The group configuration parameter allow to share access to yggdrasil
control socket with the users in the system. In the version we propose,
it is null by default so that only root can access the control socket,
but let user create their own group if they need.
Remove User= durective in systemd unit. Should a user with the specified
name already exist in the system, it would be used silently instead of a
dynamic user which could be a security concern.
Since version 0.4 Yggdrasil works again using systemd's DynamicUser option.
This patch reenables it to improve security.
We tested this with both persistent and non-persistent keys. Everything
seems to work fine.
The option `services.jira.sso.applicationPassword` has been replaced by
`applicationPasswordFile` that needs to be readable by the `jira`-user
or group.
The new `crowd.properties` is created on startup in `~jira` and the
secret is injected into it using `replace-secret`.
Rely on services.jenkins-job-builder to reload the configuration instead
of doing that manually in the test.
(If this had been implemented already, it would have caught the bug
fixed by the parent commit, that services.jenkins-job-builder failed to
reload jenkins config from disk.)
The current authentication code is broken against newer jenkins:
jenkins-job-builder-start[1257]: Asking Jenkins to reload config
jenkins-start[789]: 2022-07-12 14:34:31.148+0000 [id=17] WARNING hudson.security.csrf.CrumbFilter#doFilter: Found invalid crumb 31e96e52938b51f099a61df9505a4427cb9dca7e35192216755659032a4151df. If you are calling this URL with a script, please use the API Token instead. More information: https://www.jenkins.io/redirect/crumb-cannot-be-used-for-script
jenkins-start[789]: 2022-07-12 14:34:31.160+0000 [id=17] WARNING hudson.security.csrf.CrumbFilter#doFilter: No valid crumb was included in request for /reload by admin. Returning 403.
jenkins-job-builder-start[1357]: curl: (22) The requested URL returned error: 403
Fix it by using `jenkins-cli` instead of messing with `curl`.
This rewrite also prevents leaking the password in process listings. (We
could probably do it without `replace-secret`, assuming `printf` is a
shell built-in, but this implementation should be safe even with shells
not having a built-in `printf`.)
Ref https://github.com/NixOS/nixpkgs/issues/156400.
Instead of hard-coding a single `configFile` for
`privacyidea-ldap-proxy.service` which is pretty unmergable with other
declarations it now uses a RFC42-like approach. Also to make sure that
secrets can be handled properly without ending up in the Nix store, it's
possible to inject secrets via envsubst
{
services.privacyidea.ldap-proxy = {
enable = true;
environmentFile = "/run/secrets/ldap-pw";
settings = {
privacyidea.instance = "privacyidea.example.org";
service-account = {
dn = "uid=readonly,ou=serviceaccounts,dc=example,dc=org";
password = "$LDAP_PW";
};
};
};
}
and the following secret file (at `/run/secrets`):
LDAP_PW=<super-secret ldap pw>
For backwards-compat the old `configFile`-option is kept, but it throws
a deprecation warning and is mutually exclusive with the
`settings`-attrset. Also, it doesn't support secrets injection with
`envsubst` & `environmentFile`.
