I think we had a *double* patch for the security problem CVE-2010-3856.

I had added the audit_suid.patch some time ago, and at some point niksnut added
this ignore-origin.patch. I think both fix the situation, the
ignore-origin.patch being released sooner than the audit_suid. As the
ignore-origin-patch is not in the recent glibc, it makes me think it was a quick
solution to the vulnerability, later properly fixed.

I remove, then, the ignore-origin.patch. We can check later if we remain
vulnerable.

svn path=/nixpkgs/branches/stdenv-updates/; revision=25110
This commit is contained in:
Lluís Batlle i Rossell 2010-12-13 23:09:57 +00:00
parent 55051fec78
commit 8895565d45
2 changed files with 0 additions and 88 deletions

View file

@ -77,9 +77,6 @@ stdenv.mkDerivation ({
/* Allow nixos and nix handle the locale-archive. */
./nix-locale-archive.patch
/* Fix for CVE-2010-3856. */
./ignore-origin.patch
];
postPatch = ''

View file

@ -1,85 +0,0 @@
Fix for CVE-2010-3847.
2010-10-18 Andreas Schwab <schwab@redhat.com>
* elf/dl-load.c (is_dst): Remove last parameter.
(_dl_dst_count): Ignore $ORIGIN in privileged programs.
(_dl_dst_substitute): Likewise.
---
elf/dl-load.c | 30 +++++++++++++-----------------
1 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
diff --git a/elf/dl-load.c b/elf/dl-load.c
index a7162eb..776f7e4 100644
--- a/elf/dl-load.c
+++ b/elf/dl-load.c
@@ -169,8 +169,7 @@ local_strdup (const char *s)
static size_t
-is_dst (const char *start, const char *name, const char *str,
- int is_path, int secure)
+is_dst (const char *start, const char *name, const char *str, int is_path)
{
size_t len;
bool is_curly = false;
@@ -199,11 +198,6 @@ is_dst (const char *start, const char *name, const char *str,
&& (!is_path || name[len] != ':'))
return 0;
- if (__builtin_expect (secure, 0)
- && ((name[len] != '\0' && (!is_path || name[len] != ':'))
- || (name != start + 1 && (!is_path || name[-2] != ':'))))
- return 0;
-
return len;
}
@@ -218,13 +212,12 @@ _dl_dst_count (const char *name, int is_path)
{
size_t len;
- /* $ORIGIN is not expanded for SUID/GUID programs (except if it
- is $ORIGIN alone) and it must always appear first in path. */
+ /* $ORIGIN is not expanded for SUID/GUID programs. */
++name;
- if ((len = is_dst (start, name, "ORIGIN", is_path,
- INTUSE(__libc_enable_secure))) != 0
- || (len = is_dst (start, name, "PLATFORM", is_path, 0)) != 0
- || (len = is_dst (start, name, "LIB", is_path, 0)) != 0)
+ if (((len = is_dst (start, name, "ORIGIN", is_path)) != 0
+ && !INTUSE(__libc_enable_secure))
+ || (len = is_dst (start, name, "PLATFORM", is_path)) != 0
+ || (len = is_dst (start, name, "LIB", is_path)) != 0)
++cnt;
name = strchr (name + len, '$');
@@ -256,9 +249,12 @@ _dl_dst_substitute (struct link_map *l, const char *name, char *result,
size_t len;
++name;
- if ((len = is_dst (start, name, "ORIGIN", is_path,
- INTUSE(__libc_enable_secure))) != 0)
+ if ((len = is_dst (start, name, "ORIGIN", is_path)) != 0)
{
+ /* Ignore this path element in SUID/SGID programs. */
+ if (INTUSE(__libc_enable_secure))
+ repl = (const char *) -1;
+ else
#ifndef SHARED
if (l == NULL)
repl = _dl_get_origin ();
@@ -266,9 +262,9 @@ _dl_dst_substitute (struct link_map *l, const char *name, char *result,
#endif
repl = l->l_origin;
}
- else if ((len = is_dst (start, name, "PLATFORM", is_path, 0)) != 0)
+ else if ((len = is_dst (start, name, "PLATFORM", is_path)) != 0)
repl = GLRO(dl_platform);
- else if ((len = is_dst (start, name, "LIB", is_path, 0)) != 0)
+ else if ((len = is_dst (start, name, "LIB", is_path)) != 0)
repl = DL_DST_LIB;
if (repl != NULL && repl != (const char *) -1)
--
1.7.2.3