mbedtls/library/x509.c

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/*
* X.509 common functions for parsing and verification
*
* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
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* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
*
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* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
* not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
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* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
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* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
* WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*/
/*
* The ITU-T X.509 standard defines a certificate format for PKI.
*
* http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5280.txt (Certificates and CRLs)
* http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3279.txt (Alg IDs for CRLs)
* http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2986.txt (CSRs, aka PKCS#10)
*
* http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/languages/X.680-0207.pdf
* http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/languages/X.690-0207.pdf
*/
#include "common.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C)
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#include "mbedtls/x509.h"
#include "mbedtls/asn1.h"
#include "mbedtls/error.h"
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#include "mbedtls/oid.h"
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C)
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#include "mbedtls/pem.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
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#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
#else
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#define mbedtls_free free
#define mbedtls_calloc calloc
#define mbedtls_printf printf
#define mbedtls_snprintf snprintf
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
#include "mbedtls/platform_time.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE)
#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
#include <time.h>
#endif
#include "mbedtls/legacy_or_psa.h"
#define CHECK(code) if( ( ret = ( code ) ) != 0 ){ return( ret ); }
#define CHECK_RANGE(min, max, val) \
do \
{ \
if( ( val ) < ( min ) || ( val ) > ( max ) ) \
{ \
return( ret ); \
} \
} while( 0 )
/*
* CertificateSerialNumber ::= INTEGER
*/
int mbedtls_x509_get_serial( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end,
mbedtls_x509_buf *serial )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
if( ( end - *p ) < 1 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SERIAL,
MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ) );
if( **p != ( MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRIMITIVE | 2 ) &&
**p != MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER )
return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SERIAL,
MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) );
serial->tag = *(*p)++;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_len( p, end, &serial->len ) ) != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SERIAL, ret ) );
serial->p = *p;
*p += serial->len;
return( 0 );
}
/* Get an algorithm identifier without parameters (eg for signatures)
*
* AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
* algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
* parameters ANY DEFINED BY algorithm OPTIONAL }
*/
int mbedtls_x509_get_alg_null( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end,
mbedtls_x509_buf *alg )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg_null( p, end, alg ) ) != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, ret ) );
return( 0 );
}
/*
* Parse an algorithm identifier with (optional) parameters
*/
int mbedtls_x509_get_alg( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end,
mbedtls_x509_buf *alg, mbedtls_x509_buf *params )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg( p, end, alg, params ) ) != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, ret ) );
return( 0 );
}
/*
* Convert md type to string
*/
static inline const char* md_type_to_string( mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg )
{
switch( md_alg )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_MD5_VIA_MD_OR_PSA)
case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:
return( "MD5" );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_1_VIA_MD_OR_PSA)
case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:
return( "SHA1" );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_224_VIA_MD_OR_PSA)
case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:
return( "SHA224" );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_256_VIA_MD_OR_PSA)
case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:
return( "SHA256" );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_384_VIA_MD_OR_PSA)
case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:
return( "SHA384" );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_SHA_512_VIA_MD_OR_PSA)
case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:
return( "SHA512" );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAS_ALG_RIPEMD160_VIA_MD_OR_PSA)
case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160:
return( "RIPEMD160" );
#endif
case MBEDTLS_MD_NONE:
return( NULL );
default:
return( NULL );
}
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT)
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/*
* HashAlgorithm ::= AlgorithmIdentifier
*
* AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
* algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
* parameters ANY DEFINED BY algorithm OPTIONAL }
*
* For HashAlgorithm, parameters MUST be NULL or absent.
*/
static int x509_get_hash_alg( const mbedtls_x509_buf *alg, mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg )
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{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
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unsigned char *p;
const unsigned char *end;
mbedtls_x509_buf md_oid;
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size_t len;
/* Make sure we got a SEQUENCE and setup bounds */
if( alg->tag != ( MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) )
return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG,
MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) );
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p = alg->p;
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end = p + alg->len;
if( p >= end )
return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG,
MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ) );
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/* Parse md_oid */
md_oid.tag = *p;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &md_oid.len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ) ) != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, ret ) );
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md_oid.p = p;
p += md_oid.len;
/* Get md_alg from md_oid */
if( ( ret = mbedtls_oid_get_md_alg( &md_oid, md_alg ) ) != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, ret ) );
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/* Make sure params is absent of NULL */
if( p == end )
return( 0 );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_NULL ) ) != 0 || len != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, ret ) );
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if( p != end )
return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG,
MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) );
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return( 0 );
}
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/*
* RSASSA-PSS-params ::= SEQUENCE {
* hashAlgorithm [0] HashAlgorithm DEFAULT sha1Identifier,
* maskGenAlgorithm [1] MaskGenAlgorithm DEFAULT mgf1SHA1Identifier,
* saltLength [2] INTEGER DEFAULT 20,
* trailerField [3] INTEGER DEFAULT 1 }
* -- Note that the tags in this Sequence are explicit.
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*
* RFC 4055 (which defines use of RSASSA-PSS in PKIX) states that the value
* of trailerField MUST be 1, and PKCS#1 v2.2 doesn't even define any other
* option. Enfore this at parsing time.
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*/
int mbedtls_x509_get_rsassa_pss_params( const mbedtls_x509_buf *params,
mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg, mbedtls_md_type_t *mgf_md,
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int *salt_len )
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{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
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unsigned char *p;
const unsigned char *end, *end2;
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size_t len;
mbedtls_x509_buf alg_id, alg_params;
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/* First set everything to defaults */
*md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1;
*mgf_md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1;
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*salt_len = 20;
/* Make sure params is a SEQUENCE and setup bounds */
if( params->tag != ( MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) )
return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG,
MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) );
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p = (unsigned char *) params->p;
end = p + params->len;
if( p == end )
return( 0 );
/*
* HashAlgorithm
*/
if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len,
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 0 ) ) == 0 )
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{
end2 = p + len;
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/* HashAlgorithm ::= AlgorithmIdentifier (without parameters) */
if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_alg_null( &p, end2, &alg_id ) ) != 0 )
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return( ret );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_oid_get_md_alg( &alg_id, md_alg ) ) != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, ret ) );
if( p != end2 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG,
MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) );
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}
else if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG )
return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, ret ) );
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if( p == end )
return( 0 );
/*
* MaskGenAlgorithm
*/
if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len,
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 1 ) ) == 0 )
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{
end2 = p + len;
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/* MaskGenAlgorithm ::= AlgorithmIdentifier (params = HashAlgorithm) */
if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_alg( &p, end2, &alg_id, &alg_params ) ) != 0 )
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return( ret );
/* Only MFG1 is recognised for now */
if( MBEDTLS_OID_CMP( MBEDTLS_OID_MGF1, &alg_id ) != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE,
MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND ) );
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/* Parse HashAlgorithm */
if( ( ret = x509_get_hash_alg( &alg_params, mgf_md ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
if( p != end2 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG,
MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) );
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}
else if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG )
return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, ret ) );
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if( p == end )
return( 0 );
/*
* salt_len
*/
if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len,
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 2 ) ) == 0 )
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{
end2 = p + len;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( &p, end2, salt_len ) ) != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, ret ) );
if( p != end2 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG,
MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) );
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}
else if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG )
return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, ret ) );
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if( p == end )
return( 0 );
/*
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* trailer_field (if present, must be 1)
*/
if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len,
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 3 ) ) == 0 )
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{
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int trailer_field;
end2 = p + len;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( &p, end2, &trailer_field ) ) != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, ret ) );
if( p != end2 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG,
MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) );
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if( trailer_field != 1 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG );
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}
else if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG )
return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, ret ) );
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if( p != end )
return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG,
MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) );
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return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT */
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/*
* AttributeTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE {
* type AttributeType,
* value AttributeValue }
*
* AttributeType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
*
* AttributeValue ::= ANY DEFINED BY AttributeType
*/
static int x509_get_attr_type_value( unsigned char **p,
const unsigned char *end,
mbedtls_x509_name *cur )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t len;
mbedtls_x509_buf *oid;
mbedtls_x509_buf *val;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len,
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME, ret ) );
Obey bounds of ASN.1 substructures When parsing a substructure of an ASN.1 structure, no field within the substructure must exceed the bounds of the substructure. Concretely, the `end` pointer passed to the ASN.1 parsing routines must be updated to point to the end of the substructure while parsing the latter. This was previously not the case for the routines - x509_get_attr_type_and_value(), - mbedtls_x509_get_crt_ext(), - mbedtls_x509_get_crl_ext(). These functions kept using the end of the parent structure as the `end` pointer and would hence allow substructure fields to cross the substructure boundary. This could lead to successful parsing of ill-formed X.509 CRTs. This commit fixes this. Care has to be taken when adapting `mbedtls_x509_get_crt_ext()` and `mbedtls_x509_get_crl_ext()`, as the underlying function `mbedtls_x509_get_ext()` returns `0` if no extensions are present but doesn't set the variable which holds the bounds of the Extensions structure in case the latter is present. This commit addresses this by returning early from `mbedtls_x509_get_crt_ext()` and `mbedtls_x509_get_crl_ext()` if parsing has reached the end of the input buffer. The following X.509 parsing tests need to be adapted: - "TBSCertificate, issuer two inner set datas" This test exercises the X.509 CRT parser with a Subject name which has two empty `AttributeTypeAndValue` structures. This is supposed to fail with `MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA` because the parser should attempt to parse the first structure and fail because of a lack of data. Previously, it failed to obey the (0-length) bounds of the first AttributeTypeAndValue structure and would try to interpret the beginning of the second AttributeTypeAndValue structure as the first field of the first AttributeTypeAndValue structure, returning an UNEXPECTED_TAG error. - "TBSCertificate, issuer, no full following string" This test exercises the parser's behaviour on an AttributeTypeAndValue structure which contains more data than expected; it should therefore fail with MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH. Because of the missing bounds check, it previously failed with UNEXPECTED_TAG because it interpreted the remaining byte in the first AttributeTypeAndValue structure as the first byte in the second AttributeTypeAndValue structure. - "SubjectAltName repeated" This test should exercise two SubjectAltNames extensions in succession, but a wrong length values makes the second SubjectAltNames extension appear outside of the Extensions structure. With the new bounds in place, this therefore fails with a LENGTH_MISMATCH error. This commit adapts the test data to put the 2nd SubjectAltNames extension inside the Extensions structure, too.
2019-02-12 18:22:36 +01:00
end = *p + len;
if( ( end - *p ) < 1 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME,
MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ) );
oid = &cur->oid;
oid->tag = **p;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &oid->len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ) ) != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME, ret ) );
oid->p = *p;
*p += oid->len;
if( ( end - *p ) < 1 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME,
MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ) );
if( **p != MBEDTLS_ASN1_BMP_STRING && **p != MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING &&
**p != MBEDTLS_ASN1_T61_STRING && **p != MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING &&
**p != MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING && **p != MBEDTLS_ASN1_UNIVERSAL_STRING &&
**p != MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING )
return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME,
MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) );
val = &cur->val;
val->tag = *(*p)++;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_len( p, end, &val->len ) ) != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME, ret ) );
val->p = *p;
*p += val->len;
Obey bounds of ASN.1 substructures When parsing a substructure of an ASN.1 structure, no field within the substructure must exceed the bounds of the substructure. Concretely, the `end` pointer passed to the ASN.1 parsing routines must be updated to point to the end of the substructure while parsing the latter. This was previously not the case for the routines - x509_get_attr_type_and_value(), - mbedtls_x509_get_crt_ext(), - mbedtls_x509_get_crl_ext(). These functions kept using the end of the parent structure as the `end` pointer and would hence allow substructure fields to cross the substructure boundary. This could lead to successful parsing of ill-formed X.509 CRTs. This commit fixes this. Care has to be taken when adapting `mbedtls_x509_get_crt_ext()` and `mbedtls_x509_get_crl_ext()`, as the underlying function `mbedtls_x509_get_ext()` returns `0` if no extensions are present but doesn't set the variable which holds the bounds of the Extensions structure in case the latter is present. This commit addresses this by returning early from `mbedtls_x509_get_crt_ext()` and `mbedtls_x509_get_crl_ext()` if parsing has reached the end of the input buffer. The following X.509 parsing tests need to be adapted: - "TBSCertificate, issuer two inner set datas" This test exercises the X.509 CRT parser with a Subject name which has two empty `AttributeTypeAndValue` structures. This is supposed to fail with `MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA` because the parser should attempt to parse the first structure and fail because of a lack of data. Previously, it failed to obey the (0-length) bounds of the first AttributeTypeAndValue structure and would try to interpret the beginning of the second AttributeTypeAndValue structure as the first field of the first AttributeTypeAndValue structure, returning an UNEXPECTED_TAG error. - "TBSCertificate, issuer, no full following string" This test exercises the parser's behaviour on an AttributeTypeAndValue structure which contains more data than expected; it should therefore fail with MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH. Because of the missing bounds check, it previously failed with UNEXPECTED_TAG because it interpreted the remaining byte in the first AttributeTypeAndValue structure as the first byte in the second AttributeTypeAndValue structure. - "SubjectAltName repeated" This test should exercise two SubjectAltNames extensions in succession, but a wrong length values makes the second SubjectAltNames extension appear outside of the Extensions structure. With the new bounds in place, this therefore fails with a LENGTH_MISMATCH error. This commit adapts the test data to put the 2nd SubjectAltNames extension inside the Extensions structure, too.
2019-02-12 18:22:36 +01:00
if( *p != end )
{
return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME,
MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) );
Obey bounds of ASN.1 substructures When parsing a substructure of an ASN.1 structure, no field within the substructure must exceed the bounds of the substructure. Concretely, the `end` pointer passed to the ASN.1 parsing routines must be updated to point to the end of the substructure while parsing the latter. This was previously not the case for the routines - x509_get_attr_type_and_value(), - mbedtls_x509_get_crt_ext(), - mbedtls_x509_get_crl_ext(). These functions kept using the end of the parent structure as the `end` pointer and would hence allow substructure fields to cross the substructure boundary. This could lead to successful parsing of ill-formed X.509 CRTs. This commit fixes this. Care has to be taken when adapting `mbedtls_x509_get_crt_ext()` and `mbedtls_x509_get_crl_ext()`, as the underlying function `mbedtls_x509_get_ext()` returns `0` if no extensions are present but doesn't set the variable which holds the bounds of the Extensions structure in case the latter is present. This commit addresses this by returning early from `mbedtls_x509_get_crt_ext()` and `mbedtls_x509_get_crl_ext()` if parsing has reached the end of the input buffer. The following X.509 parsing tests need to be adapted: - "TBSCertificate, issuer two inner set datas" This test exercises the X.509 CRT parser with a Subject name which has two empty `AttributeTypeAndValue` structures. This is supposed to fail with `MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA` because the parser should attempt to parse the first structure and fail because of a lack of data. Previously, it failed to obey the (0-length) bounds of the first AttributeTypeAndValue structure and would try to interpret the beginning of the second AttributeTypeAndValue structure as the first field of the first AttributeTypeAndValue structure, returning an UNEXPECTED_TAG error. - "TBSCertificate, issuer, no full following string" This test exercises the parser's behaviour on an AttributeTypeAndValue structure which contains more data than expected; it should therefore fail with MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH. Because of the missing bounds check, it previously failed with UNEXPECTED_TAG because it interpreted the remaining byte in the first AttributeTypeAndValue structure as the first byte in the second AttributeTypeAndValue structure. - "SubjectAltName repeated" This test should exercise two SubjectAltNames extensions in succession, but a wrong length values makes the second SubjectAltNames extension appear outside of the Extensions structure. With the new bounds in place, this therefore fails with a LENGTH_MISMATCH error. This commit adapts the test data to put the 2nd SubjectAltNames extension inside the Extensions structure, too.
2019-02-12 18:22:36 +01:00
}
cur->next = NULL;
return( 0 );
}
/*
* Name ::= CHOICE { -- only one possibility for now --
* rdnSequence RDNSequence }
*
* RDNSequence ::= SEQUENCE OF RelativeDistinguishedName
*
* RelativeDistinguishedName ::=
* SET OF AttributeTypeAndValue
*
* AttributeTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE {
* type AttributeType,
* value AttributeValue }
*
* AttributeType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
*
* AttributeValue ::= ANY DEFINED BY AttributeType
*
* The data structure is optimized for the common case where each RDN has only
* one element, which is represented as a list of AttributeTypeAndValue.
* For the general case we still use a flat list, but we mark elements of the
* same set so that they are "merged" together in the functions that consume
* this list, eg mbedtls_x509_dn_gets().
*/
int mbedtls_x509_get_name( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end,
mbedtls_x509_name *cur )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t set_len;
const unsigned char *end_set;
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/* don't use recursion, we'd risk stack overflow if not optimized */
while( 1 )
{
/*
* parse SET
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*/
if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &set_len,
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SET ) ) != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME, ret ) );
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end_set = *p + set_len;
while( 1 )
{
if( ( ret = x509_get_attr_type_value( p, end_set, cur ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
if( *p == end_set )
break;
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/* Mark this item as being no the only one in a set */
cur->next_merged = 1;
cur->next = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_name ) );
if( cur->next == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED );
cur = cur->next;
}
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/*
* continue until end of SEQUENCE is reached
*/
if( *p == end )
return( 0 );
cur->next = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_name ) );
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if( cur->next == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED );
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cur = cur->next;
}
}
static int x509_parse_int( unsigned char **p, size_t n, int *res )
{
*res = 0;
for( ; n > 0; --n )
{
if( ( **p < '0') || ( **p > '9' ) )
return ( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE );
*res *= 10;
*res += ( *(*p)++ - '0' );
}
return( 0 );
}
static int x509_date_is_valid(const mbedtls_x509_time *t )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE;
int month_len;
CHECK_RANGE( 0, 9999, t->year );
CHECK_RANGE( 0, 23, t->hour );
CHECK_RANGE( 0, 59, t->min );
CHECK_RANGE( 0, 59, t->sec );
switch( t->mon )
{
case 1: case 3: case 5: case 7: case 8: case 10: case 12:
month_len = 31;
break;
case 4: case 6: case 9: case 11:
month_len = 30;
break;
case 2:
if( ( !( t->year % 4 ) && t->year % 100 ) ||
!( t->year % 400 ) )
month_len = 29;
else
month_len = 28;
break;
default:
return( ret );
}
CHECK_RANGE( 1, month_len, t->day );
return( 0 );
}
/*
* Parse an ASN1_UTC_TIME (yearlen=2) or ASN1_GENERALIZED_TIME (yearlen=4)
* field.
*/
static int x509_parse_time( unsigned char **p, size_t len, size_t yearlen,
mbedtls_x509_time *tm )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
/*
* Minimum length is 10 or 12 depending on yearlen
*/
if ( len < yearlen + 8 )
return ( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE );
len -= yearlen + 8;
/*
* Parse year, month, day, hour, minute
*/
CHECK( x509_parse_int( p, yearlen, &tm->year ) );
if ( 2 == yearlen )
{
if ( tm->year < 50 )
tm->year += 100;
tm->year += 1900;
}
CHECK( x509_parse_int( p, 2, &tm->mon ) );
CHECK( x509_parse_int( p, 2, &tm->day ) );
CHECK( x509_parse_int( p, 2, &tm->hour ) );
CHECK( x509_parse_int( p, 2, &tm->min ) );
/*
* Parse seconds if present
*/
if ( len >= 2 )
{
CHECK( x509_parse_int( p, 2, &tm->sec ) );
len -= 2;
}
else
return ( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE );
/*
* Parse trailing 'Z' if present
*/
if ( 1 == len && 'Z' == **p )
{
(*p)++;
len--;
}
/*
* We should have parsed all characters at this point
*/
if ( 0 != len )
return ( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE );
CHECK( x509_date_is_valid( tm ) );
return ( 0 );
}
/*
* Time ::= CHOICE {
* utcTime UTCTime,
* generalTime GeneralizedTime }
*/
int mbedtls_x509_get_time( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end,
mbedtls_x509_time *tm )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t len, year_len;
unsigned char tag;
if( ( end - *p ) < 1 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE,
MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ) );
tag = **p;
if( tag == MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTC_TIME )
year_len = 2;
else if( tag == MBEDTLS_ASN1_GENERALIZED_TIME )
year_len = 4;
else
return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE,
MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) );
(*p)++;
ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_len( p, end, &len );
if( ret != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE, ret ) );
return x509_parse_time( p, len, year_len, tm );
}
int mbedtls_x509_get_sig( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, mbedtls_x509_buf *sig )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t len;
int tag_type;
if( ( end - *p ) < 1 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SIGNATURE,
MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ) );
tag_type = **p;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring_null( p, end, &len ) ) != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SIGNATURE, ret ) );
sig->tag = tag_type;
sig->len = len;
sig->p = *p;
*p += len;
return( 0 );
}
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/*
* Get signature algorithm from alg OID and optional parameters
*/
int mbedtls_x509_get_sig_alg( const mbedtls_x509_buf *sig_oid, const mbedtls_x509_buf *sig_params,
mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg, mbedtls_pk_type_t *pk_alg,
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void **sig_opts )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
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if( *sig_opts != NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
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if( ( ret = mbedtls_oid_get_sig_alg( sig_oid, md_alg, pk_alg ) ) != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG, ret ) );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT)
if( *pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS )
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{
mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options *pss_opts;
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pss_opts = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options ) );
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if( pss_opts == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED );
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ret = mbedtls_x509_get_rsassa_pss_params( sig_params,
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md_alg,
&pss_opts->mgf1_hash_id,
&pss_opts->expected_salt_len );
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if( ret != 0 )
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{
mbedtls_free( pss_opts );
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return( ret );
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}
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*sig_opts = (void *) pss_opts;
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}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT */
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{
/* Make sure parameters are absent or NULL */
if( ( sig_params->tag != MBEDTLS_ASN1_NULL && sig_params->tag != 0 ) ||
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sig_params->len != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG );
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}
return( 0 );
}
/*
* X.509 Extensions (No parsing of extensions, pointer should
* be either manually updated or extensions should be parsed!)
*/
int mbedtls_x509_get_ext( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end,
Always return a high-level error code from X.509 module Some functions within the X.509 module return an ASN.1 low level error code where instead this error code should be wrapped by a high-level X.509 error code as in the bulk of the module. Specifically, the following functions are affected: - mbedtls_x509_get_ext() - x509_get_version() - x509_get_uid() This commit modifies these functions to always return an X.509 high level error code. Care has to be taken when adapting `mbetls_x509_get_ext()`: Currently, the callers `mbedtls_x509_crt_ext()` treat the return code `MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG` specially to gracefully detect and continue if the extension structure is not present. Wrapping the ASN.1 error with `MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS` and adapting the check accordingly would mean that an unexpected tag somewhere down the extension parsing would be ignored by the caller. The way out of this is the following: Luckily, the extension structure is always the last field in the surrounding structure, so if there is some data remaining, it must be an Extension structure, so we don't need to deal with a tag mismatch gracefully in the first place. We may therefore wrap the return code from the initial call to `mbedtls_asn1_get_tag()` in `mbedtls_x509_get_ext()` by `MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS` and simply remove the special treatment of `MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG` in the callers `x509_crl_get_ext()` and `x509_crt_get_ext()`. This renders `mbedtls_x509_get_ext()` unsuitable if it ever happened that an Extension structure is optional and does not occur at the end of its surrounding structure, but for CRTs and CRLs, it's fine. The following tests need to be adapted: - "TBSCertificate v3, issuerID wrong tag" The issuerID is optional, so if we look for its presence but find a different tag, we silently continue and try parsing the subjectID, and then the extensions. The tag '00' used in this test doesn't match either of these, and the previous code would hence return LENGTH_MISMATCH after unsucessfully trying issuerID, subjectID and Extensions. With the new code, any data remaining after issuerID and subjectID _must_ be Extension data, so we fail with UNEXPECTED_TAG when trying to parse the Extension data. - "TBSCertificate v3, UIDs, invalid length" The test hardcodes the expectation of MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH, which needs to be wrapped in MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT now. Fixes #2431.
2019-02-12 12:52:10 +01:00
mbedtls_x509_buf *ext, int tag )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t len;
/* Extension structure use EXPLICIT tagging. That is, the actual
* `Extensions` structure is wrapped by a tag-length pair using
* the respective context-specific tag. */
Always return a high-level error code from X.509 module Some functions within the X.509 module return an ASN.1 low level error code where instead this error code should be wrapped by a high-level X.509 error code as in the bulk of the module. Specifically, the following functions are affected: - mbedtls_x509_get_ext() - x509_get_version() - x509_get_uid() This commit modifies these functions to always return an X.509 high level error code. Care has to be taken when adapting `mbetls_x509_get_ext()`: Currently, the callers `mbedtls_x509_crt_ext()` treat the return code `MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG` specially to gracefully detect and continue if the extension structure is not present. Wrapping the ASN.1 error with `MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS` and adapting the check accordingly would mean that an unexpected tag somewhere down the extension parsing would be ignored by the caller. The way out of this is the following: Luckily, the extension structure is always the last field in the surrounding structure, so if there is some data remaining, it must be an Extension structure, so we don't need to deal with a tag mismatch gracefully in the first place. We may therefore wrap the return code from the initial call to `mbedtls_asn1_get_tag()` in `mbedtls_x509_get_ext()` by `MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS` and simply remove the special treatment of `MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG` in the callers `x509_crl_get_ext()` and `x509_crt_get_ext()`. This renders `mbedtls_x509_get_ext()` unsuitable if it ever happened that an Extension structure is optional and does not occur at the end of its surrounding structure, but for CRTs and CRLs, it's fine. The following tests need to be adapted: - "TBSCertificate v3, issuerID wrong tag" The issuerID is optional, so if we look for its presence but find a different tag, we silently continue and try parsing the subjectID, and then the extensions. The tag '00' used in this test doesn't match either of these, and the previous code would hence return LENGTH_MISMATCH after unsucessfully trying issuerID, subjectID and Extensions. With the new code, any data remaining after issuerID and subjectID _must_ be Extension data, so we fail with UNEXPECTED_TAG when trying to parse the Extension data. - "TBSCertificate v3, UIDs, invalid length" The test hardcodes the expectation of MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH, which needs to be wrapped in MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT now. Fixes #2431.
2019-02-12 12:52:10 +01:00
ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &ext->len,
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | tag );
if( ret != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) );
Always return a high-level error code from X.509 module Some functions within the X.509 module return an ASN.1 low level error code where instead this error code should be wrapped by a high-level X.509 error code as in the bulk of the module. Specifically, the following functions are affected: - mbedtls_x509_get_ext() - x509_get_version() - x509_get_uid() This commit modifies these functions to always return an X.509 high level error code. Care has to be taken when adapting `mbetls_x509_get_ext()`: Currently, the callers `mbedtls_x509_crt_ext()` treat the return code `MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG` specially to gracefully detect and continue if the extension structure is not present. Wrapping the ASN.1 error with `MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS` and adapting the check accordingly would mean that an unexpected tag somewhere down the extension parsing would be ignored by the caller. The way out of this is the following: Luckily, the extension structure is always the last field in the surrounding structure, so if there is some data remaining, it must be an Extension structure, so we don't need to deal with a tag mismatch gracefully in the first place. We may therefore wrap the return code from the initial call to `mbedtls_asn1_get_tag()` in `mbedtls_x509_get_ext()` by `MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS` and simply remove the special treatment of `MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG` in the callers `x509_crl_get_ext()` and `x509_crt_get_ext()`. This renders `mbedtls_x509_get_ext()` unsuitable if it ever happened that an Extension structure is optional and does not occur at the end of its surrounding structure, but for CRTs and CRLs, it's fine. The following tests need to be adapted: - "TBSCertificate v3, issuerID wrong tag" The issuerID is optional, so if we look for its presence but find a different tag, we silently continue and try parsing the subjectID, and then the extensions. The tag '00' used in this test doesn't match either of these, and the previous code would hence return LENGTH_MISMATCH after unsucessfully trying issuerID, subjectID and Extensions. With the new code, any data remaining after issuerID and subjectID _must_ be Extension data, so we fail with UNEXPECTED_TAG when trying to parse the Extension data. - "TBSCertificate v3, UIDs, invalid length" The test hardcodes the expectation of MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH, which needs to be wrapped in MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT now. Fixes #2431.
2019-02-12 12:52:10 +01:00
ext->tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | tag;
ext->p = *p;
end = *p + ext->len;
/*
* Extensions ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Extension
*/
if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len,
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret ) );
if( end != *p + len )
return( MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS,
MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ) );
return( 0 );
}
/*
* Store the name in printable form into buf; no more
* than size characters will be written
*/
int mbedtls_x509_dn_gets( char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_x509_name *dn )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t i, j, n;
unsigned char c, merge = 0;
const mbedtls_x509_name *name;
const char *short_name = NULL;
char s[MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_DN_NAME_SIZE], *p;
memset( s, 0, sizeof( s ) );
name = dn;
p = buf;
n = size;
while( name != NULL )
{
if( !name->oid.p )
{
name = name->next;
continue;
}
if( name != dn )
{
ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, merge ? " + " : ", " );
MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
}
ret = mbedtls_oid_get_attr_short_name( &name->oid, &short_name );
if( ret == 0 )
ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%s=", short_name );
else
ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\?\?=" );
MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
for( i = 0, j = 0; i < name->val.len; i++, j++ )
{
if( j >= sizeof( s ) - 1 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
c = name->val.p[i];
// Special characters requiring escaping, RFC 1779
if( c && strchr( ",=+<>#;\"\\", c ) )
{
if( j + 1 >= sizeof( s ) - 1 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
s[j++] = '\\';
}
if( c < 32 || c >= 127 )
s[j] = '?';
else s[j] = c;
}
s[j] = '\0';
ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%s", s );
MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
merge = name->next_merged;
name = name->next;
}
return( (int) ( size - n ) );
}
/*
* Store the serial in printable form into buf; no more
* than size characters will be written
*/
int mbedtls_x509_serial_gets( char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_x509_buf *serial )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t i, n, nr;
char *p;
p = buf;
n = size;
nr = ( serial->len <= 32 )
? serial->len : 28;
for( i = 0; i < nr; i++ )
{
if( i == 0 && nr > 1 && serial->p[i] == 0x0 )
continue;
ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%02X%s",
serial->p[i], ( i < nr - 1 ) ? ":" : "" );
MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
}
if( nr != serial->len )
{
ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "...." );
MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
}
return( (int) ( size - n ) );
}
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO)
/*
2014-06-05 15:41:39 +02:00
* Helper for writing signature algorithms
*/
int mbedtls_x509_sig_alg_gets( char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_x509_buf *sig_oid,
mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
2014-06-05 15:41:39 +02:00
const void *sig_opts )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
char *p = buf;
size_t n = size;
const char *desc = NULL;
ret = mbedtls_oid_get_sig_alg_desc( sig_oid, &desc );
if( ret != 0 )
ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "???" );
else
ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%s", desc );
MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT)
if( pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS )
{
const mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options *pss_opts;
pss_opts = (const mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options *) sig_opts;
const char *name = md_type_to_string( md_alg );
const char *mgf_name = md_type_to_string( pss_opts->mgf1_hash_id );
ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, " (%s, MGF1-%s, 0x%02X)",
name ? name : "???",
mgf_name ? mgf_name : "???",
(unsigned int) pss_opts->expected_salt_len );
MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
}
#else
((void) pk_alg);
2014-06-05 15:41:39 +02:00
((void) md_alg);
((void) sig_opts);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT */
return( (int)( size - n ) );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO */
/*
* Helper for writing "RSA key size", "EC key size", etc
*/
2015-06-18 16:25:56 +02:00
int mbedtls_x509_key_size_helper( char *buf, size_t buf_size, const char *name )
{
char *p = buf;
2015-06-18 16:25:56 +02:00
size_t n = buf_size;
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%s key size", name );
MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
return( 0 );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE)
/*
* Set the time structure to the current time.
* Return 0 on success, non-zero on failure.
*/
static int x509_get_current_time( mbedtls_x509_time *now )
{
struct tm *lt, tm_buf;
mbedtls_time_t tt;
int ret = 0;
tt = mbedtls_time( NULL );
lt = mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r( &tt, &tm_buf );
if( lt == NULL )
ret = -1;
else
{
now->year = lt->tm_year + 1900;
now->mon = lt->tm_mon + 1;
now->day = lt->tm_mday;
now->hour = lt->tm_hour;
now->min = lt->tm_min;
now->sec = lt->tm_sec;
}
return( ret );
2014-03-10 12:26:11 +01:00
}
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/*
* Return 0 if before <= after, 1 otherwise
*/
static int x509_check_time( const mbedtls_x509_time *before, const mbedtls_x509_time *after )
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{
if( before->year > after->year )
return( 1 );
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if( before->year == after->year &&
before->mon > after->mon )
return( 1 );
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if( before->year == after->year &&
before->mon == after->mon &&
before->day > after->day )
return( 1 );
2014-03-10 12:26:11 +01:00
if( before->year == after->year &&
before->mon == after->mon &&
before->day == after->day &&
before->hour > after->hour )
return( 1 );
2014-03-10 12:26:11 +01:00
if( before->year == after->year &&
before->mon == after->mon &&
before->day == after->day &&
before->hour == after->hour &&
before->min > after->min )
return( 1 );
2014-03-10 12:26:11 +01:00
if( before->year == after->year &&
before->mon == after->mon &&
before->day == after->day &&
before->hour == after->hour &&
before->min == after->min &&
before->sec > after->sec )
return( 1 );
return( 0 );
}
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int mbedtls_x509_time_is_past( const mbedtls_x509_time *to )
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{
mbedtls_x509_time now;
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if( x509_get_current_time( &now ) != 0 )
return( 1 );
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return( x509_check_time( &now, to ) );
}
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int mbedtls_x509_time_is_future( const mbedtls_x509_time *from )
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{
mbedtls_x509_time now;
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if( x509_get_current_time( &now ) != 0 )
return( 1 );
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return( x509_check_time( from, &now ) );
}
#else /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE */
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int mbedtls_x509_time_is_past( const mbedtls_x509_time *to )
{
((void) to);
return( 0 );
}
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int mbedtls_x509_time_is_future( const mbedtls_x509_time *from )
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{
((void) from);
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C */