mbedtls/library/ssl_misc.h

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/**
* \file ssl_misc.h
*
* \brief Internal functions shared by the SSL modules
*/
/*
* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
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* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
*
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* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
* not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
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* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
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* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
* WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*/
#ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_MISC_H
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MISC_H
#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
#include "mbedtls/ssl.h"
#include "mbedtls/cipher.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
#include "psa/crypto.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C)
#include "mbedtls/md5.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C)
#include "mbedtls/sha1.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
#include "mbedtls/sha256.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
#include "mbedtls/sha512.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
#include "mbedtls/ecjpake.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
#include "psa/crypto.h"
#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h"
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
#if ( defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER) ) && \
!defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus)
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#define inline __inline
#endif
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/* Legacy minor version numbers as defined by:
* - RFC 2246: ProtocolVersion version = { 3, 1 }; // TLS v1.0
* - RFC 4346: ProtocolVersion version = { 3, 2 }; // TLS v1.1
*
* We no longer support these versions, but some code still references those
* constants as part of negotiating with the peer, so keep them available
* internally.
*/
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 1
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 2
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/* Determine minimum supported version */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MAJOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_VALID_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_VALID_MAJOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3
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/* Determine maximum supported version */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MAJOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
/* Shorthand for restartable ECC */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED)
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED
#endif
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#define MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE 0
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS 1 /* In progress */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DONE 2 /* Done or aborted */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING 3 /* Requested (server only) */
/*
* Mask of TLS 1.3 handshake extensions used in extensions_present
* of mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params.
*/
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_NONE 0
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_SERVERNAME ( 1 << 0 )
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH ( 1 << 1 )
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_STATUS_REQUEST ( 1 << 2 )
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_SUPPORTED_GROUPS ( 1 << 3 )
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_SIG_ALG ( 1 << 4 )
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_USE_SRTP ( 1 << 5 )
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_HEARTBEAT ( 1 << 6 )
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ALPN ( 1 << 7 )
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_SCT ( 1 << 8 )
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_CLI_CERT_TYPE ( 1 << 9 )
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_SERV_CERT_TYPE ( 1 << 10 )
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_PADDING ( 1 << 11 )
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_PRE_SHARED_KEY ( 1 << 12 )
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_EARLY_DATA ( 1 << 13 )
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS ( 1 << 14 )
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_COOKIE ( 1 << 15 )
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES ( 1 << 16 )
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_CERT_AUTH ( 1 << 17 )
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_OID_FILTERS ( 1 << 18 )
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH ( 1 << 19 )
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_SIG_ALG_CERT ( 1 << 20 )
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_KEY_SHARE ( 1 << 21 )
/*
* Helper macros for function call with return check.
*/
/*
* Exit when return non-zero value
*/
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( f ) \
do { \
ret = ( f ); \
if( ret != 0 ) \
{ \
goto cleanup; \
} \
} while( 0 )
/*
* Exit when return negative value
*/
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK_NEG( f ) \
do { \
ret = ( f ); \
if( ret < 0 ) \
{ \
goto cleanup; \
} \
} while( 0 )
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/*
* DTLS retransmission states, see RFC 6347 4.2.4
*
* The SENDING state is merged in PREPARING for initial sends,
* but is distinct for resends.
*
* Note: initial state is wrong for server, but is not used anyway.
*/
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_PREPARING 0
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING 1
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_WAITING 2
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_FINISHED 3
/*
* Allow extra bytes for record, authentication and encryption overhead:
* counter (8) + header (5) + IV(16) + MAC (16-48) + padding (0-256).
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*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
/* This macro determines whether CBC is supported. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && \
( defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) )
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC
#endif
/* This macro determines whether a ciphersuite using a
* stream cipher can be used. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER)
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_STREAM
#endif
/* This macro determines whether the CBC construct used in TLS 1.2 is supported. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_STREAM) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC)
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC
#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC)
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/* Ciphersuites using HMAC */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
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#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 48 /* SHA-384 used for HMAC */
#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 32 /* SHA-256 used for HMAC */
#else
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 20 /* SHA-1 used for HMAC */
#endif
#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC */
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/* AEAD ciphersuites: GCM and CCM use a 128 bits tag */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 16
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PADDING_ADD 256
#else
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PADDING_ADD 0
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CID_EXPANSION MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY
#else
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CID_EXPANSION 0
#endif
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD ( MBEDTLS_MAX_IV_LENGTH + \
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD + \
MBEDTLS_SSL_PADDING_ADD + \
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CID_EXPANSION \
)
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN ( MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD + \
( MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN ) )
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN ( MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD + \
( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) )
/* The maximum number of buffered handshake messages. */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS 4
/* Maximum length we can advertise as our max content length for
RFC 6066 max_fragment_length extension negotiation purposes
(the lesser of both sizes, if they are unequal.)
*/
#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ADV_CONTENT_LEN ( \
(MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN) \
? ( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) \
: ( MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN ) \
)
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/* Maximum size in bytes of list in sig-hash algorithm ext., RFC 5246 */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_SIG_HASH_ALG_LIST_LEN 65534
/* Maximum size in bytes of list in supported elliptic curve ext., RFC 4492 */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CURVE_LIST_LEN 65535
/*
* Check that we obey the standard's message size bounds
*/
#if MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN > 16384
#error "Bad configuration - incoming record content too large."
#endif
#if MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN > 16384
#error "Bad configuration - outgoing record content too large."
#endif
#if MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN + 2048
#error "Bad configuration - incoming protected record payload too large."
#endif
#if MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN + 2048
#error "Bad configuration - outgoing protected record payload too large."
#endif
/* Calculate buffer sizes */
/* Note: Even though the TLS record header is only 5 bytes
long, we're internally using 8 bytes to store the
implicit sequence number. */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN 13
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN \
( ( MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN ) + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN ) )
#else
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN \
( ( MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN ) + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN ) \
+ ( MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX ) )
#endif
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN \
( ( MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN ) + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN ) )
#else
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN \
( ( MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN ) + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN ) \
+ ( MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX ) )
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
/**
* \brief Return the maximum fragment length (payload, in bytes) for
* the output buffer. For the client, this is the configured
* value. For the server, it is the minimum of two - the
* configured value and the negotiated one.
*
* \sa mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len()
* \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_max_out_record_payload()
*
* \param ssl SSL context
*
* \return Current maximum fragment length for the output buffer.
*/
size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
/**
* \brief Return the maximum fragment length (payload, in bytes) for
* the input buffer. This is the negotiated maximum fragment
* length, or, if there is none, MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN.
* If it is not defined either, the value is 2^14. This function
* works as its predecessor, \c mbedtls_ssl_get_max_frag_len().
*
* \sa mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len()
* \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_max_in_record_payload()
*
* \param ssl SSL context
*
* \return Current maximum fragment length for the output buffer.
*/
size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH)
static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_output_buflen( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ctx )
{
#if defined (MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
return mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len( ctx )
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN + MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX;
#else
return mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len( ctx )
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN + MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD;
#endif
}
static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_input_buflen( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ctx )
{
#if defined (MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
return mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len( ctx )
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN + MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX;
#else
return mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len( ctx )
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN + MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD;
#endif
}
#endif
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/*
* TLS extension flags (for extensions with outgoing ServerHello content
* that need it (e.g. for RENEGOTIATION_INFO the server already knows because
* of state of the renegotiation flag, so no indicator is required)
*/
#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS_PRESENT (1 << 0)
#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP_OK (1 << 1)
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/**
* \brief This function checks if the remaining size in a buffer is
* greater or equal than a needed space.
*
* \param cur Pointer to the current position in the buffer.
* \param end Pointer to one past the end of the buffer.
* \param need Needed space in bytes.
*
* \return Zero if the needed space is available in the buffer, non-zero
* otherwise.
*/
static inline int mbedtls_ssl_chk_buf_ptr( const uint8_t *cur,
const uint8_t *end, size_t need )
{
return( ( cur > end ) || ( need > (size_t)( end - cur ) ) );
}
/**
* \brief This macro checks if the remaining size in a buffer is
* greater or equal than a needed space. If it is not the case,
* it returns an SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL error.
*
* \param cur Pointer to the current position in the buffer.
* \param end Pointer to one past the end of the buffer.
* \param need Needed space in bytes.
*
*/
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( cur, end, need ) \
do { \
if( mbedtls_ssl_chk_buf_ptr( ( cur ), ( end ), ( need ) ) != 0 ) \
{ \
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); \
} \
} while( 0 )
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
/*
* Abstraction for a grid of allowed signature-hash-algorithm pairs.
*/
struct mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t
{
/* At the moment, we only need to remember a single suitable
* hash algorithm per signature algorithm. As long as that's
* the case - and we don't need a general lookup function -
* we can implement the sig-hash-set as a map from signatures
* to hash algorithms. */
mbedtls_md_type_t rsa;
mbedtls_md_type_t ecdsa;
};
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 &&
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */
typedef int mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf_cb( const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen,
const char *label,
const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen,
unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen );
/* cipher.h exports the maximum IV, key and block length from
* all ciphers enabled in the config, regardless of whether those
* ciphers are actually usable in SSL/TLS. Notably, XTS is enabled
* in the default configuration and uses 64 Byte keys, but it is
* not used for record protection in SSL/TLS.
*
* In order to prevent unnecessary inflation of key structures,
* we introduce SSL-specific variants of the max-{key,block,IV}
* macros here which are meant to only take those ciphers into
* account which can be negotiated in SSL/TLS.
*
* Since the current definitions of MBEDTLS_MAX_{KEY|BLOCK|IV}_LENGTH
* in cipher.h are rough overapproximations of the real maxima, here
* we content ourselves with replicating those overapproximations
* for the maximum block and IV length, and excluding XTS from the
* computation of the maximum key length. */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH 16
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_IV_LENGTH 16
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_KEY_LENGTH 32
/**
* \brief The data structure holding the cryptographic material (key and IV)
* used for record protection in TLS 1.3.
*/
struct mbedtls_ssl_key_set
{
/*! The key for client->server records. */
unsigned char client_write_key[ MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_KEY_LENGTH ];
/*! The key for server->client records. */
unsigned char server_write_key[ MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_KEY_LENGTH ];
/*! The IV for client->server records. */
unsigned char client_write_iv[ MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_IV_LENGTH ];
/*! The IV for server->client records. */
unsigned char server_write_iv[ MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_IV_LENGTH ];
size_t key_len; /*!< The length of client_write_key and
* server_write_key, in Bytes. */
size_t iv_len; /*!< The length of client_write_iv and
* server_write_iv, in Bytes. */
};
typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_key_set mbedtls_ssl_key_set;
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/*
* This structure contains the parameters only needed during handshake.
*/
struct mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params
{
/*
* Handshake specific crypto variables
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t hash_algs; /*!< Set of suitable sig-hash pairs */
#endif
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C)
mbedtls_dhm_context dhm_ctx; /*!< DHM key exchange */
#endif
/* Adding guard for MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C to ensure no compile errors due
* to guards also being in ssl_srv.c and ssl_cli.c. There is a gap
* in functionality that access to ecdh_ctx structure is needed for
* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C which does not seem correct.
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
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mbedtls_ecdh_context ecdh_ctx; /*!< ECDH key exchange */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
psa_key_type_t ecdh_psa_type;
uint16_t ecdh_bits;
psa_key_id_t ecdh_psa_privkey;
unsigned char ecdh_psa_peerkey[MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH];
size_t ecdh_psa_peerkey_len;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
mbedtls_ecjpake_context ecjpake_ctx; /*!< EC J-PAKE key exchange */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
unsigned char *ecjpake_cache; /*!< Cache for ClientHello ext */
size_t ecjpake_cache_len; /*!< Length of cached data */
#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
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const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info **curves; /*!< Supported elliptic curves */
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
psa_key_id_t psk_opaque; /*!< Opaque PSK from the callback */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
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unsigned char *psk; /*!< PSK from the callback */
size_t psk_len; /*!< Length of PSK from callback */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert; /*!< chosen key/cert pair (server) */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
int sni_authmode; /*!< authmode from SNI callback */
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mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *sni_key_cert; /*!< key/cert list from SNI */
mbedtls_x509_crt *sni_ca_chain; /*!< trusted CAs from SNI callback */
mbedtls_x509_crl *sni_ca_crl; /*!< trusted CAs CRLs from SNI */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */
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#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED)
int ecrs_enabled; /*!< Handshake supports EC restart? */
mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx ecrs_ctx; /*!< restart context */
enum { /* this complements ssl->state with info on intra-state operations */
ssl_ecrs_none = 0, /*!< nothing going on (yet) */
ssl_ecrs_crt_verify, /*!< Certificate: crt_verify() */
ssl_ecrs_ske_start_processing, /*!< ServerKeyExchange: pk_verify() */
ssl_ecrs_cke_ecdh_calc_secret, /*!< ClientKeyExchange: ECDH step 2 */
ssl_ecrs_crt_vrfy_sign, /*!< CertificateVerify: pk_sign() */
} ecrs_state; /*!< current (or last) operation */
mbedtls_x509_crt *ecrs_peer_cert; /*!< The peer's CRT chain. */
size_t ecrs_n; /*!< place for saving a length */
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
mbedtls_pk_context peer_pubkey; /*!< The public key from the peer. */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
unsigned int out_msg_seq; /*!< Outgoing handshake sequence number */
unsigned int in_msg_seq; /*!< Incoming handshake sequence number */
unsigned char *verify_cookie; /*!< Cli: HelloVerifyRequest cookie
Srv: unused */
unsigned char verify_cookie_len; /*!< Cli: cookie length
Srv: flag for sending a cookie */
uint32_t retransmit_timeout; /*!< Current value of timeout */
unsigned char retransmit_state; /*!< Retransmission state */
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mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *flight; /*!< Current outgoing flight */
mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *cur_msg; /*!< Current message in flight */
unsigned char *cur_msg_p; /*!< Position in current message */
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unsigned int in_flight_start_seq; /*!< Minimum message sequence in the
flight being received */
mbedtls_ssl_transform *alt_transform_out; /*!< Alternative transform for
resending messages */
unsigned char alt_out_ctr[MBEDTLS_SSL_COUNTER_LEN]; /*!< Alternative record epoch/counter
for resending messages */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
/* The state of CID configuration in this handshake. */
uint8_t cid_in_use; /*!< This indicates whether the use of the CID extension
* has been negotiated. Possible values are
* #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED and
* #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED. */
unsigned char peer_cid[ MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX ]; /*! The peer's CID */
uint8_t peer_cid_len; /*!< The length of
* \c peer_cid. */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
struct
{
size_t total_bytes_buffered; /*!< Cumulative size of heap allocated
* buffers used for message buffering. */
uint8_t seen_ccs; /*!< Indicates if a CCS message has
* been seen in the current flight. */
struct mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer
{
unsigned is_valid : 1;
unsigned is_fragmented : 1;
unsigned is_complete : 1;
unsigned char *data;
size_t data_len;
} hs[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS];
struct
{
unsigned char *data;
size_t len;
unsigned epoch;
} future_record;
} buffering;
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uint16_t mtu; /*!< Handshake mtu, used to fragment outgoing messages */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL)
/*! TLS 1.3 transforms for 0-RTT and encrypted handshake messages.
* Those pointers own the transforms they reference. */
mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform_handshake;
mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform_earlydata;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */
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/*
* Checksum contexts
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
psa_hash_operation_t fin_sha256_psa;
#else
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mbedtls_sha256_context fin_sha256;
#endif
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
psa_hash_operation_t fin_sha384_psa;
#else
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mbedtls_sha512_context fin_sha512;
#endif
#endif
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#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
void (*update_checksum)(mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t);
void (*calc_verify)(const mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, size_t *);
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void (*calc_finished)(mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, int);
mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf_cb *tls_prf;
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL)
uint16_t offered_group_id; /* The NamedGroup value for the group
* that is being used for ephemeral
* key exchange.
*
* On the client: Defaults to the first
* entry in the client's group list,
* but can be overwritten by the HRR. */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */
Remove ciphersuite_info from ssl_transform Prior to this commit, the security parameter struct `ssl_transform` contained a `ciphersuite_info` field pointing to the information structure for the negotiated ciphersuite. However, the only information extracted from that structure that was used in the core encryption and decryption functions `ssl_encrypt_buf`/`ssl_decrypt_buf` was the authentication tag length in case of an AEAD cipher. The present commit removes the `ciphersuite_info` field from the `ssl_transform` structure and adds an explicit `taglen` field for AEAD authentication tag length. This is in accordance with the principle that the `ssl_transform` structure should contain the raw parameters needed for the record encryption and decryption functions to work, but not the higher-level information that gave rise to them. For example, the `ssl_transform` structure implicitly contains the encryption/decryption keys within their cipher contexts, but it doesn't contain the SSL master or premaster secrets. Likewise, it contains an explicit `maclen`, while the status of the 'Truncated HMAC' extension -- which determines the value of `maclen` when the `ssl_transform` structure is created in `ssl_derive_keys` -- is not contained in `ssl_transform`. The `ciphersuite_info` pointer was used in other places outside the encryption/decryption functions during the handshake, and for these functions to work, this commit adds a `ciphersuite_info` pointer field to the handshake-local `ssl_handshake_params` structure.
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mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t const *ciphersuite_info;
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size_t pmslen; /*!< premaster length */
unsigned char randbytes[64]; /*!< random bytes */
unsigned char premaster[MBEDTLS_PREMASTER_SIZE];
/*!< premaster secret */
int resume; /*!< session resume indicator*/
int max_major_ver; /*!< max. major version client*/
int max_minor_ver; /*!< max. minor version client*/
int cli_exts; /*!< client extension presence*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL)
int extensions_present; /*!< extension presence; Each bitfield
represents an extension and defined
as \c MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_XXX */
union
{
unsigned char early [MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
unsigned char handshake[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
unsigned char app [MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
} tls1_3_master_secrets;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
int new_session_ticket; /*!< use NewSessionTicket? */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
int extended_ms; /*!< use Extended Master Secret? */
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
unsigned int async_in_progress : 1; /*!< an asynchronous operation is in progress */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
/** Asynchronous operation context. This field is meant for use by the
* asynchronous operation callbacks (mbedtls_ssl_config::f_async_sign_start,
* mbedtls_ssl_config::f_async_decrypt_start,
* mbedtls_ssl_config::f_async_resume, mbedtls_ssl_config::f_async_cancel).
* The library does not use it internally. */
void *user_async_ctx;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */
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};
typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer;
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/*
* Representation of decryption/encryption transformations on records
*
* There are the following general types of record transformations:
* - Stream transformations (TLS versions == 1.2 only)
* Transformation adding a MAC and applying a stream-cipher
* to the authenticated message.
* - CBC block cipher transformations ([D]TLS versions == 1.2 only)
* For TLS 1.2, no IV is generated at key extraction time, but every
* encrypted record is explicitly prefixed by the IV with which it was
* encrypted.
* - AEAD transformations ([D]TLS versions == 1.2 only)
* These come in two fundamentally different versions, the first one
* used in TLS 1.2, excluding ChaChaPoly ciphersuites, and the second
* one used for ChaChaPoly ciphersuites in TLS 1.2 as well as for TLS 1.3.
* In the first transformation, the IV to be used for a record is obtained
* as the concatenation of an explicit, static 4-byte IV and the 8-byte
* record sequence number, and explicitly prepending this sequence number
* to the encrypted record. In contrast, in the second transformation
* the IV is obtained by XOR'ing a static IV obtained at key extraction
* time with the 8-byte record sequence number, without prepending the
* latter to the encrypted record.
*
* Additionally, DTLS 1.2 + CID as well as TLS 1.3 use an inner plaintext
* which allows to add flexible length padding and to hide a record's true
* content type.
*
* In addition to type and version, the following parameters are relevant:
* - The symmetric cipher algorithm to be used.
* - The (static) encryption/decryption keys for the cipher.
* - For stream/CBC, the type of message digest to be used.
* - For stream/CBC, (static) encryption/decryption keys for the digest.
* - For AEAD transformations, the size (potentially 0) of an explicit,
* random initialization vector placed in encrypted records.
* - For some transformations (currently AEAD) an implicit IV. It is static
* and (if present) is combined with the explicit IV in a transformation-
* -dependent way (e.g. appending in TLS 1.2 and XOR'ing in TLS 1.3).
* - For stream/CBC, a flag determining the order of encryption and MAC.
* - The details of the transformation depend on the SSL/TLS version.
* - The length of the authentication tag.
*
* The struct below refines this abstract view as follows:
* - The cipher underlying the transformation is managed in
* cipher contexts cipher_ctx_{enc/dec}, which must have the
* same cipher type. The mode of these cipher contexts determines
* the type of the transformation in the sense above: e.g., if
* the type is MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC resp. MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM
* then the transformation has type CBC resp. AEAD.
* - The cipher keys are never stored explicitly but
* are maintained within cipher_ctx_{enc/dec}.
* - For stream/CBC transformations, the message digest contexts
* used for the MAC's are stored in md_ctx_{enc/dec}. These contexts
* are unused for AEAD transformations.
* - For stream/CBC transformations, the MAC keys are not stored explicitly
* but maintained within md_ctx_{enc/dec}.
* - The mac_enc and mac_dec fields are unused for EAD transformations.
* - For transformations using an implicit IV maintained within
* the transformation context, its contents are stored within
* iv_{enc/dec}.
* - The value of ivlen indicates the length of the IV.
* This is redundant in case of stream/CBC transformations
* which always use 0 resp. the cipher's block length as the
* IV length, but is needed for AEAD ciphers and may be
* different from the underlying cipher's block length
* in this case.
* - The field fixed_ivlen is nonzero for AEAD transformations only
* and indicates the length of the static part of the IV which is
* constant throughout the communication, and which is stored in
* the first fixed_ivlen bytes of the iv_{enc/dec} arrays.
* - minor_ver denotes the SSL/TLS version
* - For stream/CBC transformations, maclen denotes the length of the
* authentication tag, while taglen is unused and 0.
* - For AEAD transformations, taglen denotes the length of the
* authentication tag, while maclen is unused and 0.
* - For CBC transformations, encrypt_then_mac determines the
* order of encryption and authentication. This field is unused
* in other transformations.
*
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*/
struct mbedtls_ssl_transform
{
/*
* Session specific crypto layer
*/
size_t minlen; /*!< min. ciphertext length */
size_t ivlen; /*!< IV length */
size_t fixed_ivlen; /*!< Fixed part of IV (AEAD) */
Remove ciphersuite_info from ssl_transform Prior to this commit, the security parameter struct `ssl_transform` contained a `ciphersuite_info` field pointing to the information structure for the negotiated ciphersuite. However, the only information extracted from that structure that was used in the core encryption and decryption functions `ssl_encrypt_buf`/`ssl_decrypt_buf` was the authentication tag length in case of an AEAD cipher. The present commit removes the `ciphersuite_info` field from the `ssl_transform` structure and adds an explicit `taglen` field for AEAD authentication tag length. This is in accordance with the principle that the `ssl_transform` structure should contain the raw parameters needed for the record encryption and decryption functions to work, but not the higher-level information that gave rise to them. For example, the `ssl_transform` structure implicitly contains the encryption/decryption keys within their cipher contexts, but it doesn't contain the SSL master or premaster secrets. Likewise, it contains an explicit `maclen`, while the status of the 'Truncated HMAC' extension -- which determines the value of `maclen` when the `ssl_transform` structure is created in `ssl_derive_keys` -- is not contained in `ssl_transform`. The `ciphersuite_info` pointer was used in other places outside the encryption/decryption functions during the handshake, and for these functions to work, this commit adds a `ciphersuite_info` pointer field to the handshake-local `ssl_handshake_params` structure.
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size_t maclen; /*!< MAC(CBC) len */
size_t taglen; /*!< TAG(AEAD) len */
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unsigned char iv_enc[16]; /*!< IV (encryption) */
unsigned char iv_dec[16]; /*!< IV (decryption) */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC)
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mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx_enc; /*!< MAC (encryption) */
mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx_dec; /*!< MAC (decryption) */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
int encrypt_then_mac; /*!< flag for EtM activation */
#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC */
mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher_ctx_enc; /*!< encryption context */
mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher_ctx_dec; /*!< decryption context */
int minor_ver;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
uint8_t in_cid_len;
uint8_t out_cid_len;
unsigned char in_cid [ MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX ];
unsigned char out_cid[ MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX ];
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION)
/* We need the Hello random bytes in order to re-derive keys from the
* Master Secret and other session info,
* see ssl_tls12_populate_transform() */
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unsigned char randbytes[64]; /*!< ServerHello.random+ClientHello.random */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION */
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};
/*
* Return 1 if the transform uses an AEAD cipher, 0 otherwise.
* Equivalently, return 0 if a separate MAC is used, 1 otherwise.
*/
static inline int mbedtls_ssl_transform_uses_aead(
const mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC)
return( transform->maclen == 0 && transform->taglen != 0 );
#else
(void) transform;
return( 1 );
#endif
}
/*
* Internal representation of record frames
*
* Instances come in two flavors:
* (1) Encrypted
* These always have data_offset = 0
* (2) Unencrypted
* These have data_offset set to the amount of
* pre-expansion during record protection. Concretely,
* this is the length of the fixed part of the explicit IV
* used for encryption, or 0 if no explicit IV is used
* (e.g. for stream ciphers).
*
* The reason for the data_offset in the unencrypted case
* is to allow for in-place conversion of an unencrypted to
* an encrypted record. If the offset wasn't included, the
* encrypted content would need to be shifted afterwards to
* make space for the fixed IV.
*
*/
#if MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX > MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_LEN_MAX MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX
#else
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_LEN_MAX MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX
#endif
typedef struct
{
uint8_t ctr[MBEDTLS_SSL_COUNTER_LEN]; /* In TLS: The implicit record sequence number.
* In DTLS: The 2-byte epoch followed by
* the 6-byte sequence number.
* This is stored as a raw big endian byte array
* as opposed to a uint64_t because we rarely
* need to perform arithmetic on this, but do
* need it as a Byte array for the purpose of
* MAC computations. */
uint8_t type; /* The record content type. */
uint8_t ver[2]; /* SSL/TLS version as present on the wire.
* Convert to internal presentation of versions
* using mbedtls_ssl_read_version() and
* mbedtls_ssl_write_version().
* Keep wire-format for MAC computations. */
unsigned char *buf; /* Memory buffer enclosing the record content */
size_t buf_len; /* Buffer length */
size_t data_offset; /* Offset of record content */
size_t data_len; /* Length of record content */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
uint8_t cid_len; /* Length of the CID (0 if not present) */
unsigned char cid[ MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_LEN_MAX ]; /* The CID */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
} mbedtls_record;
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
/*
* List of certificate + private key pairs
*/
struct mbedtls_ssl_key_cert
{
mbedtls_x509_crt *cert; /*!< cert */
mbedtls_pk_context *key; /*!< private key */
mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *next; /*!< next key/cert pair */
};
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
/*
* List of handshake messages kept around for resending
*/
struct mbedtls_ssl_flight_item
{
unsigned char *p; /*!< message, including handshake headers */
size_t len; /*!< length of p */
unsigned char type; /*!< type of the message: handshake or CCS */
mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *next; /*!< next handshake message(s) */
};
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
/* Find an entry in a signature-hash set matching a given hash algorithm. */
mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_find( mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set,
mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg );
/* Add a signature-hash-pair to a signature-hash set */
void mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_add( mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set,
mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg,
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg );
/* Allow exactly one hash algorithm for each signature. */
void mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_const_hash( mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set,
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg );
/* Setup an empty signature-hash set */
static inline void mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_init( mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set )
{
mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_const_hash( set, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) &&
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */
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/**
* \brief Free referenced items in an SSL transform context and clear
* memory
*
* \param transform SSL transform context
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_transform_free( mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform );
/**
* \brief Free referenced items in an SSL handshake context and clear
* memory
*
* \param ssl SSL context
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*/
void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_free( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
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/* set inbound transform of ssl context */
void mbedtls_ssl_set_inbound_transform( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform );
/* set outbound transform of ssl context */
void mbedtls_ssl_set_outbound_transform( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform );
int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_client_step( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_server_step( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL)
/**
* \brief TLS 1.3 client side state machine entry
*
* \param ssl SSL context
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_client_step( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
/**
* \brief TLS 1.3 server side state machine entry
*
* \param ssl SSL context
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_server_step( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
#endif
int mbedtls_ssl_send_fatal_handshake_failure( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
void mbedtls_ssl_reset_checksum( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
int mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
int mbedtls_ssl_handle_message_type( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
int mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
void mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
/**
* \brief Update record layer
*
* This function roughly separates the implementation
* of the logic of (D)TLS from the implementation
* of the secure transport.
*
* \param ssl The SSL context to use.
* \param update_hs_digest This indicates if the handshake digest
* should be automatically updated in case
* a handshake message is found.
*
* \return 0 or non-zero error code.
*
* \note A clarification on what is called 'record layer' here
* is in order, as many sensible definitions are possible:
*
* The record layer takes as input an untrusted underlying
* transport (stream or datagram) and transforms it into
* a serially multiplexed, secure transport, which
* conceptually provides the following:
*
* (1) Three datagram based, content-agnostic transports
* for handshake, alert and CCS messages.
* (2) One stream- or datagram-based transport
* for application data.
* (3) Functionality for changing the underlying transform
* securing the contents.
*
* The interface to this functionality is given as follows:
*
* a Updating
* [Currently implemented by mbedtls_ssl_read_record]
*
* Check if and on which of the four 'ports' data is pending:
* Nothing, a controlling datagram of type (1), or application
* data (2). In any case data is present, internal buffers
* provide access to the data for the user to process it.
* Consumption of type (1) datagrams is done automatically
* on the next update, invalidating that the internal buffers
* for previous datagrams, while consumption of application
* data (2) is user-controlled.
*
* b Reading of application data
* [Currently manual adaption of ssl->in_offt pointer]
*
* As mentioned in the last paragraph, consumption of data
* is different from the automatic consumption of control
* datagrams (1) because application data is treated as a stream.
*
* c Tracking availability of application data
* [Currently manually through decreasing ssl->in_msglen]
*
* For efficiency and to retain datagram semantics for
* application data in case of DTLS, the record layer
* provides functionality for checking how much application
* data is still available in the internal buffer.
*
* d Changing the transformation securing the communication.
*
* Given an opaque implementation of the record layer in the
* above sense, it should be possible to implement the logic
* of (D)TLS on top of it without the need to know anything
* about the record layer's internals. This is done e.g.
* in all the handshake handling functions, and in the
* application data reading function mbedtls_ssl_read.
*
* \note The above tries to give a conceptual picture of the
* record layer, but the current implementation deviates
* from it in some places. For example, our implementation of
* the update functionality through mbedtls_ssl_read_record
* discards datagrams depending on the current state, which
* wouldn't fall under the record layer's responsibility
* following the above definition.
*
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_read_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned update_hs_digest );
int mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t nb_want );
int mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
int update_checksum );
static inline int mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
return( mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg_ext( ssl, 1 /* update checksum */ ) );
}
int mbedtls_ssl_write_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint8_t force_flush );
int mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
int mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
int mbedtls_ssl_parse_change_cipher_spec( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
int mbedtls_ssl_write_change_cipher_spec( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
int mbedtls_ssl_parse_finished( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
int mbedtls_ssl_write_finished( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
void mbedtls_ssl_optimize_checksum( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED)
int mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t key_ex );
/**
* Get the first defined PSK by order of precedence:
* 1. handshake PSK set by \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk() in the PSK callback
* 2. static PSK configured by \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk()
* Return a code and update the pair (PSK, PSK length) passed to this function
*/
static inline int mbedtls_ssl_get_psk( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char **psk, size_t *psk_len )
{
if( ssl->handshake->psk != NULL && ssl->handshake->psk_len > 0 )
{
*psk = ssl->handshake->psk;
*psk_len = ssl->handshake->psk_len;
}
else if( ssl->conf->psk != NULL && ssl->conf->psk_len > 0 )
{
*psk = ssl->conf->psk;
*psk_len = ssl->conf->psk_len;
}
else
{
*psk = NULL;
*psk_len = 0;
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED );
}
return( 0 );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
/**
* Get the first defined opaque PSK by order of precedence:
* 1. handshake PSK set by \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk_opaque() in the PSK
* callback
* 2. static PSK configured by \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque()
* Return an opaque PSK
*/
static inline psa_key_id_t mbedtls_ssl_get_opaque_psk(
const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
if( ! mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( ssl->handshake->psk_opaque ) )
return( ssl->handshake->psk_opaque );
if( ! mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( ssl->conf->psk_opaque ) )
return( ssl->conf->psk_opaque );
return( MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C)
unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk( mbedtls_pk_context *pk );
unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk_alg( mbedtls_pk_type_t type );
mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig( unsigned char sig );
#endif
mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash( unsigned char hash );
2015-06-17 14:34:48 +02:00
unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_alg( int md );
int mbedtls_ssl_set_calc_verify_md( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int md );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
int mbedtls_ssl_check_curve( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
2015-06-17 14:34:48 +02:00
int mbedtls_ssl_check_sig_hash( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
mbedtls_md_type_t md );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP)
static inline mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile mbedtls_ssl_check_srtp_profile_value
( const uint16_t srtp_profile_value )
{
switch( srtp_profile_value )
{
case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_80:
case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32:
case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_80:
case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_32:
return srtp_profile_value;
default: break;
}
return( MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET );
}
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
static inline mbedtls_pk_context *mbedtls_ssl_own_key( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert;
if( ssl->handshake != NULL && ssl->handshake->key_cert != NULL )
key_cert = ssl->handshake->key_cert;
else
key_cert = ssl->conf->key_cert;
return( key_cert == NULL ? NULL : key_cert->key );
}
static inline mbedtls_x509_crt *mbedtls_ssl_own_cert( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert;
if( ssl->handshake != NULL && ssl->handshake->key_cert != NULL )
key_cert = ssl->handshake->key_cert;
else
key_cert = ssl->conf->key_cert;
return( key_cert == NULL ? NULL : key_cert->cert );
}
/*
* Check usage of a certificate wrt extensions:
* keyUsage, extendedKeyUsage (later), and nSCertType (later).
*
* Warning: cert_endpoint is the endpoint of the cert (ie, of our peer when we
* check a cert we received from them)!
*
* Return 0 if everything is OK, -1 if not.
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage( const mbedtls_x509_crt *cert,
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite,
int cert_endpoint,
uint32_t *flags );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
void mbedtls_ssl_write_version( int major, int minor, int transport,
unsigned char ver[2] );
void mbedtls_ssl_read_version( int *major, int *minor, int transport,
const unsigned char ver[2] );
static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_in_hdr_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
((void) ssl);
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
{
return( 13 );
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
{
return( 5 );
}
}
static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_out_hdr_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
return( (size_t) ( ssl->out_iv - ssl->out_hdr ) );
}
static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
return( 12 );
#else
((void) ssl);
#endif
return( 4 );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
void mbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completed( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
void mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
int mbedtls_ssl_resend( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
int mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
#endif
/* Visible for testing purposes only */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY)
int mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_check( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl );
void mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_update( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
#endif
int mbedtls_ssl_session_copy( mbedtls_ssl_session *dst,
const mbedtls_ssl_session *src );
/* constant-time buffer comparison */
static inline int mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( const void *a, const void *b, size_t n )
{
size_t i;
volatile const unsigned char *A = (volatile const unsigned char *) a;
volatile const unsigned char *B = (volatile const unsigned char *) b;
volatile unsigned char diff = 0;
for( i = 0; i < n; i++ )
{
/* Read volatile data in order before computing diff.
* This avoids IAR compiler warning:
* 'the order of volatile accesses is undefined ..' */
unsigned char x = A[i], y = B[i];
diff |= x ^ y;
}
return( diff );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
/* The hash buffer must have at least MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE bytes of length. */
2017-07-20 17:17:51 +02:00
int mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *hash, size_t *hashlen,
unsigned char *data, size_t data_len,
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
2017-07-20 17:17:51 +02:00
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif
void mbedtls_ssl_transform_init( mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform );
int mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform,
mbedtls_record *rec,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng );
int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl,
mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform,
mbedtls_record *rec );
2020-02-05 11:38:31 +01:00
/* Length of the "epoch" field in the record header */
static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_ep_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
return( 2 );
#else
((void) ssl);
#endif
return( 0 );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
int mbedtls_ssl_resend_hello_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
void mbedtls_ssl_set_timer( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint32_t millisecs );
int mbedtls_ssl_check_timer( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
void mbedtls_ssl_reset_in_out_pointers( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
void mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform );
void mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
int mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int partial );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY)
void mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_reset( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
#endif
void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup_free_hs_transform( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
int mbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiation( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_current_mtu( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
void mbedtls_ssl_buffering_free( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
void mbedtls_ssl_flight_free( mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *flight );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL)
/*
* Helper functions around key exchange modes.
*/
static inline unsigned mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_check_kex_modes( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
int kex_mode_mask )
{
return( ( ssl->conf->tls13_kex_modes & kex_mode_mask ) != 0 );
}
static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_psk_enabled( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
return( mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_check_kex_modes( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS13_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK ) );
}
static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_psk_ephemeral_enabled( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
return( mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_check_kex_modes( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS13_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL ) );
}
static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_ephemeral_enabled( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
return( mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_check_kex_modes( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS13_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL ) );
}
static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_some_ephemeral_enabled( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
return( mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_check_kex_modes( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS13_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ALL ) );
}
static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_some_psk_enabled( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
return( mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_check_kex_modes( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS13_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ALL ) );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */
/**
* ssl utils functions for checking configuration.
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL)
static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_is_tls13_only( const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf )
{
if( conf->min_major_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 &&
conf->max_major_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 &&
conf->min_minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4 &&
conf->max_minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4 )
{
return( 1 );
}
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_is_tls12_only( const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf )
{
if( conf->min_major_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 &&
conf->max_major_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 &&
conf->min_minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 &&
conf->max_minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 )
{
return( 1 );
}
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL)
static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_is_hybrid_tls12_tls13( const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf )
{
if( conf->min_major_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 &&
conf->max_major_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 &&
conf->min_minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 &&
conf->max_minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4 )
{
return( 1 );
}
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL)
/*
* Helper functions for NamedGroup.
*/
static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ecdhe( uint16_t named_group )
{
return( named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS13_NAMED_GROUP_SECP256R1 ||
named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS13_NAMED_GROUP_SECP384R1 ||
named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS13_NAMED_GROUP_SECP521R1 ||
named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS13_NAMED_GROUP_X25519 ||
named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS13_NAMED_GROUP_X448 );
}
static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_dhe( uint16_t named_group )
{
return( named_group >= MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS13_NAMED_GROUP_FFDHE2048 &&
named_group <= MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS13_NAMED_GROUP_FFDHE8192 );
}
static inline void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
mbedtls_ssl_states state )
{
ssl->state = ( int ) state;
}
/*
* Write TLS 1.3 handshake message header
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_start_handshake_msg( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned hs_type,
unsigned char **buf,
size_t *buflen );
/*
* Write TLS 1.3 handshake message tail
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_finish_handshake_msg( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
size_t buf_len,
size_t msg_len );
void mbedtls_ssl_tls13_add_hs_hdr_to_checksum( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned hs_type,
size_t total_hs_len );
/*
* Update checksum of handshake messages.
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_add_hs_msg_to_checksum( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned hs_type,
unsigned char const *msg,
size_t msg_len );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
/*
* Write TLS 1.3 Signature Algorithm extension
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_sig_alg_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *buf,
unsigned char *end,
size_t *olen);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */
/* Get handshake transcript */
int mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const mbedtls_md_type_t md,
unsigned char *dst,
size_t dst_len,
size_t *olen );
#endif /* ssl_misc.h */