_src_path(*args):
+    return os.path.normpath(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), "..", *args))
+
+
+def run_c_source(src, cflags):
+    """
+    Compile and run C source code
+    :param src: the c language code to run
+    :param cflags: additional cflags passing to compiler
+    :return:
+    """
+    binname = tempfile.mktemp(prefix="mbedtls")
+    fd, srcname = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix="mbedtls", suffix=".c")
+    srcfile = os.fdopen(fd, mode="w")
+    srcfile.write(src)
+    srcfile.close()
+    args = [CC,
+            *cflags,
+            '-I' + join_src_path("include"),
+            "-o", binname,
+            '-L' + MBEDTLS_LIBRARY_PATH,
+            srcname,
+            '-lmbedcrypto']
+
+    p = subprocess.run(args=args, check=False)
+    if p.returncode != 0:
+        return False
+    p = subprocess.run(args=[binname], check=False, env={
+        'LD_LIBRARY_PATH': MBEDTLS_LIBRARY_PATH
+    })
+    if p.returncode != 0:
+        return False
+    os.unlink(srcname)
+    os.unlink(binname)
+    return True
+
+
+def compute_curve(curve):
+    """compute comb table for curve"""
+    r = run_c_source(
+        SRC_DUMP_COMB_TABLE,
+        [
+            '-g',
+            '-DCURVE_ID=MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_%s' % curve.upper(),
+            '-DCURVE_NAME="%s"' % curve.lower(),
+        ])
+    if not r:
+        print("""\
+Unable to compile and run utility.""", file=sys.stderr)
+        sys.exit(1)
+
+
+def usage():
+    print("""
+Usage: python %s <curve>...
+
+Arguments:
+    curve       Specify one or more curve names (e.g secp256r1)
+
+All possible curves: """ % sys.argv[0])
+    run_c_source(SRC_DUMP_KNOWN_CURVE, [])
+    print("""
+Environment Variable:
+    CC          Specify which c compile to use to compile utility.
+    MBEDTLS_LIBRARY_PATH
+                Specify the path to mbedcrypto library. (e.g. build/library/)
+
+How to add a new curve: %s""" % HOW_TO_ADD_NEW_CURVE)
+
+
+def run_main():
+    shared_lib_path = os.path.normpath(os.path.join(MBEDTLS_LIBRARY_PATH, "libmbedcrypto.so"))
+    static_lib_path = os.path.normpath(os.path.join(MBEDTLS_LIBRARY_PATH, "libmbedcrypto.a"))
+    if not os.path.exists(shared_lib_path) and not os.path.exists(static_lib_path):
+        print("Warning: both '%s' and '%s' are not exists. This script will use "
+              "the library from your system instead of the library compiled by "
+              "this source directory.\n"
+              "You can specify library path using environment variable "
+              "'MBEDTLS_LIBRARY_PATH'." % (shared_lib_path, static_lib_path),
+              file=sys.stderr)
+
+    if len(sys.argv) <= 1:
+        usage()
+    else:
+        for curve in sys.argv[1:]:
+            compute_curve(curve)
+
+
+if __name__ == '__main__':
+    run_main()

scripts/mbedtls_dev/crypto_knowledge.py

@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ class KeyType:
         `name` is a string 'PSA_KEY_TYPE_xxx' which is the name of a PSA key
         type macro. For key types that take arguments, the arguments can
         be passed either through the optional argument `params` or by
-        passing an expression of the form 'PSA_KEY_TYPE_xxx(param1, param2)'
+        passing an expression of the form 'PSA_KEY_TYPE_xxx(param1, ...)'
         in `name` as a string.
         """
 
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ class KeyType:
                 m = re.match(r'(\w+)\s*\((.*)\)\Z', self.name)
                 assert m is not None
                 self.name = m.group(1)
-                params = ','.split(m.group(2))
+                params = m.group(2).split(',')
         self.params = (None if params is None else
                        [param.strip() for param in params])
         """The parameters of the key type, if there are any.

scripts/mbedtls_dev/macro_collector.py

@@ -18,7 +18,55 @@
 
 import itertools
 import re
-from typing import Dict, Iterable, Iterator, List, Set
+from typing import Dict, Iterable, Iterator, List, Optional, Pattern, Set, Tuple, Union
+
+
+class ReadFileLineException(Exception):
+    def __init__(self, filename: str, line_number: Union[int, str]) -> None:
+        message = 'in {} at {}'.format(filename, line_number)
+        super(ReadFileLineException, self).__init__(message)
+        self.filename = filename
+        self.line_number = line_number
+
+
+class read_file_lines:
+    # Dear Pylint, conventionally, a context manager class name is lowercase.
+    # pylint: disable=invalid-name,too-few-public-methods
+    """Context manager to read a text file line by line.
+
+    ```
+    with read_file_lines(filename) as lines:
+        for line in lines:
+            process(line)
+    ```
+    is equivalent to
+    ```
+    with open(filename, 'r') as input_file:
+        for line in input_file:
+            process(line)
+    ```
+    except that if process(line) raises an exception, then the read_file_lines
+    snippet annotates the exception with the file name and line number.
+    """
+    def __init__(self, filename: str, binary: bool = False) -> None:
+        self.filename = filename
+        self.line_number = 'entry' #type: Union[int, str]
+        self.generator = None #type: Optional[Iterable[Tuple[int, str]]]
+        self.binary = binary
+    def __enter__(self) -> 'read_file_lines':
+        self.generator = enumerate(open(self.filename,
+                                        'rb' if self.binary else 'r'))
+        return self
+    def __iter__(self) -> Iterator[str]:
+        assert self.generator is not None
+        for line_number, content in self.generator:
+            self.line_number = line_number
+            yield content
+        self.line_number = 'exit'
+    def __exit__(self, exc_type, exc_value, exc_traceback) -> None:
+        if exc_type is not None:
+            raise ReadFileLineException(self.filename, self.line_number) \
+                from exc_value
 
 
 class PSAMacroEnumerator:
@@ -57,6 +105,20 @@ class PSAMacroEnumerator:
             'tag_length': [],
             'min_tag_length': [],
         } #type: Dict[str, List[str]]
+        # Whether to include intermediate macros in enumerations. Intermediate
+        # macros serve as category headers and are not valid values of their
+        # type. See `is_internal_name`.
+        # Always false in this class, may be set to true in derived classes.
+        self.include_intermediate = False
+
+    def is_internal_name(self, name: str) -> bool:
+        """Whether this is an internal macro. Internal macros will be skipped."""
+        if not self.include_intermediate:
+            if name.endswith('_BASE') or name.endswith('_NONE'):
+                return True
+            if '_CATEGORY_' in name:
+                return True
+        return name.endswith('_FLAG') or name.endswith('_MASK')
 
     def gather_arguments(self) -> None:
         """Populate the list of values for macro arguments.
@@ -73,7 +135,11 @@ class PSAMacroEnumerator:
 
     @staticmethod
     def _format_arguments(name: str, arguments: Iterable[str]) -> str:
-        """Format a macro call with arguments.."""
+        """Format a macro call with arguments.
+
+        The resulting format is consistent with
+        `InputsForTest.normalize_argument`.
+        """
         return name + '(' + ', '.join(arguments) + ')'
 
     _argument_split_re = re.compile(r' *, *')
@@ -111,6 +177,15 @@ class PSAMacroEnumerator:
         except BaseException as e:
             raise Exception('distribute_arguments({})'.format(name)) from e
 
+    def distribute_arguments_without_duplicates(
+            self, seen: Set[str], name: str
+    ) -> Iterator[str]:
+        """Same as `distribute_arguments`, but don't repeat seen results."""
+        for result in self.distribute_arguments(name):
+            if result not in seen:
+                seen.add(result)
+                yield result
+
     def generate_expressions(self, names: Iterable[str]) -> Iterator[str]:
         """Generate expressions covering values constructed from the given names.
 
@@ -123,7 +198,11 @@ class PSAMacroEnumerator:
         * ``macros.generate_expressions(macros.key_types)`` generates all
           key types.
         """
-        return itertools.chain(*map(self.distribute_arguments, names))
+        seen = set() #type: Set[str]
+        return itertools.chain(*(
+            self.distribute_arguments_without_duplicates(seen, name)
+            for name in names
+        ))
 
 
 class PSAMacroCollector(PSAMacroEnumerator):
@@ -144,15 +223,6 @@ class PSAMacroCollector(PSAMacroEnumerator):
         self.key_types_from_group = {} #type: Dict[str, str]
         self.algorithms_from_hash = {} #type: Dict[str, str]
 
-    def is_internal_name(self, name: str) -> bool:
-        """Whether this is an internal macro. Internal macros will be skipped."""
-        if not self.include_intermediate:
-            if name.endswith('_BASE') or name.endswith('_NONE'):
-                return True
-            if '_CATEGORY_' in name:
-                return True
-        return name.endswith('_FLAG') or name.endswith('_MASK')
-
     def record_algorithm_subtype(self, name: str, expansion: str) -> None:
         """Record the subtype of an algorithm constructor.
 
@@ -251,3 +321,179 @@ class PSAMacroCollector(PSAMacroEnumerator):
                 m = re.search(self._continued_line_re, line)
             line = re.sub(self._nonascii_re, rb'', line).decode('ascii')
             self.read_line(line)
+
+
+class InputsForTest(PSAMacroEnumerator):
+    # pylint: disable=too-many-instance-attributes
+    """Accumulate information about macros to test.
+enumerate
+    This includes macro names as well as information about their arguments
+    when applicable.
+    """
+
+    def __init__(self) -> None:
+        super().__init__()
+        self.all_declared = set() #type: Set[str]
+        # Identifier prefixes
+        self.table_by_prefix = {
+            'ERROR': self.statuses,
+            'ALG': self.algorithms,
+            'ECC_CURVE': self.ecc_curves,
+            'DH_GROUP': self.dh_groups,
+            'KEY_TYPE': self.key_types,
+            'KEY_USAGE': self.key_usage_flags,
+        } #type: Dict[str, Set[str]]
+        # Test functions
+        self.table_by_test_function = {
+            # Any function ending in _algorithm also gets added to
+            # self.algorithms.
+            'key_type': [self.key_types],
+            'block_cipher_key_type': [self.key_types],
+            'stream_cipher_key_type': [self.key_types],
+            'ecc_key_family': [self.ecc_curves],
+            'ecc_key_types': [self.ecc_curves],
+            'dh_key_family': [self.dh_groups],
+            'dh_key_types': [self.dh_groups],
+            'hash_algorithm': [self.hash_algorithms],
+            'mac_algorithm': [self.mac_algorithms],
+            'cipher_algorithm': [],
+            'hmac_algorithm': [self.mac_algorithms],
+            'aead_algorithm': [self.aead_algorithms],
+            'key_derivation_algorithm': [self.kdf_algorithms],
+            'key_agreement_algorithm': [self.ka_algorithms],
+            'asymmetric_signature_algorithm': [],
+            'asymmetric_signature_wildcard': [self.algorithms],
+            'asymmetric_encryption_algorithm': [],
+            'other_algorithm': [],
+        } #type: Dict[str, List[Set[str]]]
+        self.arguments_for['mac_length'] += ['1', '63']
+        self.arguments_for['min_mac_length'] += ['1', '63']
+        self.arguments_for['tag_length'] += ['1', '63']
+        self.arguments_for['min_tag_length'] += ['1', '63']
+
+    def add_numerical_values(self) -> None:
+        """Add numerical values that are not supported to the known identifiers."""
+        # Sets of names per type
+        self.algorithms.add('0xffffffff')
+        self.ecc_curves.add('0xff')
+        self.dh_groups.add('0xff')
+        self.key_types.add('0xffff')
+        self.key_usage_flags.add('0x80000000')
+
+        # Hard-coded values for unknown algorithms
+        #
+        # These have to have values that are correct for their respective
+        # PSA_ALG_IS_xxx macros, but are also not currently assigned and are
+        # not likely to be assigned in the near future.
+        self.hash_algorithms.add('0x020000fe') # 0x020000ff is PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH
+        self.mac_algorithms.add('0x03007fff')
+        self.ka_algorithms.add('0x09fc0000')
+        self.kdf_algorithms.add('0x080000ff')
+        # For AEAD algorithms, the only variability is over the tag length,
+        # and this only applies to known algorithms, so don't test an
+        # unknown algorithm.
+
+    def get_names(self, type_word: str) -> Set[str]:
+        """Return the set of known names of values of the given type."""
+        return {
+            'status': self.statuses,
+            'algorithm': self.algorithms,
+            'ecc_curve': self.ecc_curves,
+            'dh_group': self.dh_groups,
+            'key_type': self.key_types,
+            'key_usage': self.key_usage_flags,
+        }[type_word]
+
+    # Regex for interesting header lines.
+    # Groups: 1=macro name, 2=type, 3=argument list (optional).
+    _header_line_re = \
+        re.compile(r'#define +' +
+                   r'(PSA_((?:(?:DH|ECC|KEY)_)?[A-Z]+)_\w+)' +
+                   r'(?:\(([^\n()]*)\))?')
+    # Regex of macro names to exclude.
+    _excluded_name_re = re.compile(r'_(?:GET|IS|OF)_|_(?:BASE|FLAG|MASK)\Z')
+    # Additional excluded macros.
+    _excluded_names = set([
+        # Macros that provide an alternative way to build the same
+        # algorithm as another macro.
+        'PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG',
+        'PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC',
+        # Auxiliary macro whose name doesn't fit the usual patterns for
+        # auxiliary macros.
+        'PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG_CASE',
+    ])
+    def parse_header_line(self, line: str) -> None:
+        """Parse a C header line, looking for "#define PSA_xxx"."""
+        m = re.match(self._header_line_re, line)
+        if not m:
+            return
+        name = m.group(1)
+        self.all_declared.add(name)
+        if re.search(self._excluded_name_re, name) or \
+           name in self._excluded_names or \
+           self.is_internal_name(name):
+            return
+        dest = self.table_by_prefix.get(m.group(2))
+        if dest is None:
+            return
+        dest.add(name)
+        if m.group(3):
+            self.argspecs[name] = self._argument_split(m.group(3))
+
+    _nonascii_re = re.compile(rb'[^\x00-\x7f]+') #type: Pattern
+    def parse_header(self, filename: str) -> None:
+        """Parse a C header file, looking for "#define PSA_xxx"."""
+        with read_file_lines(filename, binary=True) as lines:
+            for line in lines:
+                line = re.sub(self._nonascii_re, rb'', line).decode('ascii')
+                self.parse_header_line(line)
+
+    _macro_identifier_re = re.compile(r'[A-Z]\w+')
+    def generate_undeclared_names(self, expr: str) -> Iterable[str]:
+        for name in re.findall(self._macro_identifier_re, expr):
+            if name not in self.all_declared:
+                yield name
+
+    def accept_test_case_line(self, function: str, argument: str) -> bool:
+        #pylint: disable=unused-argument
+        undeclared = list(self.generate_undeclared_names(argument))
+        if undeclared:
+            raise Exception('Undeclared names in test case', undeclared)
+        return True
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def normalize_argument(argument: str) -> str:
+        """Normalize whitespace in the given C expression.
+
+        The result uses the same whitespace as
+        ` PSAMacroEnumerator.distribute_arguments`.
+        """
+        return re.sub(r',', r', ', re.sub(r' +', r'', argument))
+
+    def add_test_case_line(self, function: str, argument: str) -> None:
+        """Parse a test case data line, looking for algorithm metadata tests."""
+        sets = []
+        if function.endswith('_algorithm'):
+            sets.append(self.algorithms)
+            if function == 'key_agreement_algorithm' and \
+               argument.startswith('PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT('):
+                # We only want *raw* key agreement algorithms as such, so
+                # exclude ones that are already chained with a KDF.
+                # Keep the expression as one to test as an algorithm.
+                function = 'other_algorithm'
+        sets += self.table_by_test_function[function]
+        if self.accept_test_case_line(function, argument):
+            for s in sets:
+                s.add(self.normalize_argument(argument))
+
+    # Regex matching a *.data line containing a test function call and
+    # its arguments. The actual definition is partly positional, but this
+    # regex is good enough in practice.
+    _test_case_line_re = re.compile(r'(?!depends_on:)(\w+):([^\n :][^:\n]*)')
+    def parse_test_cases(self, filename: str) -> None:
+        """Parse a test case file (*.data), looking for algorithm metadata tests."""
+        with read_file_lines(filename) as lines:
+            for line in lines:
+                m = re.match(self._test_case_line_re, line)
+                if m:
+                    self.add_test_case_line(m.group(1), m.group(2))

tests/CMakeLists.txt

@@ -151,6 +151,8 @@ add_test_suite(psa_crypto_se_driver_hal)
 add_test_suite(psa_crypto_se_driver_hal_mocks)
 add_test_suite(psa_crypto_slot_management)
 add_test_suite(psa_crypto_storage_format psa_crypto_storage_format.misc)
+add_test_suite(psa_crypto_storage_format psa_crypto_storage_format.current)
+add_test_suite(psa_crypto_storage_format psa_crypto_storage_format.v0)
 add_test_suite(psa_its)
 add_test_suite(random)
 add_test_suite(rsa)

tests/include/test/random.h

@@ -36,8 +36,11 @@
 
 typedef struct
 {
-    unsigned char *buf;
+    unsigned char *buf; /* Pointer to a buffer of length bytes. */
     size_t length;
+    /* If fallback_f_rng is NULL, fail after delivering length bytes. */
+    int ( *fallback_f_rng )( void*, unsigned char *, size_t );
+    void *fallback_p_rng;
 } mbedtls_test_rnd_buf_info;
 
 /**
@@ -67,24 +70,25 @@ int mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand( void *rng_state,
                                size_t len );
 
 /**
- * This function only returns zeros
+ * This function only returns zeros.
  *
- * rng_state shall be NULL.
+ * \p rng_state shall be \c NULL.
  */
 int mbedtls_test_rnd_zero_rand( void *rng_state,
                                 unsigned char *output,
                                 size_t len );
 
 /**
- * This function returns random based on a buffer it receives.
+ * This function returns random data based on a buffer it receives.
  *
- * rng_state shall be a pointer to a rnd_buf_info structure.
+ * \p rng_state shall be a pointer to a #mbedtls_test_rnd_buf_info structure.
  *
  * The number of bytes released from the buffer on each call to
- * the random function is specified by per_call. (Can be between
+ * the random function is specified by \p len.
- * 1 and 4)
  *
- * After the buffer is empty it will return rand();
+ * After the buffer is empty, this function will call the fallback RNG in the
+ * #mbedtls_test_rnd_buf_info structure if there is one, and
+ * will return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED otherwise.
  */
 int mbedtls_test_rnd_buffer_rand( void *rng_state,
                                   unsigned char *output,
@@ -96,7 +100,7 @@ int mbedtls_test_rnd_buffer_rand( void *rng_state,
  * Pseudo random is based on the XTEA encryption algorithm to
  * generate pseudorandom.
  *
- * rng_state shall be a pointer to a rnd_pseudo_info structure.
+ * \p rng_state shall be a pointer to a #mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info structure.
  */
 int mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand( void *rng_state,
                                   unsigned char *output,

tests/scripts/all.sh

@@ -1085,26 +1085,8 @@ component_test_ecp_restartable_no_internal_rng () {
     # no SSL tests as they all depend on having a DRBG
 }
 
-component_test_new_ecdh_context () {
-    msg "build: new ECDH context (ASan build)" # ~ 6 min
-    scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT
-    CC=gcc cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Asan .
-    make
-
-    msg "test: new ECDH context - main suites (inc. selftests) (ASan build)" # ~ 50s
-    make test
-
-    msg "test: new ECDH context - ECDH-related part of ssl-opt.sh (ASan build)" # ~ 5s
-    if_build_succeeded tests/ssl-opt.sh -f ECDH
-
-    msg "test: new ECDH context - compat.sh with some ECDH ciphersuites (ASan build)" # ~ 3 min
-    # Exclude some symmetric ciphers that are redundant here to gain time.
-    if_build_succeeded tests/compat.sh -f ECDH -V NO -e 'ARCFOUR\|ARIA\|CAMELLIA\|CHACHA\|DES\|RC4'
-}
-
 component_test_everest () {
     msg "build: Everest ECDH context (ASan build)" # ~ 6 min
-    scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT
     scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED
     CC=clang cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Asan .
     make
@@ -1122,7 +1104,6 @@ component_test_everest () {
 
 component_test_everest_curve25519_only () {
     msg "build: Everest ECDH context, only Curve25519" # ~ 6 min
-    scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT
     scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED
     scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
     scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED
@@ -2294,7 +2275,6 @@ support_test_m32_o1 () {
 
 component_test_m32_everest () {
     msg "build: i386, Everest ECDH context (ASan build)" # ~ 6 min
-    scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT
     scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED
     make CC=gcc CFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS -m32 -O2" LDFLAGS="-m32 $ASAN_CFLAGS"
 

tests/scripts/check-generated-files.sh

@@ -44,23 +44,28 @@ if [ $# -ne 0 ] && [ "$1" = "-u" ]; then
     UPDATE='y'
 fi
 
+# check SCRIPT FILENAME[...]
+# check SCRIPT DIRECTORY
+# Run SCRIPT and check that it does not modify any of the specified files.
+# In the first form, there can be any number of FILENAMEs, which must be
+# regular files.
+# In the second form, there must be a single DIRECTORY, standing for the
+# list of files in the directory. Running SCRIPT must not modify any file
+# in the directory and must not add or remove files either.
+# If $UPDATE is empty, abort with an error status if a file is modified.
 check()
 {
     SCRIPT=$1
-    TO_CHECK=$2
+    shift
-    PATTERN=""
-    FILES=""
 
-    if [ -d $TO_CHECK ]; then
+    directory=
-        rm -f "$TO_CHECK"/*.bak
+    if [ -d "$1" ]; then
-        for FILE in $TO_CHECK/*; do
+        directory="$1"
-            FILES="$FILE $FILES"
+        rm -f "$directory"/*.bak
-        done
+        set -- "$1"/*
-    else
-        FILES=$TO_CHECK
     fi
 
-    for FILE in $FILES; do
+    for FILE in "$@"; do
         if [ -e "$FILE" ]; then
             cp "$FILE" "$FILE.bak"
         else
@@ -68,37 +73,32 @@ check()
         fi
     done
 
-    $SCRIPT
+    "$SCRIPT"
 
     # Compare the script output to the old files and remove backups
-    for FILE in $FILES; do
+    for FILE in "$@"; do
-        if ! diff $FILE $FILE.bak >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+        if ! diff "$FILE" "$FILE.bak" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
             echo "'$FILE' was either modified or deleted by '$SCRIPT'"
             if [ -z "$UPDATE" ]; then
                 exit 1
             fi
         fi
         if [ -z "$UPDATE" ]; then
-            mv $FILE.bak $FILE
+            mv "$FILE.bak" "$FILE"
         else
             rm -f "$FILE.bak"
         fi
-
-        if [ -d $TO_CHECK ]; then
-            # Create a grep regular expression that we can check against the
-            # directory contents to test whether new files have been created
-            if [ -z $PATTERN ]; then
-                PATTERN="$(basename $FILE)"
-            else
-                PATTERN="$PATTERN\|$(basename $FILE)"
-            fi
-        fi
     done
 
-    if [ -d $TO_CHECK ]; then
+    if [ -n "$directory" ]; then
+        old_list="$*"
+        set -- "$directory"/*
+        new_list="$*"
         # Check if there are any new files
-        if ls -1 $TO_CHECK | grep -v "$PATTERN" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+        if [ "$old_list" != "$new_list" ]; then
-            echo "Files were created by '$SCRIPT'"
+            echo "Files were deleted or created by '$SCRIPT'"
+            echo "Before: $old_list"
+            echo "After: $new_list"
             if [ -z "$UPDATE" ]; then
                 exit 1
             fi

tests/scripts/generate_psa_tests.py

@@ -60,6 +60,14 @@ def finish_family_dependencies(dependencies: List[str], bits: int) -> List[str]:
     """
     return [finish_family_dependency(dep, bits) for dep in dependencies]
 
+SYMBOLS_WITHOUT_DEPENDENCY = frozenset([
+    'PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG', # modifier, only in policies
+    'PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG', # modifier
+    'PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH', # only in policies
+    'PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC', # modifier, only in policies
+    'PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT', # chaining
+    'PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC', # modifier
+])
 def automatic_dependencies(*expressions: str) -> List[str]:
     """Infer dependencies of a test case by looking for PSA_xxx symbols.
 
@@ -70,6 +78,7 @@ def automatic_dependencies(*expressions: str) -> List[str]:
     used = set()
     for expr in expressions:
         used.update(re.findall(r'PSA_(?:ALG|ECC_FAMILY|KEY_TYPE)_\w+', expr))
+    used.difference_update(SYMBOLS_WITHOUT_DEPENDENCY)
     return sorted(psa_want_symbol(name) for name in used)
 
 # A temporary hack: at the time of writing, not all dependency symbols
@@ -100,24 +109,27 @@ class Information:
 
     @staticmethod
     def remove_unwanted_macros(
-            constructors: macro_collector.PSAMacroCollector
+            constructors: macro_collector.PSAMacroEnumerator
     ) -> None:
-        # Mbed TLS doesn't support DSA. Don't attempt to generate any related
+        # Mbed TLS doesn't support finite-field DH yet and will not support
-        # test case.
+        # finite-field DSA. Don't attempt to generate any related test case.
+        constructors.key_types.discard('PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR')
+        constructors.key_types.discard('PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY')
         constructors.key_types.discard('PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_KEY_PAIR')
         constructors.key_types.discard('PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_PUBLIC_KEY')
-        constructors.algorithms_from_hash.pop('PSA_ALG_DSA', None)
-        constructors.algorithms_from_hash.pop('PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA', None)
 
-    def read_psa_interface(self) -> macro_collector.PSAMacroCollector:
+    def read_psa_interface(self) -> macro_collector.PSAMacroEnumerator:
         """Return the list of known key types, algorithms, etc."""
-        constructors = macro_collector.PSAMacroCollector()
+        constructors = macro_collector.InputsForTest()
         header_file_names = ['include/psa/crypto_values.h',
                              'include/psa/crypto_extra.h']
+        test_suites = ['tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_metadata.data']
         for header_file_name in header_file_names:
-            with open(header_file_name, 'rb') as header_file:
+            constructors.parse_header(header_file_name)
-                constructors.read_file(header_file)
+        for test_cases in test_suites:
+            constructors.parse_test_cases(test_cases)
         self.remove_unwanted_macros(constructors)
+        constructors.gather_arguments()
         return constructors
 
 
@@ -199,14 +211,18 @@ class NotSupported:
             )
             # To be added: derive
 
+    ECC_KEY_TYPES = ('PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR',
+                     'PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY')
+
     def test_cases_for_not_supported(self) -> Iterator[test_case.TestCase]:
         """Generate test cases that exercise the creation of keys of unsupported types."""
         for key_type in sorted(self.constructors.key_types):
+            if key_type in self.ECC_KEY_TYPES:
+                continue
             kt = crypto_knowledge.KeyType(key_type)
             yield from self.test_cases_for_key_type_not_supported(kt)
         for curve_family in sorted(self.constructors.ecc_curves):
-            for constr in ('PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR',
+            for constr in self.ECC_KEY_TYPES:
-                           'PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY'):
                 kt = crypto_knowledge.KeyType(constr, [curve_family])
                 yield from self.test_cases_for_key_type_not_supported(
                     kt, param_descr='type')
@@ -260,13 +276,17 @@ class StorageFormat:
         if self.forward:
             extra_arguments = []
         else:
+            flags = []
             # Some test keys have the RAW_DATA type and attributes that don't
             # necessarily make sense. We do this to validate numerical
             # encodings of the attributes.
             # Raw data keys have no useful exercise anyway so there is no
             # loss of test coverage.
-            exercise = key.type.string != 'PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA'
+            if key.type.string != 'PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA':
-            extra_arguments = ['1' if exercise else '0']
+                flags.append('TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE')
+            if 'READ_ONLY' in key.lifetime.string:
+                flags.append('TEST_FLAG_READ_ONLY')
+            extra_arguments = [' | '.join(flags) if flags else '0']
         tc.set_arguments([key.lifetime.string,
                           key.type.string, str(key.bits),
                           key.usage.string, key.alg.string, key.alg2.string,
@@ -335,23 +355,17 @@ class StorageFormat:
 
     def all_keys_for_types(self) -> Iterator[StorageKey]:
         """Generate test keys covering key types and their representations."""
-        for key_type in sorted(self.constructors.key_types):
+        key_types = sorted(self.constructors.key_types)
+        for key_type in self.constructors.generate_expressions(key_types):
             yield from self.keys_for_type(key_type)
-        for key_type in sorted(self.constructors.key_types_from_curve):
-            for curve in sorted(self.constructors.ecc_curves):
-                yield from self.keys_for_type(key_type, [curve])
-        ## Diffie-Hellman (FFDH) is not supported yet, either in
-        ## crypto_knowledge.py or in Mbed TLS.
-        # for key_type in sorted(self.constructors.key_types_from_group):
-        #     for group in sorted(self.constructors.dh_groups):
-        #         yield from self.keys_for_type(key_type, [group])
 
     def keys_for_algorithm(self, alg: str) -> Iterator[StorageKey]:
         """Generate test keys for the specified algorithm."""
         # For now, we don't have information on the compatibility of key
         # types and algorithms. So we just test the encoding of algorithms,
         # and not that operations can be performed with them.
-        descr = alg
+        descr = re.sub(r'PSA_ALG_', r'', alg)
+        descr = re.sub(r',', r', ', re.sub(r' +', r'', descr))
         usage = 'PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT'
         key1 = StorageKey(version=self.version,
                           id=1, lifetime=0x00000001,
@@ -370,17 +384,21 @@ class StorageFormat:
 
     def all_keys_for_algorithms(self) -> Iterator[StorageKey]:
         """Generate test keys covering algorithm encodings."""
-        for alg in sorted(self.constructors.algorithms):
+        algorithms = sorted(self.constructors.algorithms)
+        for alg in self.constructors.generate_expressions(algorithms):
             yield from self.keys_for_algorithm(alg)
-        # To do: algorithm constructors with parameters
 
     def all_test_cases(self) -> Iterator[test_case.TestCase]:
         """Generate all storage format test cases."""
-        for key in self.all_keys_for_usage_flags():
+        # First build a list of all keys, then construct all the corresponding
-            yield self.make_test_case(key)
+        # test cases. This allows all required information to be obtained in
-        for key in self.all_keys_for_types():
+        # one go, which is a significant performance gain as the information
-            yield self.make_test_case(key)
+        # includes numerical values obtained by compiling a C program.
-        for key in self.all_keys_for_algorithms():
+        keys = [] #type: List[StorageKey]
+        keys += self.all_keys_for_usage_flags()
+        keys += self.all_keys_for_types()
+        keys += self.all_keys_for_algorithms()
+        for key in keys:
             yield self.make_test_case(key)
         # To do: vary id, lifetime
 

tests/scripts/test_psa_constant_names.py

@@ -28,231 +28,30 @@ import os
 import re
 import subprocess
 import sys
+from typing import Iterable, List, Optional, Tuple
 
 import scripts_path # pylint: disable=unused-import
 from mbedtls_dev import c_build_helper
-from mbedtls_dev import macro_collector
+from mbedtls_dev.macro_collector import InputsForTest, PSAMacroEnumerator
+from mbedtls_dev import typing_util
 
-class ReadFileLineException(Exception):
+def gather_inputs(headers: Iterable[str],
-    def __init__(self, filename, line_number):
+                  test_suites: Iterable[str],
-        message = 'in {} at {}'.format(filename, line_number)
+                  inputs_class=InputsForTest) -> PSAMacroEnumerator:
-        super(ReadFileLineException, self).__init__(message)
-        self.filename = filename
-        self.line_number = line_number
-
-class read_file_lines:
-    # Dear Pylint, conventionally, a context manager class name is lowercase.
-    # pylint: disable=invalid-name,too-few-public-methods
-    """Context manager to read a text file line by line.
-
-    ```
-    with read_file_lines(filename) as lines:
-        for line in lines:
-            process(line)
-    ```
-    is equivalent to
-    ```
-    with open(filename, 'r') as input_file:
-        for line in input_file:
-            process(line)
-    ```
-    except that if process(line) raises an exception, then the read_file_lines
-    snippet annotates the exception with the file name and line number.
-    """
-    def __init__(self, filename, binary=False):
-        self.filename = filename
-        self.line_number = 'entry'
-        self.generator = None
-        self.binary = binary
-    def __enter__(self):
-        self.generator = enumerate(open(self.filename,
-                                        'rb' if self.binary else 'r'))
-        return self
-    def __iter__(self):
-        for line_number, content in self.generator:
-            self.line_number = line_number
-            yield content
-        self.line_number = 'exit'
-    def __exit__(self, exc_type, exc_value, exc_traceback):
-        if exc_type is not None:
-            raise ReadFileLineException(self.filename, self.line_number) \
-                from exc_value
-
-class InputsForTest(macro_collector.PSAMacroEnumerator):
-    # pylint: disable=too-many-instance-attributes
-    """Accumulate information about macros to test.
-
-    This includes macro names as well as information about their arguments
-    when applicable.
-    """
-
-    def __init__(self):
-        super().__init__()
-        self.all_declared = set()
-        # Sets of names per type
-        self.statuses.add('PSA_SUCCESS')
-        self.algorithms.add('0xffffffff')
-        self.ecc_curves.add('0xff')
-        self.dh_groups.add('0xff')
-        self.key_types.add('0xffff')
-        self.key_usage_flags.add('0x80000000')
-
-        # Hard-coded values for unknown algorithms
-        #
-        # These have to have values that are correct for their respective
-        # PSA_ALG_IS_xxx macros, but are also not currently assigned and are
-        # not likely to be assigned in the near future.
-        self.hash_algorithms.add('0x020000fe') # 0x020000ff is PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH
-        self.mac_algorithms.add('0x03007fff')
-        self.ka_algorithms.add('0x09fc0000')
-        self.kdf_algorithms.add('0x080000ff')
-        # For AEAD algorithms, the only variability is over the tag length,
-        # and this only applies to known algorithms, so don't test an
-        # unknown algorithm.
-
-        # Identifier prefixes
-        self.table_by_prefix = {
-            'ERROR': self.statuses,
-            'ALG': self.algorithms,
-            'ECC_CURVE': self.ecc_curves,
-            'DH_GROUP': self.dh_groups,
-            'KEY_TYPE': self.key_types,
-            'KEY_USAGE': self.key_usage_flags,
-        }
-        # Test functions
-        self.table_by_test_function = {
-            # Any function ending in _algorithm also gets added to
-            # self.algorithms.
-            'key_type': [self.key_types],
-            'block_cipher_key_type': [self.key_types],
-            'stream_cipher_key_type': [self.key_types],
-            'ecc_key_family': [self.ecc_curves],
-            'ecc_key_types': [self.ecc_curves],
-            'dh_key_family': [self.dh_groups],
-            'dh_key_types': [self.dh_groups],
-            'hash_algorithm': [self.hash_algorithms],
-            'mac_algorithm': [self.mac_algorithms],
-            'cipher_algorithm': [],
-            'hmac_algorithm': [self.mac_algorithms],
-            'aead_algorithm': [self.aead_algorithms],
-            'key_derivation_algorithm': [self.kdf_algorithms],
-            'key_agreement_algorithm': [self.ka_algorithms],
-            'asymmetric_signature_algorithm': [],
-            'asymmetric_signature_wildcard': [self.algorithms],
-            'asymmetric_encryption_algorithm': [],
-            'other_algorithm': [],
-        }
-        self.arguments_for['mac_length'] += ['1', '63']
-        self.arguments_for['min_mac_length'] += ['1', '63']
-        self.arguments_for['tag_length'] += ['1', '63']
-        self.arguments_for['min_tag_length'] += ['1', '63']
-
-    def get_names(self, type_word):
-        """Return the set of known names of values of the given type."""
-        return {
-            'status': self.statuses,
-            'algorithm': self.algorithms,
-            'ecc_curve': self.ecc_curves,
-            'dh_group': self.dh_groups,
-            'key_type': self.key_types,
-            'key_usage': self.key_usage_flags,
-        }[type_word]
-
-    # Regex for interesting header lines.
-    # Groups: 1=macro name, 2=type, 3=argument list (optional).
-    _header_line_re = \
-        re.compile(r'#define +' +
-                   r'(PSA_((?:(?:DH|ECC|KEY)_)?[A-Z]+)_\w+)' +
-                   r'(?:\(([^\n()]*)\))?')
-    # Regex of macro names to exclude.
-    _excluded_name_re = re.compile(r'_(?:GET|IS|OF)_|_(?:BASE|FLAG|MASK)\Z')
-    # Additional excluded macros.
-    _excluded_names = set([
-        # Macros that provide an alternative way to build the same
-        # algorithm as another macro.
-        'PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG',
-        'PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC',
-        # Auxiliary macro whose name doesn't fit the usual patterns for
-        # auxiliary macros.
-        'PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG_CASE',
-    ])
-    def parse_header_line(self, line):
-        """Parse a C header line, looking for "#define PSA_xxx"."""
-        m = re.match(self._header_line_re, line)
-        if not m:
-            return
-        name = m.group(1)
-        self.all_declared.add(name)
-        if re.search(self._excluded_name_re, name) or \
-           name in self._excluded_names:
-            return
-        dest = self.table_by_prefix.get(m.group(2))
-        if dest is None:
-            return
-        dest.add(name)
-        if m.group(3):
-            self.argspecs[name] = self._argument_split(m.group(3))
-
-    _nonascii_re = re.compile(rb'[^\x00-\x7f]+')
-    def parse_header(self, filename):
-        """Parse a C header file, looking for "#define PSA_xxx"."""
-        with read_file_lines(filename, binary=True) as lines:
-            for line in lines:
-                line = re.sub(self._nonascii_re, rb'', line).decode('ascii')
-                self.parse_header_line(line)
-
-    _macro_identifier_re = re.compile(r'[A-Z]\w+')
-    def generate_undeclared_names(self, expr):
-        for name in re.findall(self._macro_identifier_re, expr):
-            if name not in self.all_declared:
-                yield name
-
-    def accept_test_case_line(self, function, argument):
-        #pylint: disable=unused-argument
-        undeclared = list(self.generate_undeclared_names(argument))
-        if undeclared:
-            raise Exception('Undeclared names in test case', undeclared)
-        return True
-
-    def add_test_case_line(self, function, argument):
-        """Parse a test case data line, looking for algorithm metadata tests."""
-        sets = []
-        if function.endswith('_algorithm'):
-            sets.append(self.algorithms)
-            if function == 'key_agreement_algorithm' and \
-               argument.startswith('PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT('):
-                # We only want *raw* key agreement algorithms as such, so
-                # exclude ones that are already chained with a KDF.
-                # Keep the expression as one to test as an algorithm.
-                function = 'other_algorithm'
-        sets += self.table_by_test_function[function]
-        if self.accept_test_case_line(function, argument):
-            for s in sets:
-                s.add(argument)
-
-    # Regex matching a *.data line containing a test function call and
-    # its arguments. The actual definition is partly positional, but this
-    # regex is good enough in practice.
-    _test_case_line_re = re.compile(r'(?!depends_on:)(\w+):([^\n :][^:\n]*)')
-    def parse_test_cases(self, filename):
-        """Parse a test case file (*.data), looking for algorithm metadata tests."""
-        with read_file_lines(filename) as lines:
-            for line in lines:
-                m = re.match(self._test_case_line_re, line)
-                if m:
-                    self.add_test_case_line(m.group(1), m.group(2))
-
-def gather_inputs(headers, test_suites, inputs_class=InputsForTest):
     """Read the list of inputs to test psa_constant_names with."""
     inputs = inputs_class()
     for header in headers:
         inputs.parse_header(header)
     for test_cases in test_suites:
         inputs.parse_test_cases(test_cases)
+    inputs.add_numerical_values()
     inputs.gather_arguments()
     return inputs
 
-def run_c(type_word, expressions, include_path=None, keep_c=False):
+def run_c(type_word: str,
+          expressions: Iterable[str],
+          include_path: Optional[str] = None,
+          keep_c: bool = False) -> List[str]:
     """Generate and run a program to print out numerical values of C expressions."""
     if type_word == 'status':
         cast_to = 'long'
@@ -271,14 +70,17 @@ def run_c(type_word, expressions, include_path=None, keep_c=False):
     )
 
 NORMALIZE_STRIP_RE = re.compile(r'\s+')
-def normalize(expr):
+def normalize(expr: str) -> str:
     """Normalize the C expression so as not to care about trivial differences.
 
     Currently "trivial differences" means whitespace.
     """
     return re.sub(NORMALIZE_STRIP_RE, '', expr)
 
-def collect_values(inputs, type_word, include_path=None, keep_c=False):
+def collect_values(inputs: InputsForTest,
+                   type_word: str,
+                   include_path: Optional[str] = None,
+                   keep_c: bool = False) -> Tuple[List[str], List[str]]:
     """Generate expressions using known macro names and calculate their values.
 
     Return a list of pairs of (expr, value) where expr is an expression and
@@ -296,12 +98,12 @@ class Tests:
     Error = namedtuple('Error',
                        ['type', 'expression', 'value', 'output'])
 
-    def __init__(self, options):
+    def __init__(self, options) -> None:
         self.options = options
         self.count = 0
-        self.errors = []
+        self.errors = [] #type: List[Tests.Error]
 
-    def run_one(self, inputs, type_word):
+    def run_one(self, inputs: InputsForTest, type_word: str) -> None:
         """Test psa_constant_names for the specified type.
 
         Run the program on the names for this type.
@@ -311,9 +113,10 @@ class Tests:
         expressions, values = collect_values(inputs, type_word,
                                              include_path=self.options.include,
                                              keep_c=self.options.keep_c)
-        output = subprocess.check_output([self.options.program, type_word] +
+        output_bytes = subprocess.check_output([self.options.program,
-                                         values)
+                                                type_word] + values)
-        outputs = output.decode('ascii').strip().split('\n')
+        output = output_bytes.decode('ascii')
+        outputs = output.strip().split('\n')
         self.count += len(expressions)
         for expr, value, output in zip(expressions, values, outputs):
             if self.options.show:
@@ -324,13 +127,13 @@ class Tests:
                                               value=value,
                                               output=output))
 
-    def run_all(self, inputs):
+    def run_all(self, inputs: InputsForTest) -> None:
         """Run psa_constant_names on all the gathered inputs."""
         for type_word in ['status', 'algorithm', 'ecc_curve', 'dh_group',
                           'key_type', 'key_usage']:
             self.run_one(inputs, type_word)
 
-    def report(self, out):
+    def report(self, out: typing_util.Writable) -> None:
         """Describe each case where the output is not as expected.
 
         Write the errors to ``out``.
@@ -365,7 +168,7 @@ def main():
                         help='Program to test')
     parser.add_argument('--show',
                         action='store_true',
-                        help='Keep the intermediate C file')
+                        help='Show tested values on stdout')
     parser.add_argument('--no-show',
                         action='store_false', dest='show',
                         help='Don\'t show tested values (default)')

tests/src/random.c

@@ -35,6 +35,8 @@
 #include <test/random.h>
 #include <string.h>
 
+#include <mbedtls/entropy.h>
+
 int mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand( void *rng_state,
                                unsigned char *output,
                                size_t len )
@@ -91,8 +93,16 @@ int mbedtls_test_rnd_buffer_rand( void *rng_state,
     }
 
     if( len - use_len > 0 )
-        return( mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand( NULL, output + use_len,
+    {
-                                           len - use_len ) );
+        if( info->fallback_f_rng != NULL )
+        {
+            return( info->fallback_f_rng( info->fallback_p_rng,
+                                          output + use_len,
+                                          len - use_len ) );
+        }
+        else
+            return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED );
+    }
 
     return( 0 );
 }

tests/ssl-opt.sh

@@ -5614,17 +5614,6 @@ run_test    "ECJPAKE: working, DTLS, nolog" \
              force_ciphersuite=TLS-ECJPAKE-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8" \
             0
 
-# Tests for ciphersuites per version
-
-requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
-requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C
-requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_AES_C
-run_test    "Per-version suites: TLS 1.2" \
-            "$P_SRV version_suites=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA,TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA,TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256" \
-            "$P_CLI force_version=tls1_2" \
-            0 \
-            -c "Ciphersuite is TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256"
-
 # Test for ClientHello without extensions
 
 requires_gnutls

tests/suites/test_suite_dhm.data

@@ -1,23 +1,89 @@
-Diffie-Hellman full exchange #1
+Diffie-Hellman full exchange: tiny x_size
-dhm_do_dhm:10:"23":10:"5":0
+dhm_do_dhm:10:"93450983094850938450983409623":1:10:"9345098304850938450983409622":0
 
-Diffie-Hellman full exchange #2
+Diffie-Hellman full exchange: 5-bit, x_size=3
-dhm_do_dhm:10:"93450983094850938450983409623":10:"9345098304850938450983409622":0
+dhm_do_dhm:10:"23":3:10:"5":0
 
-Diffie-Hellman full exchange #3
+Diffie-Hellman full exchange: 5-bit, x_size=2
-dhm_do_dhm:10:"93450983094850938450983409623982317398171298719873918739182739712938719287391879381271":10:"9345098309485093845098340962223981329819812792137312973297123912791271":0
+dhm_do_dhm:10:"23":2:10:"5":0
+
+## Repeat this test case and a few similar ones several times. The RNG state
+## changes, so we get to exercise the code with a few different values.
+Diffie-Hellman full exchange: 5-bit #1
+dhm_do_dhm:10:"23":1:10:"5":0
+
+Diffie-Hellman full exchange: 5-bit #2
+dhm_do_dhm:10:"23":1:10:"5":0
+
+Diffie-Hellman full exchange: 5-bit #3
+dhm_do_dhm:10:"23":1:10:"5":0
+
+Diffie-Hellman full exchange: 5-bit #4
+dhm_do_dhm:10:"23":1:10:"5":0
+
+Diffie-Hellman full exchange: 5-bit #5
+dhm_do_dhm:10:"23":1:10:"5":0
+
+## This is x_size = P_size + 1. Arguably x_size > P_size makes no sense,
+## but it's the current undocumented behavior to treat it the same as when
+## x_size = P_size. If this behavior changes in the future, change the expected
+## return status from 0 to MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA.
+Diffie-Hellman full exchange: 97-bit, x_size=14
+dhm_do_dhm:10:"93450983094850938450983409623":14:10:"9345098304850938450983409622":0
+
+Diffie-Hellman full exchange: 97-bit #1
+dhm_do_dhm:10:"93450983094850938450983409623":13:10:"9345098304850938450983409622":0
+
+Diffie-Hellman full exchange: 97-bit #2
+dhm_do_dhm:10:"93450983094850938450983409623":13:10:"9345098304850938450983409622":0
+
+Diffie-Hellman full exchange: 97-bit #3
+dhm_do_dhm:10:"93450983094850938450983409623":13:10:"9345098304850938450983409622":0
+
+Diffie-Hellman full exchange: 97-bit #4
+dhm_do_dhm:10:"93450983094850938450983409623":13:10:"9345098304850938450983409622":0
+
+Diffie-Hellman full exchange: 97-bit #5
+dhm_do_dhm:10:"93450983094850938450983409623":13:10:"9345098304850938450983409622":0
+
+Diffie-Hellman full exchange: 97-bit, x_size=12
+dhm_do_dhm:10:"93450983094850938450983409623":12:10:"9345098304850938450983409622":0
+
+Diffie-Hellman full exchange: 97-bit, x_size=11
+dhm_do_dhm:10:"93450983094850938450983409623":11:10:"9345098304850938450983409622":0
+
+Diffie-Hellman full exchange: 97-bit, x_size=1 #1
+dhm_do_dhm:10:"93450983094850938450983409623":1:10:"9345098304850938450983409622":0
+
+Diffie-Hellman full exchange: 97-bit, x_size=1 #2
+dhm_do_dhm:10:"93450983094850938450983409623":1:10:"9345098304850938450983409622":0
+
+Diffie-Hellman full exchange: 97-bit, x_size=1 #3
+dhm_do_dhm:10:"93450983094850938450983409623":1:10:"9345098304850938450983409622":0
+
+Diffie-Hellman full exchange: 97-bit, x_size=1 #4
+dhm_do_dhm:10:"93450983094850938450983409623":1:10:"9345098304850938450983409622":0
+
+Diffie-Hellman full exchange: 97-bit, x_size=1 #5
+dhm_do_dhm:10:"93450983094850938450983409623":1:10:"9345098304850938450983409622":0
+
+Diffie-Hellman full exchange: 286-bit
+dhm_do_dhm:10:"93450983094850938450983409623982317398171298719873918739182739712938719287391879381271":36:10:"9345098309485093845098340962223981329819812792137312973297123912791271":0
 
 Diffie-Hellman trivial subgroup #1
-dhm_do_dhm:10:"23":10:"1":MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA
+dhm_do_dhm:10:"23":1:10:"1":MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA
 
 Diffie-Hellman trivial subgroup #2
-dhm_do_dhm:10:"23":10:"-1":MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA
+dhm_do_dhm:10:"23":1:10:"-1":MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA
 
 Diffie-Hellman small modulus
-dhm_do_dhm:10:"3":10:"5":MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PARAMS_FAILED
+dhm_do_dhm:10:"3":1:10:"5":MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PARAMS_FAILED+MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA
 
 Diffie-Hellman zero modulus
-dhm_do_dhm:10:"0":10:"5":MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA
+dhm_do_dhm:10:"0":1:10:"5":MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA
+
+Diffie-Hellman: x_size < 0
+dhm_do_dhm:10:"93450983094850938450983409623":-1:10:"9345098304850938450983409622":MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA
 
 Diffie-Hellman MPI_MAX_SIZE modulus
 dhm_make_public:MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE:10:"5":0

tests/suites/test_suite_dhm.function

@@ -1,5 +1,68 @@
 /* BEGIN_HEADER */
 #include "mbedtls/dhm.h"
+
+/* Sanity checks on a Diffie-Hellman parameter: check the length-value
+ * syntax and check that the value is the expected one (taken from the
+ * DHM context by the caller). */
+static int check_dhm_param_output( const mbedtls_mpi *expected,
+                                   const unsigned char *buffer,
+                                   size_t size,
+                                   size_t *offset )
+{
+    size_t n;
+    mbedtls_mpi actual;
+    int ok = 0;
+    mbedtls_mpi_init( &actual );
+
+    ++mbedtls_test_info.step;
+
+    TEST_ASSERT( size >= *offset + 2 );
+    n = ( buffer[*offset] << 8 ) | buffer[*offset + 1];
+    *offset += 2;
+    /* The DHM param output from Mbed TLS has leading zeros stripped, as
+     * permitted but not required by RFC 5246 \S4.4. */
+    TEST_EQUAL( n, mbedtls_mpi_size( expected ) );
+    TEST_ASSERT( size >= *offset + n );
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &actual, buffer + *offset, n ) );
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( expected, &actual ) );
+    *offset += n;
+
+    ok = 1;
+exit:
+    mbedtls_mpi_free( &actual );
+    return( ok );
+}
+
+/* Sanity checks on Diffie-Hellman parameters: syntax, range, and comparison
+ * against the context. */
+static int check_dhm_params( const mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx,
+                             size_t x_size,
+                             const unsigned char *ske, size_t ske_len )
+{
+    size_t offset = 0;
+
+    /* Check that ctx->X and ctx->GX are within range. */
+    TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->X, 1 ) > 0 );
+    TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &ctx->X, &ctx->P ) < 0 );
+    TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->X ) <= x_size );
+    TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->GX, 1 ) > 0 );
+    TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &ctx->GX, &ctx->P ) < 0 );
+
+    /* Check ske: it must contain P, G and G^X, each prefixed with a
+     * 2-byte size. */
+    if( !check_dhm_param_output( &ctx->P, ske, ske_len, &offset ) )
+        goto exit;
+    if( !check_dhm_param_output( &ctx->G, ske, ske_len, &offset ) )
+        goto exit;
+    if( !check_dhm_param_output( &ctx->GX, ske, ske_len, &offset ) )
+        goto exit;
+    TEST_EQUAL( offset, ske_len );
+
+    return( 1 );
+exit:
+    return( 0 );
+}
+
 /* END_HEADER */
 
 /* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES
@@ -8,7 +71,7 @@
  */
 
 /* BEGIN_CASE */
-void dhm_do_dhm( int radix_P, char *input_P,
+void dhm_do_dhm( int radix_P, char *input_P, int x_size,
                  int radix_G, char *input_G, int result )
 {
     mbedtls_dhm_context ctx_srv;
@@ -22,7 +85,7 @@ void dhm_do_dhm( int radix_P, char *input_P,
     size_t pub_cli_len = 0;
     size_t sec_srv_len;
     size_t sec_cli_len;
-    int x_size, i;
+    int i;
     mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info rnd_info;
 
     mbedtls_dhm_init( &ctx_srv );
@@ -38,17 +101,19 @@ void dhm_do_dhm( int radix_P, char *input_P,
      */
     TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &ctx_srv.P, radix_P, input_P ) == 0 );
     TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &ctx_srv.G, radix_G, input_G ) == 0 );
-    x_size = mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx_srv.P );
+    pub_cli_len = mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx_srv.P );
-    pub_cli_len = x_size;
 
     /*
      * First key exchange
      */
+    mbedtls_test_set_step( 10 );
     TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_dhm_make_params( &ctx_srv, x_size, ske, &ske_len,
                                           &mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand,
                                           &rnd_info ) == result );
     if ( result != 0 )
         goto exit;
+    if( !check_dhm_params( &ctx_srv, x_size, ske, ske_len ) )
+        goto exit;
 
     ske[ske_len++] = 0;
     ske[ske_len++] = 0;
@@ -72,6 +137,7 @@ void dhm_do_dhm( int radix_P, char *input_P,
     /* Re-do calc_secret on server a few times to test update of blinding values */
     for( i = 0; i < 3; i++ )
     {
+        mbedtls_test_set_step( 20 + i );
         sec_srv_len = 1000;
         TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret( &ctx_srv, sec_srv,
                                               sizeof( sec_srv ), &sec_srv_len,
@@ -88,9 +154,12 @@ void dhm_do_dhm( int radix_P, char *input_P,
      */
     p = ske;
 
+    mbedtls_test_set_step( 30 );
     TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_dhm_make_params( &ctx_srv, x_size, ske, &ske_len,
                                           &mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand,
                                           &rnd_info ) == 0 );
+    if( !check_dhm_params( &ctx_srv, x_size, ske, ske_len ) )
+        goto exit;
     ske[ske_len++] = 0;
     ske[ske_len++] = 0;
     TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_dhm_read_params( &ctx_cli, &p, ske + ske_len ) == 0 );

tests/suites/test_suite_ecdh.data

@@ -73,10 +73,6 @@ ECDH restartable rfc 5903 p256 restart disabled max_ops=250
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
 ecdh_restart:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"C88F01F510D9AC3F70A292DAA2316DE544E9AAB8AFE84049C62A9C57862D1433":"C6EF9C5D78AE012A011164ACB397CE2088685D8F06BF9BE0B283AB46476BEE53":"D6840F6B42F6EDAFD13116E0E12565202FEF8E9ECE7DCE03812464D04B9442DE":0:250:0:0
 
-ECDH exchange legacy context
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED
-ecdh_exchange_legacy:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1
-
 ECDH calc_secret: ours first, SECP256R1 (RFC 5903)
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
 ecdh_exchange_calc_secret:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"c6ef9c5d78ae012a011164acb397ce2088685d8f06bf9be0b283ab46476bee53":"04dad0b65394221cf9b051e1feca5787d098dfe637fc90b9ef945d0c37725811805271a0461cdb8252d61f1c456fa3e59ab1f45b33accf5f58389e0577b8990bb3":0:"d6840f6b42f6edafd13116e0e12565202fef8e9ece7dce03812464d04b9442de"

tests/suites/test_suite_ecdh.function

@@ -116,6 +116,8 @@ void ecdh_primitive_testvec( int id, data_t * rnd_buf_A, char * xA_str,
 
     rnd_info_A.buf = rnd_buf_A->x;
     rnd_info_A.length = rnd_buf_A->len;
+    rnd_info_A.fallback_f_rng = mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand;
+    rnd_info_A.fallback_p_rng = NULL;
 
     /* Fix rnd_buf_A->x by shifting it left if necessary */
     if( grp.nbits % 8 != 0 )
@@ -132,6 +134,8 @@ void ecdh_primitive_testvec( int id, data_t * rnd_buf_A, char * xA_str,
 
     rnd_info_B.buf = rnd_buf_B->x;
     rnd_info_B.length = rnd_buf_B->len;
+    rnd_info_B.fallback_f_rng = mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand;
+    rnd_info_B.fallback_p_rng = NULL;
 
     /* Fix rnd_buf_B->x by shifting it left if necessary */
     if( grp.nbits % 8 != 0 )
@@ -238,9 +242,13 @@ void ecdh_restart( int id, data_t *dA, data_t *dB, data_t *z,
     mbedtls_ecdh_init( &srv );
     mbedtls_ecdh_init( &cli );
 
+    rnd_info_A.fallback_f_rng = mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand;
+    rnd_info_A.fallback_p_rng = NULL;
     rnd_info_A.buf = dA->x;
     rnd_info_A.length = dA->len;
 
+    rnd_info_B.fallback_f_rng = mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand;
+    rnd_info_B.fallback_p_rng = NULL;
     rnd_info_B.buf = dB->x;
     rnd_info_B.length = dB->len;
 
@@ -341,47 +349,6 @@ exit:
 }
 /* END_CASE */
 
-/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT */
-void ecdh_exchange_legacy( int id )
-{
-    mbedtls_ecdh_context srv, cli;
-    unsigned char buf[1000];
-    const unsigned char *vbuf;
-    size_t len;
-
-    mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info rnd_info;
-
-    mbedtls_ecdh_init( &srv );
-    mbedtls_ecdh_init( &cli );
-    memset( &rnd_info, 0x00, sizeof( mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info ) );
-
-    TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &srv.grp, id ) == 0 );
-
-    memset( buf, 0x00, sizeof( buf ) ); vbuf = buf;
-    TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecdh_make_params( &srv, &len, buf, 1000,
-                                           &mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand,
-                                           &rnd_info ) == 0 );
-    TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecdh_read_params( &cli, &vbuf, buf + len ) == 0 );
-
-    memset( buf, 0x00, sizeof( buf ) );
-    TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecdh_make_public( &cli, &len, buf, 1000,
-                                           &mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand,
-                                           &rnd_info ) == 0 );
-    TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecdh_read_public( &srv, buf, len ) == 0 );
-
-    TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret( &srv, &len, buf, 1000,
-                                           &mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand,
-                                           &rnd_info ) == 0 );
-    TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret( &cli, &len, buf, 1000, NULL,
-                                           NULL ) == 0 );
-    TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &srv.z, &cli.z ) == 0 );
-
-exit:
-    mbedtls_ecdh_free( &srv );
-    mbedtls_ecdh_free( &cli );
-}
-/* END_CASE */
-
 /* BEGIN_CASE */
 void ecdh_exchange_calc_secret( int grp_id,
                                 data_t *our_private_key,

tests/suites/test_suite_ecdsa.function

@@ -95,6 +95,8 @@ void ecdsa_prim_test_vectors( int id, char * d_str, char * xQ_str,
     TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &d, 16, d_str ) == 0 );
     TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &r_check, 16, r_str ) == 0 );
     TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &s_check, 16, s_str ) == 0 );
+    rnd_info.fallback_f_rng = mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand;
+    rnd_info.fallback_p_rng = NULL;
     rnd_info.buf = rnd_buf->x;
     rnd_info.length = rnd_buf->len;
 

tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.data

@@ -273,6 +273,42 @@ ECP gen keypair wrapper
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED
 mbedtls_ecp_gen_key:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1
 
+ECP generate Montgomery key: Curve25519, random in range
+genkey_mx_known_answer:254:"9e020406080a0c0e10121416181a1c1e20222426282a2c2e30323436383a3df0":"4f0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1ef8"
+
+ECP generate Montgomery key: Curve25519, clear higher bit
+genkey_mx_known_answer:254:"ff0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1ef8":"7f808101820283038404850586068707880889098a0a8b0b8c0c8d0d8e0e8f78"
+
+ECP generate Montgomery key: Curve25519, clear low bits
+genkey_mx_known_answer:254:"9e020406080a0c0e10121416181a1c1e20222426282a2c2e30323436383a3dff":"4f0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1ef8"
+
+ECP generate Montgomery key: Curve25519, random = all-bits-zero
+genkey_mx_known_answer:254:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"4000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
+
+ECP generate Montgomery key: Curve25519, random = all-bits-one
+genkey_mx_known_answer:254:"ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff":"7ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff8"
+
+ECP generate Montgomery key: Curve25519, not enough entropy
+genkey_mx_known_answer:254:"4f0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e":""
+
+ECP generate Montgomery key: Curve448, random in range
+genkey_mx_known_answer:447:"cf0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f30313233343536fc":"cf0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f30313233343536fc"
+
+ECP generate Montgomery key: Curve448, set high bit
+genkey_mx_known_answer:447:"0f0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f30313233343536fc":"8f0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f30313233343536fc"
+
+ECP generate Montgomery key: Curve448, clear low bits
+genkey_mx_known_answer:447:"cf0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f30313233343536ff":"cf0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f30313233343536fc"
+
+ECP generate Montgomery key: Curve448, random = all-bits-zero
+genkey_mx_known_answer:447:"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"8000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
+
+ECP generate Montgomery key: Curve448, random = all-bits-one
+genkey_mx_known_answer:447:"ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff":"fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffc"
+
+ECP generate Montgomery key: Curve448, not enough entropy
+genkey_mx_known_answer:447:"4f0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f30313233343536":""
+
 ECP read key #1 (short weierstrass, too small)
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED
 mbedtls_ecp_read_key:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1:"00":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY:0

tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.function

@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
 #define ECP_PT_RESET( x )           \
     mbedtls_ecp_point_free( x );    \
     mbedtls_ecp_point_init( x );
+
 /* END_HEADER */
 
 /* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES
@@ -916,6 +917,55 @@ exit:
 }
 /* END_CASE */
 
+/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS:MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED */
+void genkey_mx_known_answer( int bits, data_t *seed, data_t *expected )
+{
+    mbedtls_test_rnd_buf_info rnd_info;
+    mbedtls_mpi d;
+    int ret;
+    uint8_t *actual = NULL;
+
+    mbedtls_mpi_init( &d );
+    rnd_info.buf = seed->x;
+    rnd_info.length = seed->len;
+    rnd_info.fallback_f_rng = NULL;
+    rnd_info.fallback_p_rng = NULL;
+
+    ASSERT_ALLOC( actual, expected->len );
+
+    ret = mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey_mx( bits, &d,
+                                      mbedtls_test_rnd_buffer_rand, &rnd_info );
+
+    if( expected->len == 0 )
+    {
+        /* Expecting an error (happens if there isn't enough randomness) */
+        TEST_ASSERT( ret != 0 );
+    }
+    else
+    {
+        TEST_EQUAL( ret, 0 );
+        TEST_EQUAL( (size_t) bits + 1, mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &d ) );
+        TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &d, actual, expected->len ) );
+        /* Test the exact result. This assumes that the output of the
+         * RNG is used in a specific way, which is overly constraining.
+         * The advantage is that it's easier to test the expected properties
+         * of the generated key:
+         * - The most significant bit must be at a specific positions
+         *   (can be enforced by checking the bit-length).
+         * - The least significant bits must have specific values
+         *   (can be enforced by checking these bits).
+         * - Other bits must be random (by testing with different RNG outputs,
+         *   we validate that those bits are indeed influenced by the RNG). */
+        ASSERT_COMPARE( expected->x, expected->len,
+                        actual, expected->len );
+    }
+
+exit:
+    mbedtls_free( actual );
+    mbedtls_mpi_free( &d );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
 /* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
 void ecp_selftest(  )
 {

tests/suites/test_suite_mpi.data

@@ -986,46 +986,246 @@ Test bit set (Invalid bit value)
 mbedtls_mpi_set_bit:16:"00":5:2:16:"00":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA
 
 Fill random: 0 bytes
-mpi_fill_random:0:0:0
+mpi_fill_random:0:0:0:0
 
 Fill random: 1 byte, good
-mpi_fill_random:1:1:0
+mpi_fill_random:1:1:0:0
 
 Fill random: 2 bytes, good, no leading zero
-mpi_fill_random:2:2:0
+mpi_fill_random:2:2:0:0
 
 Fill random: 2 bytes, good, 1 leading zero
-mpi_fill_random:2:256:0
+mpi_fill_random:2:256:0:0
 
 Fill random: MAX_SIZE - 7, good
-mpi_fill_random:MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE - 7:MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE - 7:0
+mpi_fill_random:MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE - 7:MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE - 7:0:0
 
 Fill random: MAX_SIZE, good
-mpi_fill_random:MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE:MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE:0
+mpi_fill_random:MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE:MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE:0:0
+
+Fill random: 0 bytes, previously small >0
+mpi_fill_random:0:0:1:0
+
+Fill random: 0 bytes, previously small <0
+mpi_fill_random:0:0:-1:0
+
+Fill random: 0 bytes, previously large >0
+mpi_fill_random:0:0:65:0
+
+Fill random: 0 bytes, previously large <0
+mpi_fill_random:0:0:-65:0
+
+Fill random: 1 byte, previously small >0
+mpi_fill_random:1:1:1:0
+
+Fill random: 1 byte, previously small <0
+mpi_fill_random:1:1:-1:0
+
+Fill random: 1 byte, previously large >0
+mpi_fill_random:1:1:65:0
+
+Fill random: 1 byte, previously large <0
+mpi_fill_random:1:1:-65:0
+
+Fill random: 9 bytes, previously small >0
+mpi_fill_random:1:1:1:0
+
+Fill random: 9 bytes, previously small <0
+mpi_fill_random:1:1:-1:0
 
 Fill random: 1 byte, RNG failure
-mpi_fill_random:1:0:MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED
+mpi_fill_random:1:0:0:MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED
 
 Fill random: 2 bytes, RNG failure after 1 byte
-mpi_fill_random:2:1:MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED
+mpi_fill_random:2:1:0:MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED
 
 Fill random: 4 bytes, RNG failure after 3 bytes
-mpi_fill_random:4:3:MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED
+mpi_fill_random:4:3:0:MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED
 
 Fill random: 8 bytes, RNG failure after 7 bytes
-mpi_fill_random:8:7:MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED
+mpi_fill_random:8:7:0:MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED
 
 Fill random: 16 bytes, RNG failure after 1 bytes
-mpi_fill_random:16:1:MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED
+mpi_fill_random:16:1:0:MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED
 
 Fill random: 16 bytes, RNG failure after 8 bytes
-mpi_fill_random:16:8:MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED
+mpi_fill_random:16:8:0:MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED
 
 Fill random: 16 bytes, RNG failure after 15 bytes
-mpi_fill_random:16:15:MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED
+mpi_fill_random:16:15:0:MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED
 
 Fill random: MAX_SIZE bytes, RNG failure after MAX_SIZE-1 bytes
-mpi_fill_random:MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE:MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE-1:MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED
+mpi_fill_random:MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE:MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE-1:0:MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED
+
+MPI random in range: 1..2
+mpi_random_many:1:"02":1000
+
+MPI random in range: 1..3
+mpi_random_many:1:"03":1000
+
+MPI random in range: 1..4
+mpi_random_many:1:"04":1000
+
+MPI random in range: 1..5
+mpi_random_many:1:"05":1000
+
+MPI random in range: 1..6
+mpi_random_many:1:"06":1000
+
+MPI random in range: 1..7
+mpi_random_many:1:"07":1000
+
+MPI random in range: 1..8
+mpi_random_many:1:"08":1000
+
+MPI random in range: 1..9
+mpi_random_many:1:"09":1000
+
+MPI random in range: 1..10
+mpi_random_many:1:"0a":1000
+
+MPI random in range: 1..11
+mpi_random_many:1:"0b":1000
+
+MPI random in range: 1..12
+mpi_random_many:1:"0c":1000
+
+MPI random in range: 1..255
+mpi_random_many:1:"ff":100
+
+MPI random in range: 1..256
+mpi_random_many:1:"0100":100
+
+MPI random in range: 1..257
+mpi_random_many:1:"0101":100
+
+MPI random in range: 1..272
+mpi_random_many:1:"0110":100
+
+MPI random in range: 1..2^64-1
+mpi_random_many:1:"ffffffffffffffff":100
+
+MPI random in range: 1..2^64
+mpi_random_many:1:"010000000000000000":100
+
+MPI random in range: 1..2^64+1
+mpi_random_many:1:"010000000000000001":100
+
+MPI random in range: 1..2^64+2^63
+mpi_random_many:1:"018000000000000000":100
+
+MPI random in range: 1..2^65-1
+mpi_random_many:1:"01ffffffffffffffff":100
+
+MPI random in range: 1..2^65
+mpi_random_many:1:"020000000000000000":100
+
+MPI random in range: 1..2^65+1
+mpi_random_many:1:"020000000000000001":100
+
+MPI random in range: 1..2^65+2^64
+mpi_random_many:1:"030000000000000000":100
+
+MPI random in range: 1..2^66+2^65
+mpi_random_many:1:"060000000000000000":100
+
+MPI random in range: 1..2^71-1
+mpi_random_many:1:"7fffffffffffffffff":100
+
+MPI random in range: 1..2^71
+mpi_random_many:1:"800000000000000000":100
+
+MPI random in range: 1..2^71+1
+mpi_random_many:1:"800000000000000001":100
+
+MPI random in range: 1..2^71+2^70
+mpi_random_many:1:"c00000000000000000":100
+
+MPI random in range: 1..2^72-1
+mpi_random_many:1:"ffffffffffffffffff":100
+
+MPI random in range: 1..2^72
+mpi_random_many:1:"01000000000000000000":100
+
+MPI random in range: 1..2^72+1
+mpi_random_many:1:"01000000000000000001":100
+
+MPI random in range: 1..2^72+2^71
+mpi_random_many:1:"01800000000000000000":100
+
+MPI random in range: 0..1
+mpi_random_many:0:"04":10000
+
+MPI random in range: 0..4
+mpi_random_many:0:"04":10000
+
+MPI random in range: 2..4
+mpi_random_many:2:"04":10000
+
+MPI random in range: 3..4
+mpi_random_many:3:"04":10000
+
+MPI random in range: smaller result
+mpi_random_sizes:1:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaabbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb":1:0
+
+MPI random in range: same size result (32-bit limbs)
+mpi_random_sizes:1:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":2:0
+
+MPI random in range: same size result (64-bit limbs)
+mpi_random_sizes:1:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":1:0
+
+MPI random in range: larger result
+mpi_random_sizes:1:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":3:0
+
+## The "0 limb in upper bound" tests rely on the fact that
+## mbedtls_mpi_read_binary() bases the size of the MPI on the size of
+## the input, without first checking for leading zeros. If this was
+## not the case, the tests would still pass, but would not exercise
+## the advertised behavior.
+MPI random in range: leading 0 limb in upper bound #0
+mpi_random_sizes:1:"00aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":0:0
+
+MPI random in range: leading 0 limb in upper bound #1
+mpi_random_sizes:1:"00aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":1:0
+
+MPI random in range: leading 0 limb in upper bound #2
+mpi_random_sizes:1:"00aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":2:0
+
+MPI random in range: leading 0 limb in upper bound #3
+mpi_random_sizes:1:"00aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":3:0
+
+MPI random in range: leading 0 limb in upper bound #4
+mpi_random_sizes:1:"00aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":4:0
+
+MPI random in range: previously small >0
+mpi_random_sizes:1:"1234567890":4:1
+
+MPI random in range: previously small <0
+mpi_random_sizes:1:"1234567890":4:-1
+
+MPI random in range: previously large >0
+mpi_random_sizes:1:"1234":4:65
+
+MPI random in range: previously large <0
+mpi_random_sizes:1:"1234":4:-65
+
+MPI random bad arguments: min < 0
+mpi_random_fail:-1:"04":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA
+
+MPI random bad arguments: min = N = 0
+mpi_random_fail:0:"00":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA
+
+MPI random bad arguments: min = N = 1
+mpi_random_fail:1:"01":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA
+
+MPI random bad arguments: min > N = 0
+mpi_random_fail:1:"00":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA
+
+MPI random bad arguments: min > N = 1
+mpi_random_fail:2:"01":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA
+
+MPI random bad arguments: min > N = 1, 0 limb in upper bound
+mpi_random_fail:2:"000000000000000001":MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA
 
 MPI Selftest
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST

tests/suites/test_suite_mpi.function

@@ -64,6 +64,50 @@ static int f_rng_bytes_left( void *state, unsigned char *buf, size_t len )
     return( 0 );
 }
 
+/* Test whether bytes represents (in big-endian base 256) a number b that
+ * is significantly above a power of 2. That is, b must not have a long run
+ * of unset bits after the most significant bit.
+ *
+ * Let n be the bit-size of b, i.e. the integer such that 2^n <= b < 2^{n+1}.
+ * This function returns 1 if, when drawing a number between 0 and b,
+ * the probability that this number is at least 2^n is not negligible.
+ * This probability is (b - 2^n) / b and this function checks that this
+ * number is above some threshold A. The threshold value is heuristic and
+ * based on the needs of mpi_random_many().
+ */
+static int is_significantly_above_a_power_of_2( data_t *bytes )
+{
+    const uint8_t *p = bytes->x;
+    size_t len = bytes->len;
+    unsigned x;
+
+    /* Skip leading null bytes */
+    while( len > 0 && p[0] == 0 )
+    {
+        ++p;
+        --len;
+    }
+    /* 0 is not significantly above a power of 2 */
+    if( len == 0 )
+        return( 0 );
+    /* Extract the (up to) 2 most significant bytes */
+    if( len == 1 )
+        x = p[0];
+    else
+        x = ( p[0] << 8 ) | p[1];
+
+    /* Shift the most significant bit of x to position 8 and mask it out */
+    while( ( x & 0xfe00 ) != 0 )
+        x >>= 1;
+    x &= 0x00ff;
+
+    /* At this point, x = floor((b - 2^n) / 2^(n-8)). b is significantly above
+     * a power of 2 iff x is significantly above 0 compared to 2^8.
+     * Testing x >= 2^4 amounts to picking A = 1/16 in the function
+     * description above. */
+    return( x >= 0x10 );
+}
+
 /* END_HEADER */
 
 /* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES
@@ -1151,13 +1195,23 @@ exit:
 /* END_CASE */
 
 /* BEGIN_CASE */
-void mpi_fill_random( int wanted_bytes, int rng_bytes, int expected_ret )
+void mpi_fill_random( int wanted_bytes, int rng_bytes,
+                      int before, int expected_ret )
 {
     mbedtls_mpi X;
     int ret;
     size_t bytes_left = rng_bytes;
     mbedtls_mpi_init( &X );
 
+    if( before != 0 )
+    {
+        /* Set X to sign(before) * 2^(|before|-1) */
+        TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &X, before > 0 ? 1 : -1 ) == 0 );
+        if( before < 0 )
+            before = - before;
+        TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &X, before - 1 ) == 0 );
+    }
+
     ret = mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &X, wanted_bytes,
                                    f_rng_bytes_left, &bytes_left );
     TEST_ASSERT( ret == expected_ret );
@@ -1181,6 +1235,168 @@ exit:
 }
 /* END_CASE */
 
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
+void mpi_random_many( int min, data_t *bound_bytes, int iterations )
+{
+    /* Generate numbers in the range 1..bound-1. Do it iterations times.
+     * This function assumes that the value of bound is at least 2 and
+     * that iterations is large enough that a one-in-2^iterations chance
+     * effectively never occurs.
+     */
+
+    mbedtls_mpi upper_bound;
+    size_t n_bits;
+    mbedtls_mpi result;
+    size_t b;
+    /* If upper_bound is small, stats[b] is the number of times the value b
+     * has been generated. Otherwise stats[b] is the number of times a
+     * value with bit b set has been generated. */
+    size_t *stats = NULL;
+    size_t stats_len;
+    int full_stats;
+    size_t i;
+
+    mbedtls_mpi_init( &upper_bound );
+    mbedtls_mpi_init( &result );
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &upper_bound,
+                                            bound_bytes->x, bound_bytes->len ) );
+    n_bits = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &upper_bound );
+    /* Consider a bound "small" if it's less than 2^5. This value is chosen
+     * to be small enough that the probability of missing one value is
+     * negligible given the number of iterations. It must be less than
+     * 256 because some of the code below assumes that "small" values
+     * fit in a byte. */
+    if( n_bits <= 5 )
+    {
+        full_stats = 1;
+        stats_len = bound_bytes->x[bound_bytes->len - 1];
+    }
+    else
+    {
+        full_stats = 0;
+        stats_len = n_bits;
+    }
+    ASSERT_ALLOC( stats, stats_len );
+
+    for( i = 0; i < (size_t) iterations; i++ )
+    {
+        mbedtls_test_set_step( i );
+        TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_mpi_random( &result, min, &upper_bound,
+                                           mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL ) );
+
+        TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &result, &upper_bound ) < 0 );
+        TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &result, min ) >= 0 );
+        if( full_stats )
+        {
+            uint8_t value;
+            TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &result, &value, 1 ) );
+            TEST_ASSERT( value < stats_len );
+            ++stats[value];
+        }
+        else
+        {
+            for( b = 0; b < n_bits; b++ )
+                stats[b] += mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( &result, b );
+        }
+    }
+
+    if( full_stats )
+    {
+        for( b = min; b < stats_len; b++ )
+        {
+            mbedtls_test_set_step( 1000000 + b );
+            /* Assert that each value has been reached at least once.
+             * This is almost guaranteed if the iteration count is large
+             * enough. This is a very crude way of checking the distribution.
+             */
+            TEST_ASSERT( stats[b] > 0 );
+        }
+    }
+    else
+    {
+        int statistically_safe_all_the_way =
+            is_significantly_above_a_power_of_2( bound_bytes );
+        for( b = 0; b < n_bits; b++ )
+        {
+            mbedtls_test_set_step( 1000000 + b );
+            /* Assert that each bit has been set in at least one result and
+             * clear in at least one result. Provided that iterations is not
+             * too small, it would be extremely unlikely for this not to be
+             * the case if the results are uniformly distributed.
+             *
+             * As an exception, the top bit may legitimately never be set
+             * if bound is a power of 2 or only slightly above.
+             */
+            if( statistically_safe_all_the_way || b != n_bits - 1 )
+            {
+                TEST_ASSERT( stats[b] > 0 );
+            }
+            TEST_ASSERT( stats[b] < (size_t) iterations );
+        }
+    }
+
+exit:
+    mbedtls_mpi_free( &upper_bound );
+    mbedtls_mpi_free( &result );
+    mbedtls_free( stats );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
+void mpi_random_sizes( int min, data_t *bound_bytes, int nlimbs, int before )
+{
+    mbedtls_mpi upper_bound;
+    mbedtls_mpi result;
+
+    mbedtls_mpi_init( &upper_bound );
+    mbedtls_mpi_init( &result );
+
+    if( before != 0 )
+    {
+        /* Set result to sign(before) * 2^(|before|-1) */
+        TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &result, before > 0 ? 1 : -1 ) == 0 );
+        if( before < 0 )
+            before = - before;
+        TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_shift_l( &result, before - 1 ) == 0 );
+    }
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_mpi_grow( &result, nlimbs ) );
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &upper_bound,
+                                            bound_bytes->x, bound_bytes->len ) );
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_mpi_random( &result, min, &upper_bound,
+                                       mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL ) );
+    TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &result, &upper_bound ) < 0 );
+    TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &result, min ) >= 0 );
+
+exit:
+    mbedtls_mpi_free( &upper_bound );
+    mbedtls_mpi_free( &result );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
+void mpi_random_fail( int min, data_t *bound_bytes, int expected_ret )
+{
+    mbedtls_mpi upper_bound;
+    mbedtls_mpi result;
+    int actual_ret;
+
+    mbedtls_mpi_init( &upper_bound );
+    mbedtls_mpi_init( &result );
+
+    TEST_EQUAL( 0, mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &upper_bound,
+                                            bound_bytes->x, bound_bytes->len ) );
+    actual_ret = mbedtls_mpi_random( &result, min, &upper_bound,
+                                     mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL );
+    TEST_EQUAL( expected_ret, actual_ret );
+
+exit:
+    mbedtls_mpi_free( &upper_bound );
+    mbedtls_mpi_free( &result );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
 /* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
 void mpi_selftest(  )
 {

tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs1_v15.function

@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@ void pkcs1_rsaes_v15_encrypt( int mod, int radix_N, char * input_N,
     mbedtls_test_rnd_buf_info info;
     mbedtls_mpi N, E;
 
+    info.fallback_f_rng = mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand;
+    info.fallback_p_rng = NULL;
     info.buf = rnd_buf->x;
     info.length = rnd_buf->len;
 
@@ -268,6 +270,8 @@ void pkcs1_rsassa_v15_sign( int mod, int radix_P, char * input_P, int radix_Q,
     mbedtls_mpi N, P, Q, E;
     mbedtls_test_rnd_buf_info info;
 
+    info.fallback_f_rng = mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand;
+    info.fallback_p_rng = NULL;
     info.buf = rnd_buf->x;
     info.length = rnd_buf->len;
 

tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs1_v21.function

@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@ void pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_encrypt( int mod, data_t * input_N, data_t * input_E,
     mbedtls_test_rnd_buf_info info;
     mbedtls_mpi N, E;
 
+    info.fallback_f_rng = mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand;
+    info.fallback_p_rng = NULL;
     info.buf = rnd_buf->x;
     info.length = rnd_buf->len;
 
@@ -122,6 +124,8 @@ void pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign( int mod, data_t * input_P, data_t * input_Q,
     mbedtls_test_rnd_buf_info info;
     mbedtls_mpi N, P, Q, E;
 
+    info.fallback_f_rng = mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand;
+    info.fallback_p_rng = NULL;
     info.buf = rnd_buf->x;
     info.length = rnd_buf->len;
 

tests/suites/test_suite_pkparse.data

@@ -989,7 +989,7 @@ depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED
 pk_parse_public_keyfile_ec:"data_files/ec_bp512_pub.pem":0
 
 Parse EC Key #1 (SEC1 DER)
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED
 pk_parse_keyfile_ec:"data_files/ec_prv.sec1.der":"NULL":0
 
 Parse EC Key #2 (SEC1 PEM)
@@ -1005,15 +1005,15 @@ depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED
 pk_parse_keyfile_ec:"data_files/ec_prv.pk8.der":"NULL":0
 
 Parse EC Key #4a (PKCS8 DER, no public key)
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
 pk_parse_keyfile_ec:"data_files/ec_prv.pk8nopub.der":"NULL":0
 
 Parse EC Key #4b (PKCS8 DER, no public key, with parameters)
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
 pk_parse_keyfile_ec:"data_files/ec_prv.pk8nopubparam.der":"NULL":0
 
 Parse EC Key #4c (PKCS8 DER, with parameters)
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
 pk_parse_keyfile_ec:"data_files/ec_prv.pk8param.der":"NULL":0
 
 Parse EC Key #5 (PKCS8 PEM)
@@ -1069,7 +1069,7 @@ depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED
 pk_parse_keyfile_ec:"data_files/ec_bp512_prv.pem":"NULL":0
 
 Parse EC Key #15 (SEC1 DER, secp256k1, SpecifiedECDomain)
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED
 pk_parse_keyfile_ec:"data_files/ec_prv.specdom.der":"NULL":0
 
 Key ASN1 (No data)

tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_storage_format.function

@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@
 
 #include <psa_crypto_its.h>
 
+#define TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE      0x00000001
+
 /** Write a key with the given attributes and key material to storage.
  * Test that it has the expected representation.
  *
@@ -67,7 +69,7 @@ static int test_read_key( const psa_key_attributes_t *expected_attributes,
                           const data_t *expected_material,
                           psa_storage_uid_t uid,
                           const data_t *representation,
-                          int exercise )
+                          int flags )
 {
     psa_key_attributes_t actual_attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
     mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = psa_get_key_id( expected_attributes );
@@ -105,7 +107,7 @@ static int test_read_key( const psa_key_attributes_t *expected_attributes,
                         exported_material, length );
     }
 
-    if( exercise )
+    if( flags & TEST_FLAG_EXERCISE )
     {
         TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_test_psa_exercise_key(
                          key_id,
@@ -183,7 +185,7 @@ exit:
 void key_storage_read( int lifetime_arg, int type_arg, int bits_arg,
                        int usage_arg, int alg_arg, int alg2_arg,
                        data_t *material,
-                       data_t *representation, int exercise )
+                       data_t *representation, int flags )
 {
     /* Backward compatibility: read a key in the format of a past version
      * and check that this version can use it. */
@@ -213,7 +215,7 @@ void key_storage_read( int lifetime_arg, int type_arg, int bits_arg,
      * guarantees backward compatibility with keys that were stored by
      * past versions of Mbed TLS. */
     TEST_ASSERT( test_read_key( &attributes, material,
-                                uid, representation, exercise ) );
+                                uid, representation, flags ) );
 
 exit:
     psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes );

tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data

@@ -1,3 +1,15 @@
+Attempt to register multiple PSKs
+test_multiple_psks:
+
+Attempt to register multiple PSKS, incl. opaque PSK, #0
+test_multiple_psks_opaque:0
+
+Attempt to register multiple PSKs, incl. opaque PSK, #1
+test_multiple_psks_opaque:1
+
+Attempt to register multiple PSKs, incl. opaque PSK, #2
+test_multiple_psks_opaque:2
+
 Test calback buffer sanity
 test_callback_buffer_sanity:
 

tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function

@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@
 #include <ssl_tls13_keys.h>
 #include "test/certs.h"
 
+#include <psa/crypto.h>
+
 #include <ssl_invasive.h>
 
 #include <test/constant_flow.h>
@@ -4535,3 +4537,109 @@ exit:
     mbedtls_free( src );
 }
 /* END_CASE */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */
+void test_multiple_psks()
+{
+    unsigned char psk0[10] = { 0 };
+    unsigned char psk0_identity[] = { 'f', 'o', 'o' };
+
+    unsigned char psk1[10] = { 0 };
+    unsigned char psk1_identity[] = { 'b', 'a', 'r' };
+
+    mbedtls_ssl_config conf;
+
+    mbedtls_ssl_config_init( &conf );
+
+    TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk( &conf,
+                     psk0, sizeof( psk0 ),
+                     psk0_identity, sizeof( psk0_identity ) ) == 0 );
+    TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk( &conf,
+                     psk1, sizeof( psk1 ),
+                     psk1_identity, sizeof( psk1_identity ) ) ==
+                 MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
+
+exit:
+
+    mbedtls_ssl_config_free( &conf );
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+void test_multiple_psks_opaque( int mode )
+{
+    /*
+     * Mode 0: Raw PSK, then opaque PSK
+     * Mode 1: Opaque PSK, then raw PSK
+     * Mode 2: 2x opaque PSK
+     */
+
+    unsigned char psk0_raw[10] = { 0 };
+    unsigned char psk0_raw_identity[] = { 'f', 'o', 'o' };
+
+    psa_key_id_t psk0_opaque = (psa_key_id_t) 1;
+    unsigned char psk0_opaque_identity[] = { 'f', 'o', 'o' };
+
+    unsigned char psk1_raw[10] = { 0 };
+    unsigned char psk1_raw_identity[] = { 'b', 'a', 'r' };
+
+    psa_key_id_t psk1_opaque = (psa_key_id_t) 2;
+    unsigned char psk1_opaque_identity[] = { 'b', 'a', 'r' };
+
+    mbedtls_ssl_config conf;
+
+    USE_PSA_INIT( );
+    mbedtls_ssl_config_init( &conf );
+
+    switch( mode )
+    {
+        case 0:
+
+            TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk( &conf,
+                         psk0_raw, sizeof( psk0_raw ),
+                         psk0_raw_identity, sizeof( psk0_raw_identity ) )
+                   == 0 );
+            TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque( &conf,
+                         psk1_opaque,
+                         psk1_opaque_identity, sizeof( psk1_opaque_identity ) )
+                   == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
+            break;
+
+        case 1:
+
+            TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque( &conf,
+                         psk0_opaque,
+                         psk0_opaque_identity, sizeof( psk0_opaque_identity ) )
+                   == 0 );
+            TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk( &conf,
+                         psk1_raw, sizeof( psk1_raw ),
+                         psk1_raw_identity, sizeof( psk1_raw_identity ) )
+                   == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
+
+            break;
+
+        case 2:
+
+            TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque( &conf,
+                         psk0_opaque,
+                         psk0_opaque_identity, sizeof( psk0_opaque_identity ) )
+                   == 0 );
+            TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque( &conf,
+                         psk1_opaque,
+                         psk1_opaque_identity, sizeof( psk1_opaque_identity ) )
+                   == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
+
+            break;
+
+        default:
+            TEST_ASSERT( 0 );
+            break;
+    }
+
+exit:
+
+    mbedtls_ssl_config_free( &conf );
+    USE_PSA_DONE( );
+
+}
+/* END_CASE */

tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.data

@@ -178,10 +178,6 @@ X509 CRT information Non-ASCII string in issuer name and subject name
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
 x509_cert_info:"data_files/non-ascii-string-in-issuer.crt":"cert. version     \: 3\nserial number     \: 05\:E6\:53\:E7\:1B\:74\:F0\:B5\:D3\:84\:6D\:0C\:6D\:DC\:FA\:3F\:A4\:5A\:2B\:E0\nissuer name       \: C=JP, ST=Tokyo, O=?????????????????? Ltd, CN=?????????????????? CA\nsubject name      \: C=JP, ST=Tokyo, O=?????????????????? Ltd, CN=?????????????????? CA\nissued  on        \: 2020-05-20 16\:17\:23\nexpires on        \: 2020-06-19 16\:17\:23\nsigned using      \: RSA with SHA-256\nRSA key size      \: 2048 bits\nbasic constraints \: CA=true\n"
 
-X509 certificate v1 with extension
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3:MBEDTLS_SHA1_C
-x509_cert_info:"data_files/cert_v1_with_ext.crt":"cert. version     \: 1\nserial number     \: BD\:ED\:44\:C7\:D2\:3E\:C2\:A4\nissuer name       \: C=XX, ST=XX, L=XX, O=XX, OU=XX, emailAddress=admin@identity-check.org, CN=identity-check.org\nsubject name      \: C=XX, ST=XX, L=XX, O=XX, OU=XX, emailAddress=admin@identity-check.org, CN=identity-check.org\nissued  on        \: 2013-07-04 16\:17\:02\nexpires on        \: 2014-07-04 16\:17\:02\nsigned using      \: RSA with SHA1\nRSA key size      \: 2048 bits\nsubject alt name  \:\n    dNSName \: identity-check.org\n    dNSName \: www.identity-check.org\n    <unsupported>\n"
-
 X509 SAN parsing otherName
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
 x509_parse_san:"data_files/server5-othername.crt":"type \: 0\notherName \: hardware module name \: hardware type \: 1.3.6.1.4.1.17.3, hardware serial number \: 123456\n"
@@ -1575,7 +1571,7 @@ depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
 x509parse_crt:"308198308182a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa201300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA
 
 X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, valid IssuerID, inv SubjectID, inv tag)
-depends_on:!MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
 x509parse_crt:"30819a308184a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa1000500300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH
 
 X509 CRT ASN1 (TBSCertificate v3, ext SubjectAlternativeName malformed)
@@ -1595,21 +1591,13 @@ depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
 x509parse_crt:"30819a308184a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a201300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA
 
 X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, IssuerID unsupported in v1 CRT)
-depends_on:!MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
 x509parse_crt:"30819a308184a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a201300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH
 
-X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, IssuerID unsupported in v1 CRT, ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3)
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
-x509parse_crt:"30819a308184a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a201300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG
-
 X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, SubjectID unsupported in v1 CRT)
-depends_on:!MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
 x509parse_crt:"30819a308184a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa200a201300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH
 
-X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, SubjectID unsupported in v1 CRT, ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3)
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
-x509parse_crt:"30819a308184a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa200a201300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG
-
 X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv v3Ext, inv tag)
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
 x509parse_crt:"30819c308186a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a2000500300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG
@@ -1858,24 +1846,16 @@ X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv v3Ext, SubjectAltName repeated outside Extensions)
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
 x509parse_crt:"3081dc3081c6a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa100a200a321301f301d0603551d11041630148208666f6f2e7465737482086261722e74657374301d0603551d11041630148208666f6f2e7465737482086261722e74657374300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH
 
-X509 CRT (TBS, valid v3Ext in v1 CRT, ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3)
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
-x509parse_crt:"3081b93081a3a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa321301f301d0603551d11041630148208666f6f2e7465737482086261722e74657374300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"cert. version     \: 1\nserial number     \: DE\:AD\:BE\:EF\nissuer name       \: ??=Test\nsubject name      \: ??=Test\nissued  on        \: 2009-01-01 00\:00\:00\nexpires on        \: 2009-12-31 23\:59\:59\nsigned using      \: RSA with SHA-256\nRSA key size      \: 128 bits\nsubject alt name  \:\n    dNSName \: foo.test\n    dNSName \: bar.test\n":0
-
-X509 CRT (TBS, valid v3Ext in v2 CRT, ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3)
-depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
-x509parse_crt:"3081b93081a3a0030201018204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa321301f301d0603551d11041630148208666f6f2e7465737482086261722e74657374300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"cert. version     \: 2\nserial number     \: DE\:AD\:BE\:EF\nissuer name       \: ??=Test\nsubject name      \: ??=Test\nissued  on        \: 2009-01-01 00\:00\:00\nexpires on        \: 2009-12-31 23\:59\:59\nsigned using      \: RSA with SHA-256\nRSA key size      \: 128 bits\nsubject alt name  \:\n    dNSName \: foo.test\n    dNSName \: bar.test\n":0
-
 X509 CRT (TBS, valid v3Ext in v3 CRT)
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
 x509parse_crt:"3081b93081a3a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa321301f301d0603551d11041630148208666f6f2e7465737482086261722e74657374300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"cert. version     \: 3\nserial number     \: DE\:AD\:BE\:EF\nissuer name       \: ??=Test\nsubject name      \: ??=Test\nissued  on        \: 2009-01-01 00\:00\:00\nexpires on        \: 2009-12-31 23\:59\:59\nsigned using      \: RSA with SHA-256\nRSA key size      \: 128 bits\nsubject alt name  \:\n    dNSName \: foo.test\n    dNSName \: bar.test\n":0
 
 X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, valid v3Ext in v1 CRT)
-depends_on:!MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
 x509parse_crt:"3081b93081a3a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa321301f301d0603551d11041630148208666f6f2e7465737482086261722e74657374300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH
 
 X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, valid v3Ext in v2 CRT)
-depends_on:!MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
 x509parse_crt:"3081b93081a3a0030201018204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0202ffffa321301f301d0603551d11041630148208666f6f2e7465737482086261722e74657374300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH
 
 X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, valid SubjectID, valid IssuerID, inv v3Ext, SubjectAltName repeated outside Extensions, inv SubjectAltNames tag)