mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c

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/*
* TLS 1.3 functionality shared between client and server
*
* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
* not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
* WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*/
#include "common.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
#include <string.h>
#include "mbedtls/error.h"
#include "mbedtls/debug.h"
#include "mbedtls/oid.h"
#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h"
#include <string.h>
#include "ssl_misc.h"
#include "ssl_tls13_invasive.h"
#include "ssl_tls13_keys.h"
#include "ssl_debug_helpers.h"
#include "psa/crypto.h"
#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h"
const uint8_t mbedtls_ssl_tls13_hello_retry_request_magic[
MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN ] =
{ 0xCF, 0x21, 0xAD, 0x74, 0xE5, 0x9A, 0x61, 0x11,
0xBE, 0x1D, 0x8C, 0x02, 0x1E, 0x65, 0xB8, 0x91,
0xC2, 0xA2, 0x11, 0x16, 0x7A, 0xBB, 0x8C, 0x5E,
0x07, 0x9E, 0x09, 0xE2, 0xC8, 0xA8, 0x33, 0x9C };
int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_fetch_handshake_msg( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned hs_type,
unsigned char **buf,
size_t *buf_len )
{
int ret;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 0 ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret );
goto cleanup;
}
if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ||
ssl->in_msg[0] != hs_type )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Receive unexpected handshake message." ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* Jump handshake header (4 bytes, see Section 4 of RFC 8446).
* ...
* HandshakeType msg_type;
* uint24 length;
* ...
*/
*buf = ssl->in_msg + 4;
*buf_len = ssl->in_hslen - 4;
cleanup:
return( ret );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
/*
* STATE HANDLING: Read CertificateVerify
*/
/* Macro to express the maximum length of the verify structure.
*
* The structure is computed per TLS 1.3 specification as:
* - 64 bytes of octet 32,
* - 33 bytes for the context string
* (which is either "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify"
* or "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify"),
* - 1 byte for the octet 0x0, which serves as a separator,
* - 32 or 48 bytes for the Transcript-Hash(Handshake Context, Certificate)
* (depending on the size of the transcript_hash)
*
* This results in a total size of
* - 130 bytes for a SHA256-based transcript hash, or
* (64 + 33 + 1 + 32 bytes)
* - 146 bytes for a SHA384-based transcript hash.
* (64 + 33 + 1 + 48 bytes)
*
*/
#define SSL_VERIFY_STRUCT_MAX_SIZE ( 64 + \
33 + \
1 + \
MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE \
)
/*
* The ssl_tls13_create_verify_structure() creates the verify structure.
* As input, it requires the transcript hash.
*
* The caller has to ensure that the buffer has size at least
* SSL_VERIFY_STRUCT_MAX_SIZE bytes.
*/
static void ssl_tls13_create_verify_structure( const unsigned char *transcript_hash,
size_t transcript_hash_len,
unsigned char *verify_buffer,
size_t *verify_buffer_len,
int from )
{
size_t idx;
/* RFC 8446, Section 4.4.3:
*
* The digital signature [in the CertificateVerify message] is then
* computed over the concatenation of:
* - A string that consists of octet 32 (0x20) repeated 64 times
* - The context string
* - A single 0 byte which serves as the separator
* - The content to be signed
*/
memset( verify_buffer, 0x20, 64 );
idx = 64;
if( from == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT )
{
memcpy( verify_buffer + idx, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN( client_cv ) );
idx += MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_LEN( client_cv );
}
else
{ /* from == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER */
memcpy( verify_buffer + idx, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN( server_cv ) );
idx += MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_LEN( server_cv );
}
verify_buffer[idx++] = 0x0;
memcpy( verify_buffer + idx, transcript_hash, transcript_hash_len );
idx += transcript_hash_len;
*verify_buffer_len = idx;
}
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_tls13_parse_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *buf,
const unsigned char *end,
const unsigned char *verify_buffer,
size_t verify_buffer_len )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
const unsigned char *p = buf;
uint16_t algorithm;
size_t signature_len;
mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg;
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg;
psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_NONE;
unsigned char verify_hash[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE];
size_t verify_hash_len;
void const *options = NULL;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT)
mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options rsassa_pss_options;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT */
/*
* struct {
* SignatureScheme algorithm;
* opaque signature<0..2^16-1>;
* } CertificateVerify;
*/
MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, end, 2 );
algorithm = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE( p, 0 );
p += 2;
/* RFC 8446 section 4.4.3
*
* If the CertificateVerify message is sent by a server, the signature algorithm
* MUST be one offered in the client's "signature_algorithms" extension unless
* no valid certificate chain can be produced without unsupported algorithms
*
* RFC 8446 section 4.4.2.2
*
* If the client cannot construct an acceptable chain using the provided
* certificates and decides to abort the handshake, then it MUST abort the handshake
* with an appropriate certificate-related alert (by default, "unsupported_certificate").
*
* Check if algorithm is an offered signature algorithm.
*/
if( ! mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_offered( ssl, algorithm ) )
{
/* algorithm not in offered signature algorithms list */
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Received signature algorithm(%04x) is not "
"offered.",
( unsigned int ) algorithm ) );
goto error;
}
if( mbedtls_ssl_get_pk_type_and_md_alg_from_sig_alg(
algorithm, &sig_alg, &md_alg ) != 0 )
{
goto error;
}
hash_alg = mbedtls_hash_info_psa_from_md( md_alg );
if( hash_alg == 0 )
{
goto error;
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Certificate Verify: Signature algorithm ( %04x )",
( unsigned int ) algorithm ) );
/*
* Check the certificate's key type matches the signature alg
*/
if( !mbedtls_pk_can_do( &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk, sig_alg ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "signature algorithm doesn't match cert key" ) );
goto error;
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, end, 2 );
signature_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE( p, 0 );
p += 2;
MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, end, signature_len );
status = psa_hash_compute( hash_alg,
verify_buffer,
verify_buffer_len,
verify_hash,
sizeof( verify_hash ),
&verify_hash_len );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "hash computation PSA error", status );
goto error;
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "verify hash", verify_hash, verify_hash_len );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT)
if( sig_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS )
{
rsassa_pss_options.mgf1_hash_id = md_alg;
rsassa_pss_options.expected_salt_len = PSA_HASH_LENGTH( hash_alg );
options = (const void*) &rsassa_pss_options;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT */
if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_verify_ext( sig_alg, options,
&ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk,
md_alg, verify_hash, verify_hash_len,
p, signature_len ) ) == 0 )
{
return( 0 );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_pk_verify_ext", ret );
error:
/* RFC 8446 section 4.4.3
*
* If the verification fails, the receiver MUST terminate the handshake
* with a "decrypt_error" alert.
*/
MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPT_ERROR,
MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */
int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_process_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
unsigned char verify_buffer[SSL_VERIFY_STRUCT_MAX_SIZE];
size_t verify_buffer_len;
unsigned char transcript[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE];
size_t transcript_len;
unsigned char *buf;
size_t buf_len;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse certificate verify" ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(
mbedtls_ssl_tls13_fetch_handshake_msg( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, &buf, &buf_len ) );
/* Need to calculate the hash of the transcript first
* before reading the message since otherwise it gets
* included in the transcript
*/
ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript( ssl,
ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac,
transcript, sizeof( transcript ),
&transcript_len );
if( ret != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR,
MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
return( ret );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "handshake hash", transcript, transcript_len );
/* Create verify structure */
ssl_tls13_create_verify_structure( transcript,
transcript_len,
verify_buffer,
&verify_buffer_len,
( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ) ?
MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER :
MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT );
/* Process the message contents */
MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( ssl_tls13_parse_certificate_verify( ssl, buf,
buf + buf_len, verify_buffer, verify_buffer_len ) );
mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY,
buf, buf_len );
cleanup:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse certificate verify" ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_process_certificate_verify", ret );
return( ret );
#else
((void) ssl);
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */
}
/*
*
* STATE HANDLING: Incoming Certificate.
*
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
/*
* Structure of Certificate message:
*
* enum {
* X509(0),
* RawPublicKey(2),
* (255)
* } CertificateType;
*
* struct {
* select (certificate_type) {
* case RawPublicKey:
* * From RFC 7250 ASN.1_subjectPublicKeyInfo *
* opaque ASN1_subjectPublicKeyInfo<1..2^24-1>;
* case X509:
* opaque cert_data<1..2^24-1>;
* };
* Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>;
* } CertificateEntry;
*
* struct {
* opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>;
* CertificateEntry certificate_list<0..2^24-1>;
* } Certificate;
*
*/
/* Parse certificate chain send by the server. */
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE
int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_parse_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *buf,
const unsigned char *end )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t certificate_request_context_len = 0;
size_t certificate_list_len = 0;
const unsigned char *p = buf;
const unsigned char *certificate_list_end;
MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, end, 4 );
certificate_request_context_len = p[0];
certificate_list_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_BE( p, 1 );
p += 4;
/* In theory, the certificate list can be up to 2^24 Bytes, but we don't
* support anything beyond 2^16 = 64K.
*/
if( ( certificate_request_context_len != 0 ) ||
( certificate_list_len >= 0x10000 ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate message" ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR,
MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
}
/* In case we tried to reuse a session but it failed */
if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert != NULL )
{
mbedtls_x509_crt_free( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert );
mbedtls_free( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert );
}
if( certificate_list_len == 0 )
{
ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert = NULL;
ret = 0;
goto exit;
}
if( ( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert =
mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_crt ) ) ) == NULL )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc( %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bytes ) failed",
sizeof( mbedtls_x509_crt ) ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR,
MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED );
}
mbedtls_x509_crt_init( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert );
MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, end, certificate_list_len );
certificate_list_end = p + certificate_list_len;
while( p < certificate_list_end )
{
size_t cert_data_len, extensions_len;
MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, certificate_list_end, 3 );
cert_data_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_BE( p, 0 );
p += 3;
/* In theory, the CRT can be up to 2^24 Bytes, but we don't support
* anything beyond 2^16 = 64K. Otherwise as in the TLS 1.2 code,
* check that we have a minimum of 128 bytes of data, this is not
* clear why we need that though.
*/
if( ( cert_data_len < 128 ) || ( cert_data_len >= 0x10000 ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad Certificate message" ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR,
MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, certificate_list_end, cert_data_len );
ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert,
p, cert_data_len );
switch( ret )
{
case 0: /*ok*/
break;
case MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG + MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND:
/* Ignore certificate with an unknown algorithm: maybe a
prior certificate was already trusted. */
break;
case MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED:
MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR,
MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, " mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der", ret );
return( ret );
case MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION:
MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT,
MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, " mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der", ret );
return( ret );
default:
MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_CERT,
ret );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, " mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der", ret );
return( ret );
}
p += cert_data_len;
/* Certificate extensions length */
MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, certificate_list_end, 2 );
extensions_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE( p, 0 );
p += 2;
MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, certificate_list_end, extensions_len );
p += extensions_len;
}
exit:
/* Check that all the message is consumed. */
if( p != end )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad Certificate message" ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR, \
MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT( 3, "peer certificate", ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert );
return( ret );
}
#else
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE
int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_parse_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *buf,
const unsigned char *end )
{
((void) ssl);
((void) buf);
((void) end);
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
/* Validate certificate chain sent by the server. */
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_tls13_validate_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret = 0;
int authmode = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED;
mbedtls_x509_crt *ca_chain;
mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl;
const char *ext_oid;
size_t ext_len;
uint32_t verify_result = 0;
/* If SNI was used, overwrite authentication mode
* from the configuration. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
if( ssl->handshake->sni_authmode != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_UNSET )
authmode = ssl->handshake->sni_authmode;
else
#endif
authmode = ssl->conf->authmode;
}
#endif
/*
* If the peer hasn't sent a certificate ( i.e. it sent
* an empty certificate chain ), this is reflected in the peer CRT
* structure being unset.
* Check for that and handle it depending on the
* authentication mode.
*/
if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "peer has no certificate" ) );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER )
{
/* The client was asked for a certificate but didn't send
* one. The client should know what's going on, so we
* don't send an alert.
*/
ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result = MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_MISSING;
if( authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL )
return( 0 );
else
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_CERT,
MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE );
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_CERT,
MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FATAL_ALERT_MESSAGE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FATAL_ALERT_MESSAGE );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
if( ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain != NULL )
{
ca_chain = ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain;
ca_crl = ssl->handshake->sni_ca_crl;
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */
{
ca_chain = ssl->conf->ca_chain;
ca_crl = ssl->conf->ca_crl;
}
/*
* Main check: verify certificate
*/
ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile(
ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert,
ca_chain, ca_crl,
ssl->conf->cert_profile,
ssl->hostname,
&verify_result,
ssl->conf->f_vrfy, ssl->conf->p_vrfy );
if( ret != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "x509_verify_cert", ret );
}
/*
* Secondary checks: always done, but change 'ret' only if it was 0
*/
if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT )
{
ext_oid = MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH;
ext_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH );
}
else
{
ext_oid = MBEDTLS_OID_CLIENT_AUTH;
ext_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_CLIENT_AUTH );
}
if( ( mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage(
ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert,
MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE ) != 0 ) ||
( mbedtls_x509_crt_check_extended_key_usage(
ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert,
ext_oid, ext_len ) != 0 ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate (usage extensions)" ) );
if( ret == 0 )
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
}
/* mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile is supposed to report a
* verification failure through MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED,
* with details encoded in the verification flags. All other kinds
* of error codes, including those from the user provided f_vrfy
* functions, are treated as fatal and lead to a failure of
* mbedtls_ssl_tls13_parse_certificate even if verification was optional.
*/
if( authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL &&
( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED ||
ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE ) )
{
ret = 0;
}
if( ca_chain == NULL && authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no CA chain" ) );
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CA_CHAIN_REQUIRED;
}
if( ret != 0 )
{
/* The certificate may have been rejected for several reasons.
Pick one and send the corresponding alert. Which alert to send
may be a subject of debate in some cases. */
if( verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_OTHER )
MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ACCESS_DENIED, ret );
else if( verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH )
MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_CERT, ret );
else if( verify_result & ( MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE |
MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXT_KEY_USAGE |
MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NS_CERT_TYPE |
MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK |
MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY ) )
MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT, ret );
else if( verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED )
MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_EXPIRED, ret );
else if( verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED )
MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_REVOKED, ret );
else if( verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED )
MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_CA, ret );
else
MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_UNKNOWN, ret );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C)
if( verify_result != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "! Certificate verification flags %08x",
(unsigned int) verify_result ) );
}
else
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Certificate verification flags clear" ) );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */
ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result = verify_result;
return( ret );
}
#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_tls13_validate_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
((void) ssl);
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED */
int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_process_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse certificate" ) );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED)
unsigned char *buf;
size_t buf_len;
MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( mbedtls_ssl_tls13_fetch_handshake_msg(
ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE,
&buf, &buf_len ) );
/* Parse the certificate chain sent by the peer. */
MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( mbedtls_ssl_tls13_parse_certificate( ssl, buf,
buf + buf_len ) );
/* Validate the certificate chain and set the verification results. */
MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( ssl_tls13_validate_certificate( ssl ) );
mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE,
buf, buf_len );
cleanup:
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED */
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse certificate" ) );
return( ret );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
/*
* enum {
* X509(0),
* RawPublicKey(2),
* (255)
* } CertificateType;
*
* struct {
* select (certificate_type) {
* case RawPublicKey:
* // From RFC 7250 ASN.1_subjectPublicKeyInfo
* opaque ASN1_subjectPublicKeyInfo<1..2^24-1>;
*
* case X509:
* opaque cert_data<1..2^24-1>;
* };
* Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>;
* } CertificateEntry;
*
* struct {
* opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>;
* CertificateEntry certificate_list<0..2^24-1>;
* } Certificate;
*/
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_tls13_write_certificate_body( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *buf,
unsigned char *end,
size_t *out_len )
{
const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt = mbedtls_ssl_own_cert( ssl );
unsigned char *p = buf;
unsigned char *certificate_request_context =
ssl->handshake->certificate_request_context;
unsigned char certificate_request_context_len =
ssl->handshake->certificate_request_context_len;
unsigned char *p_certificate_list_len;
/* ...
* opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>;
* ...
*/
MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, certificate_request_context_len + 1 );
*p++ = certificate_request_context_len;
if( certificate_request_context_len > 0 )
{
memcpy( p, certificate_request_context, certificate_request_context_len );
p += certificate_request_context_len;
}
/* ...
* CertificateEntry certificate_list<0..2^24-1>;
* ...
*/
MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 3 );
p_certificate_list_len = p;
p += 3;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT( 3, "own certificate", crt );
while( crt != NULL )
{
size_t cert_data_len = crt->raw.len;
MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, cert_data_len + 3 + 2 );
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT24_BE( cert_data_len, p, 0 );
p += 3;
memcpy( p, crt->raw.p, cert_data_len );
p += cert_data_len;
crt = crt->next;
/* Currently, we don't have any certificate extensions defined.
* Hence, we are sending an empty extension with length zero.
*/
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( 0, p, 0 );
p += 2;
}
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT24_BE( p - p_certificate_list_len - 3,
p_certificate_list_len, 0 );
*out_len = p - buf;
return( 0 );
}
int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret;
unsigned char *buf;
size_t buf_len, msg_len;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write certificate" ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( mbedtls_ssl_start_handshake_msg( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE, &buf, &buf_len ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( ssl_tls13_write_certificate_body( ssl,
buf,
buf + buf_len,
&msg_len ) );
mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE,
buf, msg_len );
MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( mbedtls_ssl_finish_handshake_msg(
ssl, buf_len, msg_len ) );
cleanup:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write certificate" ) );
return( ret );
}
/*
* STATE HANDLING: Output Certificate Verify
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_sig_alg_cert_key_match( uint16_t sig_alg,
mbedtls_pk_context *key )
{
mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type = mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk( key );
size_t key_size = mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen( key );
switch( pk_type )
{
case MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA:
switch( key_size )
{
case 256:
return(
sig_alg == MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256 );
case 384:
return(
sig_alg == MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384 );
case 521:
return(
sig_alg == MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512 );
default:
break;
}
break;
case MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA:
switch( sig_alg )
{
case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256: /* Intentional fallthrough */
case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA384: /* Intentional fallthrough */
case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA512:
return( 1 );
default:
break;
}
break;
default:
break;
}
return( 0 );
}
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_tls13_write_certificate_verify_body( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *buf,
unsigned char *end,
size_t *out_len )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
unsigned char *p = buf;
mbedtls_pk_context *own_key;
unsigned char handshake_hash[ MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE ];
size_t handshake_hash_len;
unsigned char verify_buffer[ SSL_VERIFY_STRUCT_MAX_SIZE ];
size_t verify_buffer_len;
uint16_t *sig_alg = ssl->handshake->received_sig_algs;
size_t signature_len = 0;
*out_len = 0;
own_key = mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl );
if( own_key == NULL )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript( ssl,
ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac,
handshake_hash,
sizeof( handshake_hash ),
&handshake_hash_len );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "handshake hash",
handshake_hash,
handshake_hash_len);
ssl_tls13_create_verify_structure( handshake_hash, handshake_hash_len,
verify_buffer, &verify_buffer_len,
ssl->conf->endpoint );
/*
* struct {
* SignatureScheme algorithm;
* opaque signature<0..2^16-1>;
* } CertificateVerify;
*/
/* Check there is space for the algorithm identifier (2 bytes) and the
* signature length (2 bytes).
*/
MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 4 );
for( ; *sig_alg != MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_NONE ; sig_alg++ )
{
psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type = MBEDTLS_PK_NONE;
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE;
psa_algorithm_t psa_algorithm = PSA_ALG_NONE;
unsigned char verify_hash[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE];
size_t verify_hash_len;
if( !mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_offered( ssl, *sig_alg ) )
continue;
if( !mbedtls_ssl_tls13_sig_alg_for_cert_verify_is_supported( *sig_alg ) )
continue;
if( !mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_sig_alg_cert_key_match( *sig_alg, own_key ) )
continue;
if( mbedtls_ssl_get_pk_type_and_md_alg_from_sig_alg(
*sig_alg, &pk_type, &md_alg ) != 0 )
{
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
/* Hash verify buffer with indicated hash function */
psa_algorithm = mbedtls_hash_info_psa_from_md( md_alg );
status = psa_hash_compute( psa_algorithm,
verify_buffer,
verify_buffer_len,
verify_hash, sizeof( verify_hash ),
&verify_hash_len );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( psa_ssl_status_to_mbedtls( status ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "verify hash", verify_hash, verify_hash_len );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_sign_ext( pk_type, own_key,
md_alg, verify_hash, verify_hash_len,
p + 4, (size_t)( end - ( p + 4 ) ), &signature_len,
ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "CertificateVerify signature failed with %s",
mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_to_str( *sig_alg ) ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, "mbedtls_pk_sign_ext", ret );
continue;
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "CertificateVerify signature with %s",
mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_to_str( *sig_alg ) ) );
break;
}
if( *sig_alg == MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_NONE )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "no suitable signature algorithm" ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
}
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( *sig_alg, p, 0 );
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( signature_len, p, 2 );
*out_len = 4 + signature_len;
return( 0 );
}
int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret = 0;
unsigned char *buf;
size_t buf_len, msg_len;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write certificate verify" ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( mbedtls_ssl_start_handshake_msg( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, &buf, &buf_len ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( ssl_tls13_write_certificate_verify_body(
ssl, buf, buf + buf_len, &msg_len ) );
mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY,
buf, msg_len );
MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( mbedtls_ssl_finish_handshake_msg(
ssl, buf_len, msg_len ) );
cleanup:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write certificate verify" ) );
return( ret );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */
/*
*
* STATE HANDLING: Incoming Finished message.
*/
/*
* Implementation
*/
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_tls13_preprocess_finished_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret;
ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_calculate_verify_data( ssl,
ssl->handshake->state_local.finished_in.digest,
sizeof( ssl->handshake->state_local.finished_in.digest ),
&ssl->handshake->state_local.finished_in.digest_len,
ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ?
MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER : MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT );
if( ret != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_calculate_verify_data", ret );
return( ret );
}
return( 0 );
}
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_tls13_parse_finished_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *buf,
const unsigned char *end )
{
/*
* struct {
* opaque verify_data[Hash.length];
* } Finished;
*/
const unsigned char *expected_verify_data =
ssl->handshake->state_local.finished_in.digest;
size_t expected_verify_data_len =
ssl->handshake->state_local.finished_in.digest_len;
/* Structural validation */
if( (size_t)( end - buf ) != expected_verify_data_len )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad finished message" ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR,
MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "verify_data (self-computed):",
expected_verify_data,
expected_verify_data_len );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "verify_data (received message):", buf,
expected_verify_data_len );
/* Semantic validation */
if( mbedtls_ct_memcmp( buf,
expected_verify_data,
expected_verify_data_len ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad finished message" ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPT_ERROR,
MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
}
return( 0 );
}
int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_process_finished_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
unsigned char *buf;
size_t buf_len;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse finished message" ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( mbedtls_ssl_tls13_fetch_handshake_msg( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED,
&buf, &buf_len ) );
/* Preprocessing step: Compute handshake digest */
MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( ssl_tls13_preprocess_finished_message( ssl ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( ssl_tls13_parse_finished_message( ssl, buf, buf + buf_len ) );
mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED,
buf, buf_len );
cleanup:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse finished message" ) );
return( ret );
}
/*
*
* STATE HANDLING: Write and send Finished message.
*
*/
/*
* Implement
*/
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_tls13_prepare_finished_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret;
/* Compute transcript of handshake up to now. */
ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_calculate_verify_data( ssl,
ssl->handshake->state_local.finished_out.digest,
sizeof( ssl->handshake->state_local.finished_out.digest ),
&ssl->handshake->state_local.finished_out.digest_len,
ssl->conf->endpoint );
if( ret != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "calculate_verify_data failed", ret );
return( ret );
}
return( 0 );
}
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_tls13_write_finished_message_body( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *buf,
unsigned char *end,
size_t *out_len )
{
size_t verify_data_len = ssl->handshake->state_local.finished_out.digest_len;
/*
* struct {
* opaque verify_data[Hash.length];
* } Finished;
*/
MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( buf, end, verify_data_len );
memcpy( buf, ssl->handshake->state_local.finished_out.digest,
verify_data_len );
*out_len = verify_data_len;
return( 0 );
}
/* Main entry point: orchestrates the other functions */
int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_finished_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
unsigned char *buf;
size_t buf_len, msg_len;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write finished message" ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( ssl_tls13_prepare_finished_message( ssl ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( mbedtls_ssl_start_handshake_msg( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED, &buf, &buf_len ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( ssl_tls13_write_finished_message_body(
ssl, buf, buf + buf_len, &msg_len ) );
mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED,
buf, msg_len );
MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( mbedtls_ssl_finish_handshake_msg(
ssl, buf_len, msg_len ) );
cleanup:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write finished message" ) );
return( ret );
}
void mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_wrapup( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "=> handshake wrapup" ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Switch to application keys for inbound traffic" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_set_inbound_transform ( ssl, ssl->transform_application );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Switch to application keys for outbound traffic" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_set_outbound_transform( ssl, ssl->transform_application );
/*
* Free the previous session and switch to the current one.
*/
if( ssl->session )
{
mbedtls_ssl_session_free( ssl->session );
mbedtls_free( ssl->session );
}
ssl->session = ssl->session_negotiate;
ssl->session_negotiate = NULL;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "<= handshake wrapup" ) );
}
/*
*
* STATE HANDLING: Write ChangeCipherSpec
*
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE)
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_tls13_write_change_cipher_spec_body( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *buf,
unsigned char *end,
size_t *olen )
{
((void) ssl);
MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( buf, end, 1 );
buf[0] = 1;
*olen = 1;
return( 0 );
}
int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_change_cipher_spec( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write change cipher spec" ) );
/* Write CCS message */
MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( ssl_tls13_write_change_cipher_spec_body(
ssl, ssl->out_msg,
ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN,
&ssl->out_msglen ) );
ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
/* Dispatch message */
MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( mbedtls_ssl_write_record( ssl, 0 ) );
cleanup:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write change cipher spec" ) );
return( ret );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE */
/* Reset SSL context and update hash for handling HRR.
*
* Replace Transcript-Hash(X) by
* Transcript-Hash( message_hash ||
* 00 00 Hash.length ||
* X )
* A few states of the handshake are preserved, including:
* - session ID
* - session ticket
* - negotiated ciphersuite
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_reset_transcript_for_hrr( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
unsigned char hash_transcript[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE + 4];
size_t hash_len;
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info;
uint16_t cipher_suite = ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite;
ciphersuite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( cipher_suite );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Reset SSL session for HRR" ) );
ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript( ssl, ciphersuite_info->mac,
hash_transcript + 4,
PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE,
&hash_len );
if( ret != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 4, "mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript", ret );
return( ret );
}
hash_transcript[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_MESSAGE_HASH;
hash_transcript[1] = 0;
hash_transcript[2] = 0;
hash_transcript[3] = (unsigned char) hash_len;
hash_len += 4;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_256_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA)
if( ciphersuite_info->mac == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "Truncated SHA-256 handshake transcript",
hash_transcript, hash_len );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
psa_hash_abort( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa );
psa_hash_setup( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa, PSA_ALG_SHA_256 );
#else
mbedtls_sha256_starts( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256, 0 );
#endif
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_256_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_384_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA)
if( ciphersuite_info->mac == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "Truncated SHA-384 handshake transcript",
hash_transcript, hash_len );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
psa_hash_abort( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa );
psa_hash_setup( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa, PSA_ALG_SHA_384 );
#else
mbedtls_sha512_starts( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha384, 1 );
#endif
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_384_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_256_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA) || defined(MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_384_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA)
ssl->handshake->update_checksum( ssl, hash_transcript, hash_len );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_256_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA || MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_384_VIA_MD_OR_PSA_BASED_ON_USE_PSA */
return( ret );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C)
int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_read_public_ecdhe_share( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *buf,
size_t buf_len )
{
uint8_t *p = (uint8_t*)buf;
const uint8_t *end = buf + buf_len;
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake;
/* Get size of the TLS opaque key_exchange field of the KeyShareEntry struct. */
MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, end, 2 );
uint16_t peerkey_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE( p, 0 );
p += 2;
/* Check if key size is consistent with given buffer length. */
MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( p, end, peerkey_len );
/* Store peer's ECDH public key. */
memcpy( handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey, p, peerkey_len );
handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey_len = peerkey_len;
return( 0 );
}
int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_generate_and_write_ecdh_key_exchange(
mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
uint16_t named_group,
unsigned char *buf,
unsigned char *end,
size_t *out_len )
{
psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR;
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
psa_key_attributes_t key_attributes;
size_t own_pubkey_len;
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake;
size_t ecdh_bits = 0;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Perform PSA-based ECDH computation." ) );
/* Convert EC group to PSA key type. */
if( ( handshake->ecdh_psa_type =
mbedtls_psa_parse_tls_ecc_group( named_group, &ecdh_bits ) ) == 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
ssl->handshake->ecdh_bits = ecdh_bits;
key_attributes = psa_key_attributes_init();
psa_set_key_usage_flags( &key_attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE );
psa_set_key_algorithm( &key_attributes, PSA_ALG_ECDH );
psa_set_key_type( &key_attributes, handshake->ecdh_psa_type );
psa_set_key_bits( &key_attributes, handshake->ecdh_bits );
/* Generate ECDH private key. */
status = psa_generate_key( &key_attributes,
&handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
{
ret = psa_ssl_status_to_mbedtls( status );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "psa_generate_key", ret );
return( ret );
}
/* Export the public part of the ECDH private key from PSA. */
status = psa_export_public_key( handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey,
buf, (size_t)( end - buf ),
&own_pubkey_len );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
{
ret = psa_ssl_status_to_mbedtls( status );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "psa_export_public_key", ret );
return( ret );
}
*out_len = own_pubkey_len;
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED)
/* Check if we have any PSK to offer, returns 0 if PSK is available.
* Assign the psk and ticket if pointers are present.
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_get_psk_to_offer(
const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
int *psk_type,
const unsigned char **psk, size_t *psk_len,
const unsigned char **psk_identity, size_t *psk_identity_len )
{
int ptrs_present = 0;
if( psk_type != NULL && psk != NULL && psk_len != NULL &&
psk_identity != NULL && psk_identity_len != NULL )
{
ptrs_present = 1;
}
/* Check if an external PSK has been configured. */
if( ssl->conf->psk != NULL )
{
if( ptrs_present )
{
*psk_type = MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_EXTERNAL;
*psk = ssl->conf->psk;
*psk_len = ssl->conf->psk_len;
*psk_identity = ssl->conf->psk_identity;
*psk_identity_len = ssl->conf->psk_identity_len;
}
return( 0 );
}
return( 1 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */