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Quoting from https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html: ******************************************************************************* CVE-2020-14372 grub2: The acpi command allows privileged user to load crafted ACPI tables when Secure Boot is enabled CWE-184 7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H GRUB2 enables the use of the command acpi even when Secure Boot is signaled by the firmware. An attacker with local root privileges to can drop a small SSDT in /boot/efi and modify grub.cfg to instruct grub to load said SSDT. The SSDT then gets run by the kernel and it overwrites the kernel lock down configuration enabling the attacker to load unsigned kernel modules and kexec unsigned code. Reported-by: Máté Kukri ******************************************************************************* CVE-2020-25632 grub2: Use-after-free in rmmod command CWE-416 7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H The rmmod implementation for GRUB2 is flawed, allowing an attacker to unload a module used as dependency without checking if any other dependent module is still loaded. This leads to an use-after-free scenario possibly allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary code and by-pass Secure Boot protections. Reported-by: Chris Coulson (Canonical) ******************************************************************************* CVE-2020-25647 grub2: Out-of-bound write in grub_usb_device_initialize() CWE-787 6.9/CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H grub_usb_device_initialize() is called to handle USB device initialization. It reads out the descriptors it needs from the USB device and uses that data to fill in some USB data structures. grub_usb_device_initialize() performs very little bounds checking and simply assumes the USB device provides sane values. This behavior can trigger memory corruption. If properly exploited, this would lead to arbitrary code execution allowing the attacker to by-pass Secure Boot mechanism. Reported-by: Joseph Tartaro (IOActive) and Ilja van Sprundel (IOActive) ******************************************************************************* CVE-2020-27749 grub2: Stack buffer overflow in grub_parser_split_cmdline CWE-121 7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H grub_parser_split_cmdline() expands variable names present in the supplied command line in to their corresponding variable contents and uses a 1kB stack buffer for temporary storage without sufficient bounds checking. If the function is called with a command line that references a variable with a sufficiently large payload, it is possible to overflow the stack buffer, corrupt the stack frame and control execution. An attacker may use this to circumvent Secure Boot protections. Reported-by: Chris Coulson (Canonical) ******************************************************************************* CVE-2020-27779 grub2: The cutmem command allows privileged user to remove memory regions when Secure Boot is enabled CWE-285 7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H The GRUB2's cutmem command does not honor Secure Boot locking. This allows an privileged attacker to remove address ranges from memory creating an opportunity to circumvent Secure Boot protections after proper triage about grub's memory layout. Reported-by: Teddy Reed ******************************************************************************* CVE-2021-3418 - grub2: GRUB 2.05 reintroduced CVE-2020-15705 CWE-281 6.4/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H The GRUB2 upstream reintroduced the CVE-2020-15705. This refers to a distro specific flaw which made upstream in the mentioned version. If certificates that signed GRUB2 are installed into db, GRUB2 can be booted directly. It will then boot any kernel without signature validation. The booted kernel will think it was booted in Secure Boot mode and will implement lock down, yet it could have been tampered. This flaw only affects upstream and distributions using the shim_lock verifier. Reported-by: Dimitri John Ledkov (Canonical) ******************************************************************************* CVE-2021-20225 grub2: Heap out-of-bounds write in short form option parser CWE-787 7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H The option parser in GRUB2 allows an attacker to write past the end of a heap-allocated buffer by calling certain commands with a large number of specific short forms of options. Reported-by: Daniel Axtens (IBM) ******************************************************************************* CVE-2021-20233 grub2: Heap out-of-bound write due to mis-calculation of space required for quoting CWE-787 7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H There's a flaw on GRUB2 menu rendering code setparam_prefix() in the menu rendering code performs a length calculation on the assumption that expressing a quoted single quote will require 3 characters, while it actually requires 4 characters. This allow an attacker to corrupt memory by one byte for each quote in the input. Reported-by: Daniel Axtens (IBM) |
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Nixpkgs is a collection of over 60,000 software packages that can be installed with the Nix package manager. It also implements NixOS, a purely-functional Linux distribution.
Manuals
- NixOS Manual - how to install, configure, and maintain a purely-functional Linux distribution
- Nixpkgs Manual - contributing to Nixpkgs and using programming-language-specific Nix expressions
- Nix Package Manager Manual - how to write Nix expressions (programs), and how to use Nix command line tools
Community
- Discourse Forum
- IRC - #nixos on freenode.net
- NixOS Weekly
- Community-maintained wiki
- Community-maintained list of ways to get in touch (Discord, Matrix, Telegram, other IRC channels, etc.)
Other Project Repositories
The sources of all official Nix-related projects are in the NixOS organization on GitHub. Here are some of the main ones:
- Nix - the purely functional package manager
- NixOps - the tool to remotely deploy NixOS machines
- nixos-hardware - NixOS profiles to optimize settings for different hardware
- Nix RFCs - the formal process for making substantial changes to the community
- NixOS homepage - the NixOS.org website
- hydra - our continuous integration system
- NixOS Artwork - NixOS artwork
Continuous Integration and Distribution
Nixpkgs and NixOS are built and tested by our continuous integration system, Hydra.
- Continuous package builds for unstable/master
- Continuous package builds for the NixOS 20.09 release
- Tests for unstable/master
- Tests for the NixOS 20.09 release
Artifacts successfully built with Hydra are published to cache at https://cache.nixos.org/. When successful build and test criteria are met, the Nixpkgs expressions are distributed via Nix channels.
Contributing
Nixpkgs is among the most active projects on GitHub. While thousands of open issues and pull requests might seem a lot at first, it helps consider it in the context of the scope of the project. Nixpkgs describes how to build tens of thousands of pieces of software and implements a Linux distribution. The GitHub Insights page gives a sense of the project activity.
Community contributions are always welcome through GitHub Issues and Pull Requests. When pull requests are made, our tooling automation bot, OfBorg will perform various checks to help ensure expression quality.
The Nixpkgs maintainers are people who have assigned themselves to maintain specific individual packages. We encourage people who care about a package to assign themselves as a maintainer. When a pull request is made against a package, OfBorg will notify the appropriate maintainer(s). The Nixpkgs committers are people who have been given permission to merge.
Most contributions are based on and merged into these branches:
masteris the main branch where all small contributions gostagingis branched from master, changes that have a big impact on Hydra builds go to this branchstaging-nextis branched from staging and only fixes to stabilize and security fixes with a big impact on Hydra builds should be contributed to this branch. This branch is merged into master when deemed of sufficiently high quality
For more information about contributing to the project, please visit the contributing page.
Donations
The infrastructure for NixOS and related projects is maintained by a nonprofit organization, the NixOS Foundation. To ensure the continuity and expansion of the NixOS infrastructure, we are looking for donations to our organization.
You can donate to the NixOS foundation by using Open Collective:
License
Nixpkgs is licensed under the MIT License.
Note: MIT license does not apply to the packages built by Nixpkgs, merely to the files in this repository (the Nix expressions, build scripts, NixOS modules, etc.). It also might not apply to patches included in Nixpkgs, which may be derivative works of the packages to which they apply. The aforementioned artifacts are all covered by the licenses of the respective packages.