Since 7a10478ea7, all /var except
/var/lib/acme gets mounted in a read-only fashion. This behavior
breaks the existing acme deployments having a webroot set outside of
/var/lib/acme.
Collecting the webroots and adding them to the paths read/write
mounted to the systemd service runtime tree.
Fixes#139310
Reusing the same private/public key on renewal has two issues:
- some providers don't accept to sign the same public key
again (Buypass Go SSL)
- keeping the same private key forever partly defeats the purpose of
renewing the certificate often
Therefore, let's remove this option. People wanting to keep the same
key can set extraLegoRenewFlags to `[ --reuse-key ]` to keep the
previous behavior. Alternatively, we could put this as an option whose
default value is true.
As per #121293, I ensured the UMask is set correctly
and removed any unnecessary chmod/chown/chgrp commands.
The test suite already partially covered permissions
checking but I added an extra check for the selfsigned
cert permissions.
With the UMask set to 0023, the
mkdir -p command which creates the webroot
could end up unreadable if the web server
changes, as surfaced by the test suite in #114751
On top of this, the following commands
to chown the webroot + subdirectories was
mostly unnecessary. I stripped it back to
only fix the deepest part of the directory,
resolving #115976, and reintroduced a
human readable error message.
I found a logical error in the bash script, but during
debugging I enabled command echoing and realised it
would be a good idea to have it enabled all the time for
ease of bug reporting.
- Added an ExecPostStart to acme-$cert.service when webroot is defined to create the acme-challenge
directory and fix required permissions. Lego always tries to create .well-known and acme-challenge,
thus if any permissions in that tree are wrong it will crash and break cert renewal.
- acme-fixperms now configured with acme User and Group, however the script still runs as root. This
ensures the StateDirectories are owned by the acme user.
- Switched to list syntax for systemd options where multiple values are specified.
Closes#106603
Some webservers (lighttpd) require that the
files they are serving are world readable. We
do our own chmods in the scripts anyway, and
lego has sensible permissions on its output
files, so this change is safe enough.
systemd-tmpfiles is no longer required for
most of the critical paths in the module. The
only one that remains is the webroot
acme-challenge directory since there's no
other good place for this to live and forcing
users to do the right thing alone will only
create more issues.
Closes#106565
When generating multiple certificates which all
share the same server + email, lego will attempt
to create an account multiple times. By adding an
account creation target certificates which share
an account will wait for one service (chosen at
config build time) to complete first.
This means that all systems running from master will trigger
new certificate creation on next rebuild. Race conditions around
multiple account creation are fixed in #106857, not this commit.
When using the ACME DNS-01 challenge, there is a possibility of a
failure to resolve the challenge if the record is not propagated
fast enough. To circumvent this generic DNS problem, this adds
a setting to explicitly tell the ACME provider to use a certain DNS
resolver to lookup the challenge.
Signed-off-by: Jeroen Simonetti <jeroen@simonetti.nl>
This should hopefully solve races with DNS servers (such as unbound)
during the activation of a new generation. Previously unbound could
still be unavailable and thus the acme script would fail.
Attempting to reuse keys on a basis different to the cert (AKA,
storing the key in a directory with a hashed name different to
the cert it is associated with) was ineffective since when
"lego run" is used it will ALWAYS generate a new key. This causes
issues when you revert changes since your "reused" key will not
be the one associated with the old cert. As such, I tore out the
whole keyDir implementation.
As for the race condition, checking the mtime of the cert file
was not sufficient to detect changes. In testing, selfsigned
and full certs could be generated/installed within 1 second of
each other. cmp is now used instead.
Also, I removed the nginx/httpd reload waiters in favour of
simple retry logic for the curl-based tests
- Use an acme user and group, allow group override only
- Use hashes to determine when certs actually need to regenerate
- Avoid running lego more than necessary
- Harden permissions
- Support "systemctl clean" for cert regeneration
- Support reuse of keys between some configuration changes
- Permissions fix services solves for previously root owned certs
- Add a note about multiple account creation and emails
- Migrate extraDomains to a list
- Deprecate user option
- Use minica for self-signed certs
- Rewrite all tests
I thought of a few more cases where things may go wrong,
and added tests to cover them. In particular, the web server
reload services were depending on the target - which stays alive,
meaning that the renewal timer wouldn't be triggering a reload
and old certs would stay on the web servers.
I encountered some problems ensuring that the reload took place
without accidently triggering it as part of the test. The sync
commands I added ended up being essential and I'm not sure why,
it seems like either node.succeed ends too early or there's an
oddity of the vm's filesystem I'm not aware of.
- Fix duplicate systemd rules on reload services
Since useACMEHost is not unique to every vhost, if one cert
was reused many times it would create duplicate entries in
${server}-config-reload.service for wants, before and
ConditionPathExists
This reverts commit 5532065d06.
As far as I can tell setting RemainAfterExit=true here completely breaks
certificate renewal, which is really bad!
the sytemd timer will activate the service unit every OnCalendar=,
however with RemainAfterExit=true the service is already active! So the
timer doesn't rerun the service!
The commit also broke the actual tests, (As it broke activation too)
but this was fixed later in https://github.com/NixOS/nixpkgs/pull/76052
I wrongly assumed that PR fixed renewal too, which it didn't!
testing renewals is hard, as we need to sleep in tests.
This allows to have multiple certificates with the same common name.
Lego uses in its internal directory the common name to name the certificate.
fixes#84409
Previously, the NixOS ACME module defaulted to using P-384 for
TLS certificates. I believe that this is a mistake, and that we
should use P-256 instead, despite it being theoretically
cryptographically weaker.
The security margin of a 256-bit elliptic curve cipher is substantial;
beyond a certain level, more bits in the key serve more to slow things
down than add meaningful protection. It's much more likely that ECDSA
will be broken entirely, or some fatal flaw will be found in the NIST
curves that makes them all insecure, than that the security margin
will be reduced enough to put P-256 at risk but not P-384. It's also
inconsistent to target a curve with a 192-bit security margin when our
recommended nginx TLS configuration allows 128-bit AES. [This Stack
Exchange answer][pornin] by cryptographer Thomas Pornin conveys the
general attitude among experts:
> Use P-256 to minimize trouble. If you feel that your manhood is
> threatened by using a 256-bit curve where a 384-bit curve is
> available, then use P-384: it will increases your computational and
> network costs (a factor of about 3 for CPU, a few extra dozen bytes
> on the network) but this is likely to be negligible in practice (in a
> SSL-powered Web server, the heavy cost is in "Web", not "SSL").
[pornin]: https://security.stackexchange.com/a/78624
While the NIST curves have many flaws (see [SafeCurves][safecurves]),
P-256 and P-384 are no different in this respect; SafeCurves gives
them the same rating. The only NIST curve Bernstein [thinks better of,
P-521][bernstein] (see "Other standard primes"), isn't usable for Web
PKI (it's [not supported by BoringSSL by default][boringssl] and hence
[doesn't work in Chromium/Chrome][chromium], and Let's Encrypt [don't
support it either][letsencrypt]).
[safecurves]: https://safecurves.cr.yp.to/
[bernstein]: https://blog.cr.yp.to/20140323-ecdsa.html
[boringssl]: https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+/e9fc3e547e557492316932b62881c3386973ceb2
[chromium]: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=478225
[letsencrypt]: https://letsencrypt.org/docs/integration-guide/#supported-key-algorithms
So there's no real benefit to using P-384; what's the cost? In the
Stack Exchange answer I linked, Pornin estimates a factor of 3×
CPU usage, which wouldn't be so bad; unfortunately, this is wildly
optimistic in practice, as P-256 is much more common and therefore
much better optimized. [This GitHub comment][openssl] measures the
performance differential for raw Diffie-Hellman operations with OpenSSL
1.1.1 at a whopping 14× (even P-521 fares better!); [Caddy disables
P-384 by default][caddy] due to Go's [lack of accelerated assembly
implementations][crypto/elliptic] for it, and the difference there seems
even more extreme: [this golang-nuts post][golang-nuts] measures the key
generation performance differential at 275×. It's unlikely to be the
bottleneck for anyone, but I still feel kind of bad for anyone having
lego generate hundreds of certificates and sign challenges with them
with performance like that...
[openssl]: https://github.com/mozilla/server-side-tls/issues/190#issuecomment-421831599
[caddy]: 2cab475ba5/modules/caddytls/values.go (L113-L124)
[crypto/elliptic]: 2910c5b4a0/src/crypto/elliptic
[golang-nuts]: https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/golang-nuts/nlnJkBMMyzk
In conclusion, there's no real reason to use P-384 in general: if you
don't care about Web PKI compatibility and want to use a nicer curve,
then Ed25519 or P-521 are better options; if you're a NIST-fearing
paranoiac, you should use good old RSA; but if you're a normal person
running a web server, then you're best served by just using P-256. Right
now, NixOS makes an arbitrary decision between two equally-mediocre
curves that just so happens to slow down ECDH key agreement for every
TLS connection by over an order of magnitude; this commit fixes that.
Unfortunately, it seems like existing P-384 certificates won't get
migrated automatically on renewal without manual intervention, but
that's a more general problem with the existing ACME module (see #81634;
I know @yegortimoshenko is working on this). To migrate your
certificates manually, run:
$ sudo find /var/lib/acme/.lego/certificates -type f -delete
$ sudo find /var/lib/acme -name '*.pem' -delete
$ sudo systemctl restart 'acme-*.service' nginx.service
(No warranty. If it breaks, you get to keep both pieces. But it worked
for me.)
