mbedtls/library/x509_crl.c

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/*
* X.509 Certificate Revocation List (CRL) parsing
*
* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
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* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
*
2015-09-04 14:21:07 +02:00
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
* not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
2015-09-04 14:21:07 +02:00
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
2015-09-04 14:21:07 +02:00
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
* WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*/
/*
* The ITU-T X.509 standard defines a certificate format for PKI.
*
* http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5280.txt (Certificates and CRLs)
* http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3279.txt (Alg IDs for CRLs)
* http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2986.txt (CSRs, aka PKCS#10)
*
* http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/languages/X.680-0207.pdf
* http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/languages/X.690-0207.pdf
*/
#include "common.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C)
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#include "mbedtls/x509_crl.h"
#include "mbedtls/error.h"
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#include "mbedtls/oid.h"
#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
#include <string.h>
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C)
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#include "mbedtls/pem.h"
#endif
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#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32)
#include <windows.h>
#else
#include <time.h>
#endif
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) || defined(EFIX64) || defined(EFI32)
#include <stdio.h>
#endif
/*
* Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0), v2(1) }
*/
static int x509_crl_get_version(unsigned char **p,
const unsigned char *end,
int *ver)
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int(p, end, ver)) != 0) {
if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG) {
*ver = 0;
return 0;
}
return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION, ret);
}
return 0;
}
/*
* X.509 CRL v2 extensions
*
* We currently don't parse any extension's content, but we do check that the
* list of extensions is well-formed and abort on critical extensions (that
* are unsupported as we don't support any extension so far)
*/
static int x509_get_crl_ext(unsigned char **p,
const unsigned char *end,
mbedtls_x509_buf *ext)
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
if (*p == end) {
return 0;
}
Obey bounds of ASN.1 substructures When parsing a substructure of an ASN.1 structure, no field within the substructure must exceed the bounds of the substructure. Concretely, the `end` pointer passed to the ASN.1 parsing routines must be updated to point to the end of the substructure while parsing the latter. This was previously not the case for the routines - x509_get_attr_type_and_value(), - mbedtls_x509_get_crt_ext(), - mbedtls_x509_get_crl_ext(). These functions kept using the end of the parent structure as the `end` pointer and would hence allow substructure fields to cross the substructure boundary. This could lead to successful parsing of ill-formed X.509 CRTs. This commit fixes this. Care has to be taken when adapting `mbedtls_x509_get_crt_ext()` and `mbedtls_x509_get_crl_ext()`, as the underlying function `mbedtls_x509_get_ext()` returns `0` if no extensions are present but doesn't set the variable which holds the bounds of the Extensions structure in case the latter is present. This commit addresses this by returning early from `mbedtls_x509_get_crt_ext()` and `mbedtls_x509_get_crl_ext()` if parsing has reached the end of the input buffer. The following X.509 parsing tests need to be adapted: - "TBSCertificate, issuer two inner set datas" This test exercises the X.509 CRT parser with a Subject name which has two empty `AttributeTypeAndValue` structures. This is supposed to fail with `MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA` because the parser should attempt to parse the first structure and fail because of a lack of data. Previously, it failed to obey the (0-length) bounds of the first AttributeTypeAndValue structure and would try to interpret the beginning of the second AttributeTypeAndValue structure as the first field of the first AttributeTypeAndValue structure, returning an UNEXPECTED_TAG error. - "TBSCertificate, issuer, no full following string" This test exercises the parser's behaviour on an AttributeTypeAndValue structure which contains more data than expected; it should therefore fail with MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH. Because of the missing bounds check, it previously failed with UNEXPECTED_TAG because it interpreted the remaining byte in the first AttributeTypeAndValue structure as the first byte in the second AttributeTypeAndValue structure. - "SubjectAltName repeated" This test should exercise two SubjectAltNames extensions in succession, but a wrong length values makes the second SubjectAltNames extension appear outside of the Extensions structure. With the new bounds in place, this therefore fails with a LENGTH_MISMATCH error. This commit adapts the test data to put the 2nd SubjectAltNames extension inside the Extensions structure, too.
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/*
* crlExtensions [0] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL
* -- if present, version MUST be v2
*/
if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_ext(p, end, ext, 0)) != 0) {
return ret;
}
Obey bounds of ASN.1 substructures When parsing a substructure of an ASN.1 structure, no field within the substructure must exceed the bounds of the substructure. Concretely, the `end` pointer passed to the ASN.1 parsing routines must be updated to point to the end of the substructure while parsing the latter. This was previously not the case for the routines - x509_get_attr_type_and_value(), - mbedtls_x509_get_crt_ext(), - mbedtls_x509_get_crl_ext(). These functions kept using the end of the parent structure as the `end` pointer and would hence allow substructure fields to cross the substructure boundary. This could lead to successful parsing of ill-formed X.509 CRTs. This commit fixes this. Care has to be taken when adapting `mbedtls_x509_get_crt_ext()` and `mbedtls_x509_get_crl_ext()`, as the underlying function `mbedtls_x509_get_ext()` returns `0` if no extensions are present but doesn't set the variable which holds the bounds of the Extensions structure in case the latter is present. This commit addresses this by returning early from `mbedtls_x509_get_crt_ext()` and `mbedtls_x509_get_crl_ext()` if parsing has reached the end of the input buffer. The following X.509 parsing tests need to be adapted: - "TBSCertificate, issuer two inner set datas" This test exercises the X.509 CRT parser with a Subject name which has two empty `AttributeTypeAndValue` structures. This is supposed to fail with `MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA` because the parser should attempt to parse the first structure and fail because of a lack of data. Previously, it failed to obey the (0-length) bounds of the first AttributeTypeAndValue structure and would try to interpret the beginning of the second AttributeTypeAndValue structure as the first field of the first AttributeTypeAndValue structure, returning an UNEXPECTED_TAG error. - "TBSCertificate, issuer, no full following string" This test exercises the parser's behaviour on an AttributeTypeAndValue structure which contains more data than expected; it should therefore fail with MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH. Because of the missing bounds check, it previously failed with UNEXPECTED_TAG because it interpreted the remaining byte in the first AttributeTypeAndValue structure as the first byte in the second AttributeTypeAndValue structure. - "SubjectAltName repeated" This test should exercise two SubjectAltNames extensions in succession, but a wrong length values makes the second SubjectAltNames extension appear outside of the Extensions structure. With the new bounds in place, this therefore fails with a LENGTH_MISMATCH error. This commit adapts the test data to put the 2nd SubjectAltNames extension inside the Extensions structure, too.
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end = ext->p + ext->len;
while (*p < end) {
/*
* Extension ::= SEQUENCE {
* extnID OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
* critical BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
* extnValue OCTET STRING }
*/
int is_critical = 0;
const unsigned char *end_ext_data;
size_t len;
/* Get enclosing sequence tag */
if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len,
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) {
return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret);
}
end_ext_data = *p + len;
/* Get OID (currently ignored) */
if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end_ext_data, &len,
MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID)) != 0) {
return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret);
}
*p += len;
/* Get optional critical */
if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bool(p, end_ext_data,
&is_critical)) != 0 &&
(ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG)) {
return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret);
}
/* Data should be octet string type */
if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end_ext_data, &len,
MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)) != 0) {
return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret);
}
/* Ignore data so far and just check its length */
*p += len;
if (*p != end_ext_data) {
return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS,
MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
}
/* Abort on (unsupported) critical extensions */
if (is_critical) {
return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS,
MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG);
}
}
if (*p != end) {
return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS,
MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
}
return 0;
}
/*
* X.509 CRL v2 entry extensions (no extensions parsed yet.)
*/
static int x509_get_crl_entry_ext(unsigned char **p,
const unsigned char *end,
mbedtls_x509_buf *ext)
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t len = 0;
/* OPTIONAL */
if (end <= *p) {
return 0;
}
ext->tag = **p;
ext->p = *p;
/*
* Get CRL-entry extension sequence header
* crlEntryExtensions Extensions OPTIONAL -- if present, MUST be v2
*/
if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &ext->len,
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) {
if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG) {
ext->p = NULL;
return 0;
}
return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret);
}
end = *p + ext->len;
if (end != *p + ext->len) {
return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS,
MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
}
while (*p < end) {
if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len,
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) {
return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret);
}
*p += len;
}
if (*p != end) {
return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS,
MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
}
return 0;
}
/*
* X.509 CRL Entries
*/
static int x509_get_entries(unsigned char **p,
const unsigned char *end,
mbedtls_x509_crl_entry *entry)
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t entry_len;
mbedtls_x509_crl_entry *cur_entry = entry;
if (*p == end) {
return 0;
}
if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &entry_len,
MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)) != 0) {
if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG) {
return 0;
}
return ret;
}
end = *p + entry_len;
while (*p < end) {
size_t len2;
const unsigned char *end2;
cur_entry->raw.tag = **p;
if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len2,
MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)) != 0) {
return ret;
}
cur_entry->raw.p = *p;
cur_entry->raw.len = len2;
end2 = *p + len2;
if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_serial(p, end2, &cur_entry->serial)) != 0) {
return ret;
}
if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_time(p, end2,
&cur_entry->revocation_date)) != 0) {
return ret;
}
if ((ret = x509_get_crl_entry_ext(p, end2,
&cur_entry->entry_ext)) != 0) {
return ret;
}
if (*p < end) {
cur_entry->next = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_crl_entry));
if (cur_entry->next == NULL) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED;
}
cur_entry = cur_entry->next;
}
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Parse one CRLs in DER format and append it to the chained list
*/
int mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_der(mbedtls_x509_crl *chain,
const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen)
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t len;
unsigned char *p = NULL, *end = NULL;
mbedtls_x509_buf sig_params1, sig_params2, sig_oid2;
mbedtls_x509_crl *crl = chain;
/*
* Check for valid input
*/
if (crl == NULL || buf == NULL) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
}
memset(&sig_params1, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_buf));
memset(&sig_params2, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_buf));
memset(&sig_oid2, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_buf));
/*
* Add new CRL on the end of the chain if needed.
*/
while (crl->version != 0 && crl->next != NULL) {
crl = crl->next;
}
if (crl->version != 0 && crl->next == NULL) {
crl->next = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_crl));
if (crl->next == NULL) {
mbedtls_x509_crl_free(crl);
return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED;
}
mbedtls_x509_crl_init(crl->next);
crl = crl->next;
}
/*
* Copy raw DER-encoded CRL
*/
if (buflen == 0) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT;
}
p = mbedtls_calloc(1, buflen);
if (p == NULL) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED;
}
memcpy(p, buf, buflen);
crl->raw.p = p;
crl->raw.len = buflen;
end = p + buflen;
/*
* CertificateList ::= SEQUENCE {
* tbsCertList TBSCertList,
* signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
* signatureValue BIT STRING }
*/
if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len,
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) {
mbedtls_x509_crl_free(crl);
return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT;
}
if (len != (size_t) (end - p)) {
mbedtls_x509_crl_free(crl);
return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT,
MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
}
/*
* TBSCertList ::= SEQUENCE {
*/
crl->tbs.p = p;
if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len,
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) {
mbedtls_x509_crl_free(crl);
return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, ret);
}
end = p + len;
crl->tbs.len = end - crl->tbs.p;
/*
* Version ::= INTEGER OPTIONAL { v1(0), v2(1) }
* -- if present, MUST be v2
*
* signature AlgorithmIdentifier
*/
if ((ret = x509_crl_get_version(&p, end, &crl->version)) != 0 ||
(ret = mbedtls_x509_get_alg(&p, end, &crl->sig_oid, &sig_params1)) != 0) {
mbedtls_x509_crl_free(crl);
return ret;
}
if (crl->version < 0 || crl->version > 1) {
mbedtls_x509_crl_free(crl);
return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION;
}
crl->version++;
if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_sig_alg(&crl->sig_oid, &sig_params1,
&crl->sig_md, &crl->sig_pk,
&crl->sig_opts)) != 0) {
mbedtls_x509_crl_free(crl);
return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG;
}
/*
* issuer Name
*/
crl->issuer_raw.p = p;
if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len,
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) {
mbedtls_x509_crl_free(crl);
return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, ret);
}
if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_name(&p, p + len, &crl->issuer)) != 0) {
mbedtls_x509_crl_free(crl);
return ret;
}
crl->issuer_raw.len = p - crl->issuer_raw.p;
/*
* thisUpdate Time
* nextUpdate Time OPTIONAL
*/
if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_time(&p, end, &crl->this_update)) != 0) {
mbedtls_x509_crl_free(crl);
return ret;
}
if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_time(&p, end, &crl->next_update)) != 0) {
if (ret != (MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE,
MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG)) &&
ret != (MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE,
MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA))) {
mbedtls_x509_crl_free(crl);
return ret;
}
}
/*
* revokedCertificates SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
* userCertificate CertificateSerialNumber,
* revocationDate Time,
* crlEntryExtensions Extensions OPTIONAL
* -- if present, MUST be v2
* } OPTIONAL
*/
if ((ret = x509_get_entries(&p, end, &crl->entry)) != 0) {
mbedtls_x509_crl_free(crl);
return ret;
}
/*
* crlExtensions EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL
* -- if present, MUST be v2
*/
if (crl->version == 2) {
ret = x509_get_crl_ext(&p, end, &crl->crl_ext);
if (ret != 0) {
mbedtls_x509_crl_free(crl);
return ret;
}
}
if (p != end) {
mbedtls_x509_crl_free(crl);
return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT,
MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
}
end = crl->raw.p + crl->raw.len;
/*
* signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
* signatureValue BIT STRING
*/
if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_alg(&p, end, &sig_oid2, &sig_params2)) != 0) {
mbedtls_x509_crl_free(crl);
return ret;
}
if (crl->sig_oid.len != sig_oid2.len ||
memcmp(crl->sig_oid.p, sig_oid2.p, crl->sig_oid.len) != 0 ||
sig_params1.len != sig_params2.len ||
(sig_params1.len != 0 &&
memcmp(sig_params1.p, sig_params2.p, sig_params1.len) != 0)) {
mbedtls_x509_crl_free(crl);
return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_SIG_MISMATCH;
}
if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_sig(&p, end, &crl->sig)) != 0) {
mbedtls_x509_crl_free(crl);
return ret;
}
if (p != end) {
mbedtls_x509_crl_free(crl);
return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT,
MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Parse one or more CRLs and add them to the chained list
*/
int mbedtls_x509_crl_parse(mbedtls_x509_crl *chain, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen)
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C)
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t use_len = 0;
mbedtls_pem_context pem;
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int is_pem = 0;
if (chain == NULL || buf == NULL) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
}
do {
mbedtls_pem_init(&pem);
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// Avoid calling mbedtls_pem_read_buffer() on non-null-terminated
// string
if (buflen == 0 || buf[buflen - 1] != '\0') {
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ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT;
} else {
ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer(&pem,
"-----BEGIN X509 CRL-----",
"-----END X509 CRL-----",
buf, NULL, 0, &use_len);
}
if (ret == 0) {
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/*
* Was PEM encoded
*/
is_pem = 1;
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buflen -= use_len;
buf += use_len;
if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_der(chain,
pem.buf, pem.buflen)) != 0) {
mbedtls_pem_free(&pem);
return ret;
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}
} else if (is_pem) {
mbedtls_pem_free(&pem);
return ret;
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}
mbedtls_pem_free(&pem);
}
/* In the PEM case, buflen is 1 at the end, for the terminated NULL byte.
* And a valid CRL cannot be less than 1 byte anyway. */
while (is_pem && buflen > 1);
if (is_pem) {
return 0;
} else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */
return mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_der(chain, buf, buflen);
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
/*
* Load one or more CRLs and add them to the chained list
*/
int mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_file(mbedtls_x509_crl *chain, const char *path)
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t n;
unsigned char *buf;
if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_load_file(path, &buf, &n)) != 0) {
return ret;
}
ret = mbedtls_x509_crl_parse(chain, buf, n);
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, n);
mbedtls_free(buf);
return ret;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO)
/*
* Return an informational string about the certificate.
*/
#define BEFORE_COLON 14
#define BC "14"
/*
* Return an informational string about the CRL.
*/
int mbedtls_x509_crl_info(char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix,
const mbedtls_x509_crl *crl)
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t n;
char *p;
const mbedtls_x509_crl_entry *entry;
p = buf;
n = size;
ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "%sCRL version : %d",
prefix, crl->version);
MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%sissuer name : ", prefix);
MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
ret = mbedtls_x509_dn_gets(p, n, &crl->issuer);
MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%sthis update : " \
"%04d-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d", prefix,
crl->this_update.year, crl->this_update.mon,
crl->this_update.day, crl->this_update.hour,
crl->this_update.min, crl->this_update.sec);
MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%snext update : " \
"%04d-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d", prefix,
crl->next_update.year, crl->next_update.mon,
crl->next_update.day, crl->next_update.hour,
crl->next_update.min, crl->next_update.sec);
MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
entry = &crl->entry;
ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%sRevoked certificates:",
prefix);
MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
while (entry != NULL && entry->raw.len != 0) {
ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%sserial number: ",
prefix);
MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
ret = mbedtls_x509_serial_gets(p, n, &entry->serial);
MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, " revocation date: " \
"%04d-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d",
entry->revocation_date.year, entry->revocation_date.mon,
entry->revocation_date.day, entry->revocation_date.hour,
entry->revocation_date.min, entry->revocation_date.sec);
MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
entry = entry->next;
}
ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%ssigned using : ", prefix);
MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
ret = mbedtls_x509_sig_alg_gets(p, n, &crl->sig_oid, crl->sig_pk, crl->sig_md,
crl->sig_opts);
MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n");
MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
return (int) (size - n);
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO */
/*
* Initialize a CRL chain
*/
void mbedtls_x509_crl_init(mbedtls_x509_crl *crl)
{
memset(crl, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_crl));
}
/*
* Unallocate all CRL data
*/
void mbedtls_x509_crl_free(mbedtls_x509_crl *crl)
{
mbedtls_x509_crl *crl_cur = crl;
mbedtls_x509_crl *crl_prv;
mbedtls_x509_crl_entry *entry_cur;
mbedtls_x509_crl_entry *entry_prv;
while (crl_cur != NULL) {
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT)
mbedtls_free(crl_cur->sig_opts);
2014-06-05 15:14:28 +02:00
#endif
mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list_shallow(crl_cur->issuer.next);
entry_cur = crl_cur->entry.next;
while (entry_cur != NULL) {
entry_prv = entry_cur;
entry_cur = entry_cur->next;
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(entry_prv,
sizeof(mbedtls_x509_crl_entry));
mbedtls_free(entry_prv);
}
if (crl_cur->raw.p != NULL) {
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(crl_cur->raw.p, crl_cur->raw.len);
mbedtls_free(crl_cur->raw.p);
}
crl_prv = crl_cur;
crl_cur = crl_cur->next;
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(crl_prv, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_crl));
if (crl_prv != crl) {
mbedtls_free(crl_prv);
}
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C */