From 173f41cf0bc618f0b2c313b1915fee8d8a6d0ee2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: James Cook Date: Sat, 3 Jan 2015 05:52:28 -0800 Subject: [PATCH] unzip: Patch for CVE-2014-81{39,40,41}. --- pkgs/tools/archivers/unzip/CVE-2014-8139.diff | 47 ++++++ pkgs/tools/archivers/unzip/CVE-2014-8140.diff | 26 ++++ pkgs/tools/archivers/unzip/CVE-2014-8141.diff | 136 ++++++++++++++++++ pkgs/tools/archivers/unzip/default.nix | 6 +- 4 files changed, 214 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 pkgs/tools/archivers/unzip/CVE-2014-8139.diff create mode 100644 pkgs/tools/archivers/unzip/CVE-2014-8140.diff create mode 100644 pkgs/tools/archivers/unzip/CVE-2014-8141.diff diff --git a/pkgs/tools/archivers/unzip/CVE-2014-8139.diff b/pkgs/tools/archivers/unzip/CVE-2014-8139.diff new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..3bcc21c7c0d8 --- /dev/null +++ b/pkgs/tools/archivers/unzip/CVE-2014-8139.diff @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +From RedHat: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/attachment.cgi?id=971984&action=diff&context=patch&collapsed=&headers=1&format=raw + +--- unzip60/extract.c 2010-04-03 14:41:55 -0500 ++++ unzip60/extract.c 2014-12-03 15:33:35 -0600 +@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ + /* +- Copyright (c) 1990-2009 Info-ZIP. All rights reserved. ++ Copyright (c) 1990-2014 Info-ZIP. All rights reserved. + + See the accompanying file LICENSE, version 2009-Jan-02 or later + (the contents of which are also included in unzip.h) for terms of use. +@@ -298,6 +298,8 @@ + #ifndef SFX + static ZCONST char Far InconsistEFlength[] = "bad extra-field entry:\n \ + EF block length (%u bytes) exceeds remaining EF data (%u bytes)\n"; ++ static ZCONST char Far TooSmallEFlength[] = "bad extra-field entry:\n \ ++ EF block length (%u bytes) invalid (< %d)\n"; + static ZCONST char Far InvalidComprDataEAs[] = + " invalid compressed data for EAs\n"; + # if (defined(WIN32) && defined(NTSD_EAS)) +@@ -2023,7 +2025,8 @@ + ebID = makeword(ef); + ebLen = (unsigned)makeword(ef+EB_LEN); + +- if (ebLen > (ef_len - EB_HEADSIZE)) { ++ if (ebLen > (ef_len - EB_HEADSIZE)) ++ { + /* Discovered some extra field inconsistency! */ + if (uO.qflag) + Info(slide, 1, ((char *)slide, "%-22s ", +@@ -2032,6 +2035,16 @@ + ebLen, (ef_len - EB_HEADSIZE))); + return PK_ERR; + } ++ else if (ebLen < EB_HEADSIZE) ++ { ++ /* Extra block length smaller than header length. */ ++ if (uO.qflag) ++ Info(slide, 1, ((char *)slide, "%-22s ", ++ FnFilter1(G.filename))); ++ Info(slide, 1, ((char *)slide, LoadFarString(TooSmallEFlength), ++ ebLen, EB_HEADSIZE)); ++ return PK_ERR; ++ } + + switch (ebID) { + case EF_OS2: diff --git a/pkgs/tools/archivers/unzip/CVE-2014-8140.diff b/pkgs/tools/archivers/unzip/CVE-2014-8140.diff new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..81b96b8df7db --- /dev/null +++ b/pkgs/tools/archivers/unzip/CVE-2014-8140.diff @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +From RedHat: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/attachment.cgi?id=969621&action=diff +(unzip60/ path prefix added) + +--- unzip60/extract.c 2009-03-14 02:32:52.000000000 +0100 ++++ unzip60/extract.c 2014-12-05 22:43:13.000000000 +0100 +@@ -2221,10 +2234,17 @@ static int test_compr_eb(__G__ eb, eb_si + if (compr_offset < 4) /* field is not compressed: */ + return PK_OK; /* do nothing and signal OK */ + ++ /* Return no/bad-data error status if any problem is found: ++ * 1. eb_size is too small to hold the uncompressed size ++ * (eb_ucsize). (Else extract eb_ucsize.) ++ * 2. eb_ucsize is zero (invalid). 2014-12-04 SMS. ++ * 3. eb_ucsize is positive, but eb_size is too small to hold ++ * the compressed data header. ++ */ + if ((eb_size < (EB_UCSIZE_P + 4)) || +- ((eb_ucsize = makelong(eb+(EB_HEADSIZE+EB_UCSIZE_P))) > 0L && +- eb_size <= (compr_offset + EB_CMPRHEADLEN))) +- return IZ_EF_TRUNC; /* no compressed data! */ ++ ((eb_ucsize = makelong( eb+ (EB_HEADSIZE+ EB_UCSIZE_P))) == 0L) || ++ ((eb_ucsize > 0L) && (eb_size <= (compr_offset + EB_CMPRHEADLEN)))) ++ return IZ_EF_TRUNC; /* no/bad compressed data! */ + + if ( + #ifdef INT_16BIT diff --git a/pkgs/tools/archivers/unzip/CVE-2014-8141.diff b/pkgs/tools/archivers/unzip/CVE-2014-8141.diff new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..11007195b1ff --- /dev/null +++ b/pkgs/tools/archivers/unzip/CVE-2014-8141.diff @@ -0,0 +1,136 @@ +From RedHat: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/attachment.cgi?id=969625&action=diff +(unzip60/ path prefix added) + +--- unzip60/process.c 2009-03-06 02:25:10.000000000 +0100 ++++ unzip60/process.c 2014-12-05 22:42:39.000000000 +0100 +@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ + /* +- Copyright (c) 1990-2009 Info-ZIP. All rights reserved. ++ Copyright (c) 1990-2014 Info-ZIP. All rights reserved. + + See the accompanying file LICENSE, version 2009-Jan-02 or later + (the contents of which are also included in unzip.h) for terms of use. +@@ -1888,48 +1888,82 @@ int getZip64Data(__G__ ef_buf, ef_len) + and a 4-byte version of disk start number. + Sets both local header and central header fields. Not terribly clever, + but it means that this procedure is only called in one place. ++ ++ 2014-12-05 SMS. ++ Added checks to ensure that enough data are available before calling ++ makeint64() or makelong(). Replaced various sizeof() values with ++ simple ("4" or "8") constants. (The Zip64 structures do not depend ++ on our variable sizes.) Error handling is crude, but we should now ++ stay within the buffer. + ---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ + ++#define Z64FLGS 0xffff ++#define Z64FLGL 0xffffffff ++ + if (ef_len == 0 || ef_buf == NULL) + return PK_COOL; + + Trace((stderr,"\ngetZip64Data: scanning extra field of length %u\n", + ef_len)); + +- while (ef_len >= EB_HEADSIZE) { ++ while (ef_len >= EB_HEADSIZE) ++ { + eb_id = makeword(EB_ID + ef_buf); + eb_len = makeword(EB_LEN + ef_buf); + +- if (eb_len > (ef_len - EB_HEADSIZE)) { +- /* discovered some extra field inconsistency! */ ++ if (eb_len > (ef_len - EB_HEADSIZE)) ++ { ++ /* Extra block length exceeds remaining extra field length. */ + Trace((stderr, + "getZip64Data: block length %u > rest ef_size %u\n", eb_len, + ef_len - EB_HEADSIZE)); + break; + } +- if (eb_id == EF_PKSZ64) { +- ++ if (eb_id == EF_PKSZ64) ++ { + int offset = EB_HEADSIZE; + +- if (G.crec.ucsize == 0xffffffff || G.lrec.ucsize == 0xffffffff){ +- G.lrec.ucsize = G.crec.ucsize = makeint64(offset + ef_buf); +- offset += sizeof(G.crec.ucsize); ++ if ((G.crec.ucsize == Z64FLGL) || (G.lrec.ucsize == Z64FLGL)) ++ { ++ if (offset+ 8 > ef_len) ++ return PK_ERR; ++ ++ G.crec.ucsize = G.lrec.ucsize = makeint64(offset + ef_buf); ++ offset += 8; + } +- if (G.crec.csize == 0xffffffff || G.lrec.csize == 0xffffffff){ +- G.csize = G.lrec.csize = G.crec.csize = makeint64(offset + ef_buf); +- offset += sizeof(G.crec.csize); ++ ++ if ((G.crec.csize == Z64FLGL) || (G.lrec.csize == Z64FLGL)) ++ { ++ if (offset+ 8 > ef_len) ++ return PK_ERR; ++ ++ G.csize = G.crec.csize = G.lrec.csize = makeint64(offset + ef_buf); ++ offset += 8; + } +- if (G.crec.relative_offset_local_header == 0xffffffff){ ++ ++ if (G.crec.relative_offset_local_header == Z64FLGL) ++ { ++ if (offset+ 8 > ef_len) ++ return PK_ERR; ++ + G.crec.relative_offset_local_header = makeint64(offset + ef_buf); +- offset += sizeof(G.crec.relative_offset_local_header); ++ offset += 8; + } +- if (G.crec.disk_number_start == 0xffff){ ++ ++ if (G.crec.disk_number_start == Z64FLGS) ++ { ++ if (offset+ 4 > ef_len) ++ return PK_ERR; ++ + G.crec.disk_number_start = (zuvl_t)makelong(offset + ef_buf); +- offset += sizeof(G.crec.disk_number_start); ++ offset += 4; + } ++#if 0 ++ break; /* Expect only one EF_PKSZ64 block. */ ++#endif /* 0 */ + } + +- /* Skip this extra field block */ ++ /* Skip this extra field block. */ + ef_buf += (eb_len + EB_HEADSIZE); + ef_len -= (eb_len + EB_HEADSIZE); + } +--- unzip60/fileio.c 2009-04-20 02:03:44.000000000 +0200 ++++ unzip60/fileio.c 2014-12-05 22:44:16.000000000 +0100 +@@ -176,6 +176,8 @@ static ZCONST char Far FilenameTooLongTr + #endif + static ZCONST char Far ExtraFieldTooLong[] = + "warning: extra field too long (%d). Ignoring...\n"; ++static ZCONST char Far ExtraFieldCorrupt[] = ++ "warning: extra field (type: 0x%04x) corrupt. Continuing...\n"; + + #ifdef WINDLL + static ZCONST char Far DiskFullQuery[] = +@@ -2295,7 +2297,12 @@ int do_string(__G__ length, option) /* + if (readbuf(__G__ (char *)G.extra_field, length) == 0) + return PK_EOF; + /* Looks like here is where extra fields are read */ +- getZip64Data(__G__ G.extra_field, length); ++ if (getZip64Data(__G__ G.extra_field, length) != PK_COOL) ++ { ++ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide, ++ LoadFarString( ExtraFieldCorrupt), EF_PKSZ64)); ++ error = PK_WARN; ++ } + #ifdef UNICODE_SUPPORT + G.unipath_filename = NULL; + if (G.UzO.U_flag < 2) { diff --git a/pkgs/tools/archivers/unzip/default.nix b/pkgs/tools/archivers/unzip/default.nix index 0466b817f1b6..a3e0cabb57b4 100644 --- a/pkgs/tools/archivers/unzip/default.nix +++ b/pkgs/tools/archivers/unzip/default.nix @@ -9,7 +9,11 @@ stdenv.mkDerivation { sha256 = "0dxx11knh3nk95p2gg2ak777dd11pr7jx5das2g49l262scrcv83"; }; - patches = stdenv.lib.optional enableNLS + patches = [ + ./CVE-2014-8139.diff + ./CVE-2014-8140.diff + ./CVE-2014-8141.diff + ] ++ stdenv.lib.optional enableNLS (fetchurl { url = "http://sources.gentoo.org/cgi-bin/viewvc.cgi/gentoo-x86/app-arch/unzip/files/unzip-6.0-natspec.patch?revision=1.1"; name = "unzip-6.0-natspec.patch";